Eurasia Press & News
In a surprise statement last week in Saudi Arabia on the first stop of a Middle East tour, US President Donald Trump said he would lift all sanctions on Syria, a decision which caught the world off guard, including members of his own administration.
The announcement, seen as the first step towards normalising ties, came after a 33-minute meeting with Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa, the first such encounter between the presidents of the two countries in 25 years. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan joined Trump and Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed Bin Salman virtually in the meeting.
“I will be ordering the cessation of sanctions against Syria in order to give them a chance at greatness,” Trump told an investment forum in Riyadh, which gave him a standing ovation.
“It’s their time to shine. We’re taking them all off,” Trump said. “Good luck Syria, show us something very special.”
Back in Damascus, the reaction was more restrained, with Al-Sharaa’s supporters celebrating while others were more circumspect.
Firas Haj Yheia, a Syrian professor of law and economics at the University of Limoges, France, told The New Arab that lifting US sanctions is a political boost for Syria considering regional transformations, the country’s internal political transition, and the Arab/Turkish rapprochement.
“However, the impact will be limited unless the Americans take broader legal steps like easing secondary sanctions, allowing money transfers and international transactions, and lifting sanctions imposed on the Syrian president and the interior minister,” said Yheia.
“From a political perspective, this is a recognition of the new political reality in Damascus, granting the transitional Syrian administration a wider margin for regional repositioning.”
Decades of debilitating sanctions
US sanctions on Syria date back to 1979 when Washington classified Syria as a “state sponsor of terrorism” due to its support for Palestinian factions and its intervention in Lebanon.
In May 2004, the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act came into effect during the term of then-President George W. Bush, imposing more sanctions. Then, in 2006, the Patriot Act imposed broader economic sanctions.
US sanctions continued to increase after March 2011, when ousted Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad violently suppressed popular protests against him, most significantly the Caesar Syrian Civilian Protection Act of 2019, followed by the Captagon Act of 2022 and 2024, which aimed to dismantle Assad-linked narcotics production and trafficking networks.
This complex web of sanctions raises concerns about whether Trump’s announcement can be implemented.
Former Syrian diplomat Bassam Barabandi, co-founder of People Demand Change and a former Non-Resident Fellow at the New Lines Institute, explains that the US President, by virtue of his legal authority, has broad powers to stop sanctions or waive them for a limited period of two or three years.
“But for the Caesar Act, the president cannot end it alone, but he can inform Congress that the circumstances that led to its issuance have ceased,” says Barabandi.
Yheia elaborates that Trump’s decision will remain partial and restricted until it goes through an institutional path that includes the US Treasury and Congress.
“The president alone cannot remove all sanctions but his declaration has an immediate legal, political, and psychological impact on the path towards lifting sanctions on Syria,” says Yheia, noting that it may take years of procedures before the country is completely free of US sanctions.
In March, Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani, while in Brussels to attend an annual EU conference on Syria, received a list of eight preconditions for lifting EU sanctions.
These include demands that Damascus issues an official declaration supporting the international coalition against the Islamic State (IS), and allows the implementation of American counter-terrorism operations on Syrian territory.
They also include prohibiting all Palestinian political groups and activities, and deporting members of Palestinian groups to alleviate Israeli concerns.
The accelerated announcement was made under political and regional pressure, especially from Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, and the UAE, says Yheia.
“This may be part of a broader deal that could include gradual normalisation, security cooperation, and perhaps concessions from Damascus on certain files as part of the new Middle East,” says Yheia.
“The American move appears to be more driven by geopolitical interests than by the fulfilment of human rights conditions stipulated by the Caesar Act or others,” adds Yheia, who says that in exchange for US support, Damascus will need to agree to a mix of undeclared security and political concessions.
“These include cooperation in counter-terrorism operations, guarantees that Syrian territory will not be used as a platform to threaten regional or international interests, and support in locating missing Americans like journalist Austin Tice,” Yheia continues.
This could potentially extend to engagement in a comprehensive regional initiative related to peace with Israel.
“Damascus implicitly or practically agreed to restructure some of its field alliances, reduce the influence of armed groups, and combat terrorism, as part of unofficial commitments to reduce American pressure,” he says.
Economically-speaking
Ziad Ayoub Arbache, a researcher and expert in macroeconomic policy, explains that successive sanctions paralysed the Syrian economy as manufacturers paid a high price to circumvent sanctions.
US sanctions prohibited any investors, regardless of their country, to deal with Syria, says Arbache, so lifting sanctions will reintegrate Syria into the global financial system allowing international companies, airlines, and global technology institutions to invest in Syria and establish regional and global partnerships.
“Establishing a Saudi-Syrian manufacturing company, for example, will be possible and Syria will be allowed to export its products to every country in the GAFTA (Greater Arab Free Trade Area), giving it access to a 400-million consumer market,” says Arbache, adding that Syria would also be able to export to Turkey and the European Union (EU) countries.
Syrian industrialist Atef Tayfour says lifting sanctions has two main benefits.
“In the short-term, banking channels will open, allowing transfers, credits, and export outlets, which will be reflected in lower supply costs and higher production rates,” says Tayfour.
“In the long-term infrastructure investments in power will help build industrial zones and cities which will reduce costs,” he says, noting that such investments must come hand in hand with new financial and monetary policies to ease the liquidity crunch.
The anticipated reconstruction projects, says Tayfour, will open up 99 professions and directly contribute to cutting unemployment, improve trade and end the recession.
“Creating a regulatory body for real estate development is essential to protect citizens,” says Tayfour, suggesting that the Syrian Central Bank and other banks restructure their executive mechanisms for commercial trade, external transfers, and credit and allowing conversion between currencies.
“Political paths are long and complex, so it is wise for us to plan as individuals, companies, and as a government to make the institutional changes necessary for when the sanctions are lifted,” says Tayfour.
Barabandi emphasises the need for transparency.
“Lifting sanctions means allowing investment companies to bring money into Syria mainly for reconstruction,” he says, “at a cost of $100 billion-$500 billion. Whoever puts in this kind of money will demand accountability, guarantees against corruption, appropriate laws, an impartial judiciary, and a lasting peace.”
