Eurasia Press & News
Hezbollah’s strategic restraint amid escalating Iran-Israel hostilities marks a significant shift in the region’s balance of deterrence.
Once seen as Tehran’s most loyal and responsive proxy, its decision to hold back, even after the assassination of its leader and heavy blows to its infrastructure over the past 18 months, signals a recalibration driven more by political survival than ideology.
After years of threats and proxy skirmishes, the long-simmering conflict between Iran and Israel has finally boiled over.
In the early hours of Friday, Israel carried out what it described as a “pre-emptive strike,” targeting Tehran’s nuclear facilities and senior officials linked to the program.
Iran, which has long relied on its regional allies and proxies to strike back at Israeli offences, now finds itself the target of a series of unprecedented attacks deep inside its territory.
As missile exchanges between Israel and Iran hint at a widening conflict, attention has shifted to Tehran’s allies, foremost among them Hezbollah, long known for its steadfast loyalty to Iran.
Yet with the Lebanese state now in control of the southern front, a Hezbollah official told Reuters this week that the group would not launch any unilateral attacks on Israel in response.
Calculated restraint
Retired Brigadier General Yaareb Sakher told The New Arab that Hezbollah’s restraint reflects strategic pragmatism.
“Had Hezbollah intervened, it would have dragged Lebanon into another war,” he said, noting Israeli warnings that no target in Lebanon would be off-limits in such a scenario.
He added that Hezbollah’s current stance is driven by a desire to protect its political capital, gained through ministerial appointments and deep administrative control.
“If Hezbollah enters another war with Israel now, public and political support in Lebanon will collapse,” he said. “The state would move to disarm Hezbollah before addressing weapons held by Palestinian factions.”
The so-called ‘Axis of Resistance’ – anchored by Iran and its regional allies – has suffered a series of heavy setbacks in the latest escalation, which lasted for more than a year in the aftermath of the Hamas-led attack on Israel on 7 October. Chief among them is Hezbollah, Tehran’s most powerful proxy.
In the lead-up to the ceasefire agreed upon last January, Israel assassinated Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah along with other senior officials, followed by deadly strikes on the al-Bijar military base and the widespread destruction of Hezbollah’s military infrastructure in southern Lebanon.
The ceasefire effectively sidelined Hezbollah. Under the agreement, the group relinquished its military positions and weapon stockpiles south of the Litani River to the Lebanese Army. According to UNIFIL, approximately 500 weapons depots were handed over.
The ceasefire’s heavy price
Political analyst and writer Mohammad Hamiyeh said the group’s posture has shifted notably since the last ceasefire with Israel.
“We are witnessing a new phase,” he told The New Arab. “The Lebanese state has reasserted its role, and Hezbollah is now operating under its umbrella.”
He pointed to the group’s role in facilitating the ceasefire and complying with UN Security Council Resolution 1701, under which it reportedly surrendered 90 percent of its weapons south of the Litani River, according to both the Lebanese Army and UNIFIL.
Hamiyeh added that Hezbollah is reassessing its regional role amid wider geopolitical changes, with the most significant being the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, once a key logistical and strategic ally.
“There is a comprehensive recalibration underway within Hezbollah,” he said, referring to the group’s evolving approach in Lebanon and the broader region.
Haim added that Hezbollah’s internal conditions are not conducive to renewed confrontation. The current dynamics, he noted, are markedly different from those of 7 October.
While the group has not formally agreed to full disarmament, it increasingly positions itself as a national defence partner operating within the framework of the Lebanese state and remains cautious about becoming directly involved in broader regional conflicts.
Even during the collapse of the Syrian regime, despite its strategic presence there, the group refrained from deeper military engagement.
He noted that a recent statement by Deputy Secretary-General Naim Qassem confirmed Hezbollah’s containment strategy.
“They’ve chosen not to respond even to repeated Israeli violations during the ceasefire, including strikes on the southern suburbs and high-profile assassinations,” Hamiyeh said. “If they held back then, they certainly won’t act now in response to attacks on Iran.”
Hamiyeh questioned whether Lebanon could ultimately be drawn into the conflict if the situation in the region deteriorates into a full-scale regional war. He warned of Israel’s possible intention to exploit the current volatility to expand its aggression against Lebanon, using any incident or pretext as justification to escalate its attacks.
For his part, political writer and researcher Alain Sarkis argued that the Israeli strikes on Iran began with targeting its regional proxies, from Hamas and Hezbollah to the Houthis, before culminating in direct attacks on the heart of Tehran.
“The strikes against Iran are similar to the initial blows suffered by Hezbollah at the start of the war, including the bombings at the al-Bijar base and the reported assassination of Nasrallah,” he told The New Arab, cautioning that if Hezbollah were to eventually enter the conflict, despite official statement’s distancing itself from the war, it would drag Lebanon into a devastating confrontation it is “ill-prepared” to handle.
With the region entering what he described as a “major war phase,” Sarkis stressed that the Lebanese state must adopt a firm and unequivocal stance toward any unilateral action by Hezbollah.
He also revealed that messages have been relayed to Beirut from European capitals and Washington, warning that Hezbollah’s involvement in this war would “trigger a massive ground and air campaign,” potentially leading to an Israeli incursion into Beirut and even the occupation of the Bekaa Valley.
Empty slogans
Meanwhile, political analyst Georges Akouri said the Israeli strikes on Iran were a foreseeable outcome of the escalating tensions and failed negotiations between Washington and Tehran.
He asserted that after neutralising Iran’s regional network, chiefly Hezbollah, a direct strike on Iran itself was inevitable, particularly as Tehran continued to pursue its nuclear ambitions.
Akouri noted that Hezbollah has not responded from Lebanese territory, not because of “political calculations, but due to sheer incapacity”.
“Hezbollah’s role as a regional military actor has effectively ended. The field reality has exposed the emptiness of its long-standing rhetoric, that an attack on the southern suburbs of Beirut would trigger a retaliatory strike on Tel Aviv,” he told The New Arab. “Instead, these were mere slogans meant to bolster morale.”
He recalled Nasrallah’s once-defiant statement that moving the Litani River to the Israeli border would be preferable to disarming Hezbollah south of the river, yet now, the group has voluntarily handed over its weapons there.
“If any rockets are launched from Lebanese territory, Hezbollah would immediately disavow responsibility, asserting they were fired by an unaffiliated cell,” he said. “Iran, after all the devastating strikes against Hezbollah, has offered little beyond verbal support.”
Moreover, Hezbollah itself has been defanged. Akouri cited the recent airstrikes on Beirut’s southern suburbs, noting that the group’s only response was limited to statements from its MPs, particularly Hassan Fadlallah, who urged the state to respond through diplomatic channels to halt Israeli aggression.
This, Akouri argued, marks a significant shift from military confrontation to diplomatic restraint.
“Beneath the fiery rhetoric, frustration is growing among Hezbollah’s base,” he said. “Many supporters are beginning to realise that the slogans they believed in are more fragile than a spider’s web.”
