Eurasia Press & News
On 15 June, Houthi spokesperson Yahya Saree claimed that the Yemeni group had struck Israel with “hypersonic ballistic missiles” in coordination with the Iranian military.
Saree boasted that the Houthi operations against “sensitive Israeli targets” in Jaffa had “successfully achieved their objectives”.
While Saree’s bombastic claims about the efficacy of Houthi missiles require independent verification, Israel views Yemen as a critical theatre in its burgeoning conflict with Iran.
On 10 June, the Israeli Navy’s Sa’ar 6-class corvettes carried out long-range missile strikes against the Red Sea port of Hodeidah. Before the missile strikes on Jaffa, Israel reportedly tried to assassinate Houthi Chief of Staff Mohammed Abdul Karim al-Ghamari.
Israel’s intensified bombardments of Yemeni targets are likely to trigger more expansive Houthi involvement in Iran’s retaliatory efforts.
While the degradation of Iranian missile capabilities could deal a blow to supply chains to the Houthis, concerns persist about a potential regionalisation of the Israel-Iran war.
How the Houthis have responded to the Israel-Iran conflict
As Israel began its offensive operations, the Houthis released public statements of solidarity with Iran. The Yemeni group’s leader Mohammed al-Houthi condemned the “barbarism and terrorism” of the “Zionist enemy” and deplored the attacks on Iran as illegitimate.
In stark contrast to its past castigations of Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s ties to aggressive Western forces, Houthi media outlet Al-Masirah praised the Arab world’s solidarity against Israel’s attacks.
As the Houthis have lived up to their rhetoric with missile strikes on Israeli territory, they are distinguishing themselves from other Iran-aligned proxy groups. Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam urged Hezbollah to stay on the sidelines as Lebanon seeks to recover from $11 billion in war-induced economic destruction.
While Iraqi Popular Mobilisation Front (PMF) militias staged pro-Iran rallies and attacked US forces at Iraq’s Ain al-Assad Airbase, they have refrained from escalating against Israel.
Although the Houthis have a golden opportunity to cement their status as the vanguard of the Axis of Resistance, Iran’s current military vulnerabilities could restrain the scope of their retaliation. The Houthis need to thread a delicate needle between maintaining their alliance with Iran and avoiding overextension that threatens their grip on power in northern Yemen.
Abdolrasool Divsallar, a senior researcher at the UN Institute for Disarmament Research, told The New Arab that the Houthis are fundamentally pragmatic actors who want to hedge against Iran’s diminishing capabilities and are unlikely to escalate massively against Israel.
If the Houthis do exercise restraint, Divsallar contends that this underscores the fact that they have a modicum of independence and do not take orders from Tehran.
Ibrahim Jalal, an expert on the Yemen conflict and Gulf security, also noted that retaliatory strikes have been limited due to a “high-risk calculus and past US pressure”. Jalal told The New Arab that this restraint will likely persist unless “any Western power were to directly engage in the conflict” or Iran “disrupts Gulf oil and gas infrastructure”.
Israeli strikes on Iran and Houthi supply chains
Since Israel escalated its military intervention against Iran last week, it has inflicted significant damage on Iranian missile storage facilities. Maxar satellite imagery reveals that Israel destroyed multiple buildings at a key IRGC missile base in Kermanshah in western Iran.
While many of Iran’s most prized missile deposits are located below ground, Kermanshah has served as a storage hub for missiles that Tehran transfers to its aligned proxy militias.
Iran’s rate of missile expenditure further limits its ability to resupply the Houthis. While it is believed to have had 3,000 ballistic missiles before the latest escalations, that figure has already dwindled to 2,000 due to repeated launches and Israeli attacks.
This suggests that the Houthis will have to rely on their extant supply chains to carry out attacks on Israel, and there is a degree of uncertainty about where their future missile shipments will come from.
The practical impact of Iran’s missile supply constraints on Houthi military activities is unclear. The Houthis have a sizeable military arsenal and can withstand short-term supply shocks to Iran’s military-industrial complex.
They also have a diversified network of partners beyond Iran, as they maintain security links with Shia militia groups in Iraq and Al-Shabab in Somalia, as well as entrenched diplomatic relationships with Russia and China.
“Houthi capabilities remain intact, with localised production and diversified smuggling routes from China to the African Horn,” Ibrahim Jalal told The New Arab.
Dina Esfandiary, the Middle East lead for Bloomberg Economics, concurs with this assessment. She told The New Arab that “there are plenty of weapons already in Yemen for the Houthis to draw upon” and emphasised the strategic value of opening a second front against Israel.
While sustaining a multi-pronged offensive against Israel has strategic advantages, Iran might also have reasons to scale back its support for the Houthis.
As Iran’s military capabilities dissipate, it will face renewed pressure to return to the bargaining table with the US and resume negotiations on its nuclear program.
The precedent of the Houthis suing for peace with the US in May 2025 suggests that Iran can use its partnership with the Yemeni group as a diplomatic lever.
Ali Alfoneh, a Senior Fellow at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington DC, told The New Arab that the Iranian regime is “fighting for its survival and has other priorities than supplying Yemeni Ansar Allah”.
Due to its increasingly desperate position, Alfoneh contends that “should Iran and the US engage in negotiations, Iran will not sacrifice the Houthis as a bargaining chip”.
The Yemen war and Gulf security
If Iran’s military support for the Houthis is disrupted by Israel’s offensive actions, Yemen’s ongoing civil war could witness noteworthy shifts in its dynamics. In October 2024, the Houthis deployed hundreds of troops and missiles to Taiz province in southwestern Yemen.
In December 2024, the Houthis launched an attack on Yemeni government positions in Taiz. This offensive action triggered the most intense communal violence in Taiz since 2022 and prompted fears of a much more significant escalation.
The US’s military intervention against the Houthis degraded the Yemeni group’s military positions in Taiz and temporarily thwarted a major escalation. After the Houthis sued for peace with the US, they began reconstituting their military capabilities in Taiz.
The Houthis allegedly constructed tunnel infrastructure to streamline arms and personnel transfers to Taiz and built new training facilities to prepare for new offensives.
The Israel-Iran conflict has likely forced the Houthis to postpone their offensive ambitions in Taiz, and its rivals have already capitalised on this development.
On 17 June, the Yemeni government announced the capture of Houthi cells in Taiz and Aden, which were allegedly involved in illegal espionage against rival southern Yemeni forces.
Yemeni President Rashad al-Alimi’s recent meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin also has significance in this context as it indicates that the Yemeni government is trying to drive a wedge in the tightening Russia-Houthi relationship.
While Saudi Arabia’s opposition to Israeli strikes against Iran has deterred the Houthis from striking the Kingdom, apprehension persists in Riyadh about the possibility of an escalation.
Aziz Alghasian, a Saudi international security expert and non-resident fellow at the Gulf International Forum, told The New Arab that the mood in Saudi Arabia is one of “incredible apprehension” and dismissed notions that Riyadh is secretly cheering on these strikes.
Since Israel began its offensive operations against Iran’s nuclear sites on 13 June, the Houthis have not paired their strident rhetoric with large-scale military action.
This mismatch is likely to persist as Iran’s capacity to assist the Yemeni group wanes and the Houthis wish to avoid potentially devastating military overextension.
