Eurasia Press & News
We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
A variety of Syrian armed groups, including those associated with the new transitional government, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic groups, have committed a series of extrajudicial killings since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns these extrajudicial killings.
A US journalist reported on May 29 that Iran and the United States are trying to reach a “political framework text” before the next International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors meeting on June 9 and 10.[1] CTP-ISW cannot verify this report, although Iran may calculate that reaching an interim deal with the United States before the meeting would delay or prevent snapback sanctions. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism, which expires in October 2025, allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[2] The IAEA releases a quarterly verification and monitoring report on Iran’s nuclear program.[3] The IAEA Board of Governors will discuss the IAEA’s next quarterly report at the June Board of Governors meeting. The IAEA previously passed a censure resolution proposed by the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) in November 2024 that requires the IAEA to produce a “comprehensive report” about Iranian nuclear activities in addition to the IAEA’s regular verification and monitoring reports.[4] IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated on May 28 that the IAEA will release the comprehensive report “soon.”[5] The IAEA’s next quarterly report and the comprehensive report will both almost certainly confirm Iranian noncompliance with the JCPOA, which will lay the foundation for the E3 to impose snapback sanctions. The E3 recently threatened to trigger snapback sanctions on Iran by August if Iran and the United States do not reach a “substantial deal” by then.[6] Iran may calculate that reaching an interim deal with the United States would delay or prevent snapback sanctions by demonstrating Iran’s willingness to resolve the nuclear issue.[7]
IAEA Deputy Director General and head of the IAEA Safeguards Department Massimo Aparo inspected two undeclared Iranian nuclear sites in Tehran Province on May 28 as part of the March 2023 IAEA-Iran Joint Statement.[8] The joint statement identified three locations in Iran that contain undeclared nuclear material and equipment: Turquzabad, Varamin, and Marivan.[9] The IAEA reported in May 2023 that Marivan is “no longer an outstanding issue,” which suggests that Aparo visited the Turquzabad and Varamin sites during his visit to Iran.[10] The most recent IAEA Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Safeguards Agreement report from February 2025 stated that there was no progress toward implementing the March 2023 Joint Statement between November 2024 to February 2025.[11]
The United States and Syria continued to strengthen ties on May 29. The United States Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack and Syrian Foreign Affairs Minister Asaad al Shaibani raised the US flag over the US Ambassador’s residence in Damascus on May 29.[12] The United States lowered the flag at the residence in 2012 following former Syrian President Bashar al Assad’s violence crackdown on protestors.[13] The United States has not yet reopened its embassy in Syria, which it also closed in 2012. Barrack stated that Syria will no longer be designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism during the flag raising ceremony.[14] US President Donald Trump must submit a report to Congress certifying that the Syrian government does not support acts of international terrorism before the United States can remove this designation.[15] The State Sponsor of Terrorism designation restricts US foreign assistance, bans defense exports and sales, enforces controls on certain dual-use items, and restricts other forms of financial assistance.[16] The US Treasury issued a Syria General License 25 on May 23, which lifted most sanctions on Syria.[17] Barrack also suggested potential negotiations between Israel and the Syrian transitional government to establish a “non-aggression” agreement and discuss border issues during the ceremony.[18]
Hezbollah appears to be cooperating with the Lebanese state to disarm itself in southern Lebanon while likely attempting to regenerate its forces north of the Litani River. Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam told the Wall Street Journal on May 28 that the Lebanese state has achieved about 80 percent of its objectives to disarm Hezbollah in southern Lebanon.[19] Unspecified senior Arab officials said that the United States has provided Israeli intelligence to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) about Hezbollah’s remaining stockpiles and positions in southern Lebanon.[20] An unspecified Israeli military official said that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is “pleased by” the LAF’s success in disarming Hezbollah.[21] Hezbollah has reportedly cooperated with the LAF to reassert state control over southern Lebanon since the November 2024 Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire, including by reportedly ordering its fighters who are not from southern Lebanon to vacate positions and allowing the LAF to take control of the area.[22] Unspecified senior Lebanese security officials confirmed on May 28 that Hezbollah has cooperated with the LAF to disarm it in southern Lebanon.[23] Hezbollah’s cooperation with the LAF in the south likely reflects its degraded state and its prioritization of “sheltering and rebuilding” its forces.[24] Hezbollah also likely seeks to focus its near-term efforts on recalibrating its domestic political strategy and resecuring its political future in Lebanon.
