Eurasia Press & News
Without a clear mandate, inclusivity, or enforcement mechanisms, transitional justice in Syria could become a political gesture instead of a transformative tool
In a move that could redefine Syria’s post-war trajectory, the country’s interim government has announced the creation of a Transitional Justice Commission (TJC).
The body, unveiled in early May under President Ahmed al-Sharaa, is being framed as a national mechanism to address decades of state repression, human rights abuses, and the scars left by civil conflict.
The announcement came roughly six months after the fall of Bashar Al-Assad’s regime amid a fragile effort to reconstruct not only the state but also shattered trust between Syrians and their institutions.
While some have welcomed the gesture as a long-overdue reckoning, others fear the Transitional Justice Commission may be little more than a political exercise – a carefully staged bid to win legitimacy abroad without meaningfully confronting the crimes of the past.
Whether it can deliver justice or merely simulate it remains an open question.
Mandate and credibility of the commission
On 17 May, interim president Al-Sharaa appointed Abdul Basit Abdul Latif Chairman of the Commission, giving him 30 days to form his team and begin work. He previously held several official roles within the Syrian National Coalition, a political body formed in 2012 to unify opposition against the Assad regime during the Syrian war.
Despite its substantial symbolic weight, the Transitional Justice Commission’s exact mandate remains opaque. According to the transitional government’s brief announcement, the TJC will “investigate past violations and support national reconciliation”. Still, no detailed framework has been published to clarify its scope, jurisdiction, or legal standing.
Key questions remain unanswered. Will the Commission limit its investigations to crimes committed under Bashar Al-Assad’s rule, or will it also confront violations by non-state actors, such as former Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) authorities and foreign-aligned militias?
Will it have the authority to summon witnesses, initiate prosecutions, or enforce accountability, or will it simply produce non-binding reports aimed at political appeasement?
“Many Syrians are eager to testify and support accountability efforts – but the institutional system to collect, manage, and act on their testimonies has yet to be built,” Syrian-Italian journalist and author Asmae Dachan, who has long documented survivors’ voices, told The New Arab.
In the absence of clear mechanisms and guarantees, the pursuit of justice risks being aspirational rather than actionable.
According to Wael Sawah, Secretary of the American Coalition for Syria and a board member of the Syria Program at the Middle East Institute, the Commission “signals a dual intent: to respond to calls for justice from victims and civil society, and to boost the transitional government’s international legitimacy”.
But he warns that “its real impact hinges on whether it becomes an independent institution or a symbolic gesture to satisfy foreign partners”.
As long as the TJC’s composition and authority remain vague, many observers worry that it may end up operating more as a political tool than a genuine instrument of justice.
Without international oversight or coordination – for example, with the UN’s International, Impartial, and Independent Mechanism (IIIM) – the risk is that the TJC will shield current powerholders while selectively condemning past crimes.
Reform or Rebranding?
In Syria’s fractured political landscape, transitional justice carries weight not just as a legal process but as a powerful symbol of legitimacy. The creation of the Commission has been widely interpreted as an effort by the transitional authorities to demonstrate a clean break from Assad-era authoritarianism while simultaneously reassuring international actors of their commitment to reform.
Yet critics point out that transitional justice can easily be instrumentalised, especially in contexts where power dynamics remain unsettled. A commission that prioritises lower-level perpetrators while protecting those with political or military clout risks replicating, rather than dismantling, a culture of impunity.
Sawah argues that “the initiative reflects not only a stated commitment to justice but also a calculated political move to reinforce the regime’s emerging legitimacy and signal a break with the past”.
In this reading, transitional justice becomes part of a broader strategy to rebrand a controversial leadership while pursuing strategic diplomatic gains, such as overtures to Israel and Western powers.
Historical parallels offer cautionary tales. Tunisia’s post-revolution Truth and Dignity Commission yielded limited prosecutions and became mired in political controversy.
Lebanon’s amnesty erased accountability in the name of national unity, leaving unresolved wounds to fester. Syria’s TJC may face the same dilemma: the tension between justice and stability, between naming perpetrators and maintaining fragile governance.
Victims, civil society, and the weight of memory
For Syrians who endured over a decade of war, surveillance, and systemic repression, justice cannot be abstract. It is intimately tied to memory, mourning, and recognition. The creation of the Transitional Justice Commission has raised cautious hopes among victims and survivors, but also deep scepticism about whether their voices will truly be heard.
Dachan stresses that “justice begins with truth, not just reconciliation”. She notes that while the symbolic opening of regime prisons was seen by many as a hopeful gesture, it also reawakened immense collective trauma.
“Syrians want to know who gave the orders, where the disappeared are buried, and why this was allowed to happen. Without that, transitional justice becomes performance.”
Sawah warns that “despite rhetorical nods to inclusivity, the transitional government’s conduct suggests a top-down, insular approach,” privileging control over collaboration.
He adds that “there are growing concerns that justice will not be blind, but rather one-eyed,” with the risk of selectively prosecuting Assad-era crimes while ignoring abuses committed by armed factions now close to the transitional government.
For the TJC to succeed, it must confront not just the legal architecture of abuse but the lived experiences of millions who carry its consequences.
Regional and international dimensions
Beyond Syria’s borders, regional and international stakeholders are closely watching the formation of the Transitional Justice Commission. For Western governments, particularly the United States and European Union, transitional justice is often cited as a key condition for normalisation and sanctions relief.
In this sense, the Commission may serve not only a domestic function but also a diplomatic one.
Yet there is no indication, so far, that the TJC will operate in tandem with international accountability frameworks like the IIIM, raising doubts about transparency and enforcement. Without such cooperation, efforts to document crimes or bring perpetrators to trial may fall short of international standards.
The geopolitical sensitivities are considerable. Russia and Iran, both deeply embedded in Syria’s war effort, are unlikely to welcome investigations into their own military actions or proxy abuses. Similarly, regional actors who backed non-state armed groups may resist any process that assigns them responsibility.
For the transitional government, the challenge lies in balancing internal reconciliation with external legitimacy, without allowing either to eclipse real justice. If the Commission is seen as selectively blind to certain actors, it may undermine the very credibility it seeks to project.
A bumpy road ahead
The road ahead for Syria’s Transitional Justice Commission is anything but straightforward. Without clear jurisdiction, inclusive participation, or enforcement mechanisms, the Commission risks becoming a temporary political gesture rather than a transformative institution.
Much will depend on whether the TJC evolves beyond its current mandate – whether it can initiate independent investigations, collaborate with international legal bodies, and include the perspectives of marginalised communities and exiled Syrians.
Equally vital is whether it can confront the full spectrum of abuses, including those committed by actors still embedded in the transitional state’s power structure.
Sawah puts it bluntly: “Justice cannot be selective, nor can it serve short-term political interests.” His warning reflects a broader fear that the Commission will entrench impunity rather than dismantle it.
For now, the TJC stands as a fragile step toward accountability – neither entirely hollow nor definitively hopeful. As journalist Dachan put it, “Truth must come before reconciliation.”
Whether Syria’s new leadership is prepared to face that truth, or merely manage it, may determine not only the legacy of this Commission but also the credibility of the entire post-Assad transition.
