Eurasia Press & News
Since 12 April, there have been five rounds of American-Iranian nuclear talks, held in Muscat and Rome under Omani auspices. These negotiations have yet to lead to a breakthrough.
Yet, as fragile as they are, the talks appear to have some momentum. This offers a measure of cautious optimism that Washington and Tehran might bridge their differences and agree to a renewed nuclear deal seven years after the US unilaterally withdrew from the landmark 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
Today, the outlook for a potential ‘JCPOA 2.0’ appears relatively promising, as both President Donald J. Trump and Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei have indicated a willingness to resolve the US-Iran nuclear impasse through mutual concessions.
The negotiation process remains delicate and precarious, demanding careful and calibrated management. It is important to acknowledge the influence of anti-diplomacy figures in both Washington and Tehran – voices that categorically reject engagement, portraying the other side as irredeemably “evil” and fundamentally untrustworthy.
Yet, to their credit, both Trump and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei have thus far succeeded in preventing these hardline elements from derailing the successive rounds of talks that commenced in Muscat on 12 April.
Paradoxically, the return of Trump, the very president who recklessly sabotaged the JCPOA in May 2018, to the Oval Office may actually brighten the prospects for a ‘JCPOA 2.0.’
This dynamic is rooted in the contours of the US political landscape, particularly within the Republican Party. Historically, Republican lawmakers and commentators have worked to obstruct US-Iran diplomacy. However, their relative silence in response to Trump’s renewed engagement with Tehran reflects a broader reluctance among those on the right to challenge him.
In contrast, had Kamala Harris occupied the White House, it is likely that her dispatching envoys to Muscat and Rome for talks with Iranian officials would have faced far sharper political resistance from Republicans who would have almost certainly accused the former Vice President of being “weak” in the face of the “terrorist regime” in Tehran.
Gulf support for diplomacy
Another encouraging factor lies in the foreign policies of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states – some of which have evolved their foreign policies vis-à-vis Iran in recent years. During Barack Obama’s presidency, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain were, at best, lukewarm toward the JCPOA, seeing Washington as failing to consider the security ramifications of the deal from the perspective of Gulf monarchies.
Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Manama welcomed the Trump administration’s decision to withdraw from the accord and actively lobbied Washington to adopt a “maximum pressure” strategy against Tehran.
Today, however, the Gulf’s geopolitical order has shifted markedly. The GCC’s most anti-Iranian members are now in a state of détente with the Islamic Republic, favouring de-escalation and diplomacy over confrontation. The imperative for regional stability is tied closely to their economic diversification and development goals, which are fundamentally incompatible with the risks posed by a conflict involving Iran.
Gulf Arab policymakers view a war between the US-Israel alliance and Iran as a worst-case scenario under which the GCC members, by virtue of geography, would find themselves on the frontlines. Although certain elements of a renewed nuclear deal may still raise concerns in Gulf Arab capitals, there is a consensus among GCC leaders that Washington and Tehran resolving their nuclear-related tensions through diplomacy is the best way forward at this point.
During his May 2025 tour of the Gulf, President Trump made official visits to Riyadh, Doha, and Abu Dhabi, where Gulf Arab leaders engaged with the American delegation on the Iranian nuclear issue.
In his meetings, the 45th and 47th US president conveyed a message of prioritising commercial opportunities over military confrontation, signalling a clear departure from the neo-conservative agenda that is in lock-step alignment with Israeli calls for military action against Iran.
Leaders in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE appear to hold considerable influence – and a degree of leverage – over Trump, who approaches relations with the Gulf monarchies, and, for that matter, essentially all countries worldwide, in distinctly transactional terms.
The GCC states’ influence over Trump has been evident in shifts such as his revised stance on Syria sanctions, and probably grew significantly as a result of the multi-billion-dollar deals secured during his recent regional tour.
A key obstacle in the ongoing negotiations is the ambiguity surrounding US positions. Observers of the American side’s stances have noted a pattern of inconsistency. Although Trump has drawn a firm red line at the development of nuclear weapons, his Middle East envoy, Steve Witkoff, has articulated a more rigid “zero-enrichment” position, highlighting a lack of internal consensus within the Trump team on this critical issue.
Further complicating matters is the uncertainty over the scope of the administration’s objectives – whether it seeks a narrowly defined nuclear agreement or a broader accord encompassing non-nuclear concerns, including Iran’s support for armed groups as well as its drone and ballistic missile programs.
On the Iranian side, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has made it clear that any demand for “zero-enrichment” is a non-starter.
A diplomatic framework rooted in pragmatic constraints offers the most viable path forward. Conversely, insisting on a “zero-enrichment” stance risks shutting down meaningful dialogue and severely diminishing the prospects for a renewed agreement.
“If the Trump administration really wants a deal that prevents Iran from having nuclear weapons, they should pursue a deal that strictly limits Iran’s program and requires international inspections while allowing limited enrichment, which is in accordance with the [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)],” commented Dr Assal Rad, a non-resident fellow at DAWN, in a TNA interview.