The Syrian transitional government’s frequent interdictions of weapons shipments heading to Lebanon from Syria suggests that Hezbollah is attempting to replenish its weapons stockpiles north of the Litani River even while cooperating with the LAF in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah efforts to rebuild weapons stockpiles are likely part of a larger effort to reconstitute its military forces. The Syrian General Security Service (GSS) frequently interdicts weapons moving from Syrian territory into northern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley, often along well-established smuggling corridors that Hezbollah formerly operated with Assad regime- and Iranian-backed smugglers. The GSS recently seized over 100 rockets and dozens of machine guns in a shipment transiting Homs Province on May 25.[25] Syrian media reported that the munitions were heading to Hezbollah.[26] Syrian authorities also seized similar shipments of rockets, launchers, and artillery shells in Homs Province on May 22 and 28 that were en route to Lebanon.[27] Many of these shipments were likely headed to Hezbollah-affiliated fighters in the Bekaa Valley, given that the weapons were interdicted in Homs Province, which borders the Bekaa Valley. These consistent smuggling busts indicate that Hezbollah is attempting to rebuild its stockpiles of rockets and other munitions through pre-established smuggling networks. The replenishment of equipment and munitions stockpiles is a key element of a force’s regeneration.[28] Hezbollah may calculate that cooperation with the LAF in the south will buy enough goodwill with the Lebanese and Israeli governments to ensure its long-term survival and allow it to focus on reconstitution north of the Litani River. Iran is likely supporting or attempting to support efforts to send weapons to Hezbollah, given Iran’s recent efforts to financially support Hezbollah’s military reconstitution.[29]
The Syrian transitional government has continued to dismantle Iranian-linked smuggling networks between Iraq and Syria, which may decrease weapons shipments to Lebanese Hezbollah. The Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and GSS forces targeted an Iranian-linked weapons and drug smuggling network along the Syria-Iraq border on May 20.[30] The GSS has seized several weapons caches used by smuggling cells in Albu Kamal, Deir ez Zor Province, since May 20.[31] Iranian-backed militias controlled the Albu Kamal border and used its infrastructure as a key node in the ground line of communication to between Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah during Bashar al Assad’s rule.[32] The Syrian transitional government asserted control over the border crossing shortly after the fall of the Assad regime and has begun to dismantle the Iranian-backed smuggling network that operated there.[33] The transitional government’s stronger control over the eastern Syrian border could reduce the amount of materiel that Iran and its allies can transport through Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon and thereby slow down Hezbollah’s reconstitution.
Key Takeaways:
US-Iran Nuclear Negotiations: A US journalist reported on May 29 that Iran and the United States are trying to reach a "political framework text" before the next International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors meeting on June 9 and 10. CTP-ISW cannot verify this report, although Iran may calculate that reaching an interim deal with the United States before the meeting would delay or prevent snapback sanctions.
US-Syria Ties: The United States and Syria continued to strengthen ties on May 29. The United States Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack and Syrian Foreign Affairs Minister Asaad al Shaibani raised the US flag over the US Ambassador’s residence in Damascus on May 29. Barrack stated that Syria will no longer be designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism during the flag raising ceremony. US President Donald Trump must submit a report to Congress certifying that the Syrian government does not support acts of international terrorism before the United States can remove this designation.
Hezbollah Reconstitution: Hezbollah appears to be cooperating with the Lebanese state to disarm itself in southern Lebanon while likely attempting to regenerate its forces north of the Litani River. Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam told the Wall Street Journal on May 28 that the Lebanese state has achieved about 80 percent of its objectives to disarm Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. An unspecified Israeli military official said that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is "pleased by” the LAF’s success in disarming Hezbollah. The Syrian transitional government’s frequent interdictions of weapons shipments heading to Lebanon from Syria suggests that Hezbollah is attempting to replenish its weapons stockpiles north of the Litani River even while cooperating with the LAF in southern Lebanon. The Syrian transitional government has continued to dismantle Iranian-linked smuggling networks between Iraq and Syria, which may decrease weapons shipments to Lebanese Hezbollah.
Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy
Senior Iranian military commanders are continuing to prepare for potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran. Iranian Artesh Commander Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi inspected the Shahid Akbari Airbase in Qom Province on May 29.[34] The airbase is located approximately 12 miles from the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) and 10 miles from the Hazrat-e Masoumeh Air Defense Group. Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard previously visited the Hazrat-e Masoumeh Air Defense Group on April 16 to assess the unit’s operational readiness.[35] The Artesh Air Defense Force conducted air defense exercises near the FFEP in January 2025.[36] Iranian leaders likely assess that an Israeli or US strike on Iran would target critical Iranian nuclear infrastructure, including the deeply-buried Fordow nuclear facility.
Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian discussed deepening Sino-Iranian economic and security cooperation with Chinese Communist Party Politburo member Chen Wenqing on the sidelines of the Moscow International Security Summit on May 29.[37] Ahmadian and Wenqing likely discussed Iran’s continued illicit oil exports to China via its “ghost fleet” and mechanisms for the two countries to evade US sanctions on Iran.[38] The officials also likely discussed the US-Iran nuclear negotiations. China has recently defended Iran’s civil nuclear program and called US sanctions on Iran “illegal.”[39]
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Spokesperson Brigadier General Ali Mohammad Naeini expressed concern about Iran’s response to perceived “cognitive warfare.”[40] Iranian officials use the term “cognitive warfare” to describe Iran’s enemies’ alleged efforts to conduct psychological operations and instill feelings of distrust and hopeless among the Iranian population in order to facilitate regime collapse. Naeini stated that Iran faces “serious challenges” confronting “cognitive warfare,” particularly “cognitive warfare” that is directed at Iranian youth. Naeini claimed that Iran’s enemies seek to undermine Iran’s national and cultural identity through narrative manipulation, media distortion, and perception warfare. Naeini urged structural reforms to strengthen the regime’s narrative control and cultural resilience. Naeini also called for intensifying “explanation jihad” efforts to counter cognitive threats. “Explanation jihad” is an Iranian regime theory that indoctrinating and ideologizing the population, especially Iranian youth, will increase public support for the regime and reduce anti-regime sentiment.[41] Iranian officials have historically sought to expand ideologization efforts to confront anti-regime sentiment rather than address the core issues and grievances that generate this sentiment.[42] Iran’s proposed 2025–2026 budget significantly increases funding for religious and ideological institutions, which highlights the regime’s efforts to expand ideologization efforts.[43] The IRGC Baghiyatollah al Azam Sociocultural Headquarters and Islamic Propaganda Organization are set to receive a 233 percent and 177 percent funding increase, respectively, in the current .[44]
The Iranian rial appreciated from 828,800 rials to one US dollar on May 28 to 823,000 rials to one US dollar on May 29.[45]
Syria
The Syrian transitional government signed a $7 billion agreement with international energy and construction companies on May 29 to rebuild Syrian energy infrastructure.[46] Syrian Foreign Affairs Minister Asaad al Shaibani signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) between the Syrian transitional government, Qatari-based UCC Holding, Turkish and Emirati-owned Kaylon GES Enerji Yatirimlari, Turkish-based Gengiz Enerji, Qatari-owned Power International, and Qatari-based Orbacon Holding to rebuild Syria’s power stations and electricity grid.[47] The CEO of UCC Holding claimed that the reconstruction projects are expected to create 300,000 Syrian jobs.[48] Foreign investment in Syria’s energy sector is critical to supporting economic growth. This agreement will not produce immediate economic relief for Syria, however. Economic growth in Syria also only addresses one of many factors that contribute to instability in Syria. The Syrian transitional government has not addressed deeply-rooted ethno-sectarian distrust between it and minority groups in Syria. This distrust discourages cooperation with the government and can lead to renewed conflicts across Syria
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Vershinin suggested on May 29 that Russia is continuing to negotiate with the Syrian transitional government about the status of Russian military bases in Syria.[49] Vershinin told Russian state media that “Russia continues its dialogue with Syria on a range of bilateral relations that take into account the interests of both sides,” likely in reference to Russian basing rights. [50] Russia and the Syrian transitional government have engaged in negotiations about the status of Russian bases in Syria since January 2025. Syrian and Western media have reported that Russian forces remain present at three military bases in Syria: Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia, the naval base at Tartous, and Russia’s former helicopter base in Qamishli, Hasakah Province.[51] Vershinin’s statement follows Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s invitation to Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani on May 27 to visit Moscow and an attack on Hmeimim Airbase by militants unaffiliated with the Syrian government on May 20.[52] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Russia appears to have begun an incentives-based economic relationship with Syria, possibly as part of its effort to secure basing rights.[53]
Iraq
Nothing significant to report.
Arabian Peninsula
Axis of Resistance objectives:
Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas
Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of Yemen
Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza StripNothing significant to report.
The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon
Nothing significant to report.
CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran’s nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas’ military organization and severed the group’s ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.
The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.
CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.