“If the Trump administration pursues the diplomatic path of limiting Iran’s program, there is hope for reaching a deal, but the path of zero enrichment leaves no room for optimism. The fact that five rounds of talks have already taken place, which both sides have called constructive, would imply that there is space for negotiations,” she added.
In a TNA interview, Dr Sina Azodi, an adjunct professor at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs, expressed a similar view.
“[The] Iranian nuclear program cannot be bombed or wished away. It is a fact on the ground and the only way to keep Iran from [developing] nuclear weapons, as Trump has said, is through a peaceful diplomatic manner,” he noted.
Ultimately, in the ongoing US-Iran nuclear talks unfolding in Muscat and Rome, what matters most is not the public rhetoric – such as proclamations of a “zero-enrichment” policy by American officials – but the substance of what is being discussed behind closed doors.
Whatever Washington is asking of Tehran, it has not been enough to drive the Iranians away from the negotiating table. This alone signals a degree of flexibility in the US position and suggests that the Trump administration is not, in practice, demanding a complete prohibition on uranium enrichment as a prerequisite for a new accord.
Given the current context, it is reasonable to view the ongoing nuclear negotiations as moving in a promising direction. Both Washington and Tehran have compelling incentives to reach a new agreement, and the momentum appears to favour sustained diplomatic engagement.
Yet, the true measure of progress will hinge on the substance of US demands – what the Trump administration is actually placing on the table behind closed doors.
“I am cautiously optimistic, as both sides appear determined to come up with viable solutions. The discussions appear to move very slowly, but the weekly meetings appear very helpful in moving things forward,” said Dr Mehran Kamrava, a professor of government at Georgetown University in Qatar, in a TNA interview.
“The negotiations remain extremely delicate and fragile. Nonetheless, the latest, fifth round of talks appears extremely hopeful, despite the guarded way in which Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, described them,” he added.
Israeli opposition to diplomacy with Iran
The Trump administration’s decision to reengage in nuclear talks with Iran has rattled Israel, which is the sole regional actor openly opposing American-Iranian negotiations in their current context.
Tel Aviv’s repeated warnings of potential military strikes on Iranian nuclear sites underscore Israel’s longstanding anxiety over Iran’s nuclear ambitions and non-nuclear dimensions of Tehran’s foreign policy.
“It is no secret that Israel, especially under the leadership of [Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu, wants to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Netanyahu’s far-right coalition is currently occupying parts of Syria and Lebanon, as well as Palestinian territories, while committing genocide in Gaza. There appear to be no rules or limitations on Israel’s behaviour, so reports of a possible attack should be taken seriously,” Dr Rad told TNA.
“If the Trump administration wishes to avoid another potentially major conflict in the region that could drag the US in and hinder the economic projects of regional partners, then they should use their immense leverage to stop Israel from further escalation,” she added.
While the Israeli leadership may have its own strategic motivations for contemplating a strike on Iran, there are strong reasons to believe such an action is unlikely in the immediate future. Chief among them is the fragile but enduring dynamic of mutual deterrence that defines the Israeli-Iranian relationship – a tense equilibrium in which both sides understand the immense cost of open conflict.
Despite the charged rhetoric and swirling media speculation, Israeli military planners are almost certainly aware that Iran retains substantial retaliatory capabilities and could inflict serious damage, even in the aftermath of a sustained Israeli offensive.
“As much as Israel would like to attack Iran, I do not believe it would. Given Iran’s demonstrated willingness to attack Israel, the current standoff between the two sides, due to a balance of terror between them, is likely to continue for now,” explained Dr Kamrava.
For example, the Houthis remain a formidable force capable of continuing their bold attacks on Israel in response to its ongoing military campaign in Gaza and operations targeting Ansar Allah in Sanaa and across Yemen.
Although they cannot match Israel’s military strength, even limited strikes, such as a monthly attack on Tel Aviv’s Ben Gurion Airport, could deal a serious blow to Israel’s commercial and tourism sectors.
Beyond Yemen, other members of the so-called “Axis of Resistance” retain the ability to adapt, regroup, and continue exerting influence. It would therefore be misguided to interpret the setbacks faced by this Iran-aligned coalition in 2024 as establishing a permanent equilibrium in the region’s security landscape.
Moreover, Iran views the losses suffered during the 2023-24 Israel-Hezbollah conflict and the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria in late 2024 as temporary setbacks, reflecting a historical pattern of cyclical strength and vulnerability in the region.
Reports of impending Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear sites may serve multiple strategic purposes. They could be designed to exert psychological or diplomatic pressure on Tehran ahead of potential negotiations or reflect Netanyahu’s long-standing aim to expand the Gaza conflict’s scope.
This approach may also be motivated by a desire to divert international attention from the genocide and devastating humanitarian crises in Gaza, which have increasingly isolated Israel on the global stage.
Whatever the true intent, the current dynamics suggest that, for the time being, strategic restraint is more likely to prevail over outright confrontation.
