The splitting of Iran. War with Israel shakes power

On the night of June 18, the Supreme leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei, announced the “beginning of the battle” with Israel’s “terrorist Zionist regime,” and the General Staff of the Iranian army announced a transition from “containing” strikes to “punishing.” This was a reaction to the ongoing Israeli operation since June 13, which is officially directed against the Iranian nuclear program, but in fact has already led to the elimination of key figures of the military command and the destruction of air defense. Israel is striving to achieve the collapse of Iranian statehood, but the question remains whether it will be able to conduct a military campaign alone for a long time. At the same time, the pillar of the Ayatoll regime, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, is weakened and discredited, Israeli agents have been widely introduced into Iranian state and military structures, and Khamenei himself, apparently, does not receive adequate information about what is happening. Nevertheless, the regime may try to restore support through nationalist rhetoric and reforms, as it was in 2024 with the support of reformist Massoud Pezeshixian. The fate of the Islamic Republic depends on whether Tehran is adapting to the new stage of the war, says Antonio Giustozzi of the Royal United Institute for Defense Studies (RUSI).

The official target of the Israeli strike on Iran on the night of June 13 was the destruction of its nuclear program, but no less significant result was the elimination of the top of the Iranian military command. The commander-in-chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Hossein Salami, chief of staff, Mohammed Bageri, and several other high-ranking military, were killed. Serious damage was inflicted on Iranian air defense systems – perhaps they are completely disabled. In practice, this, however, does not change much: they have not previously coped with Israeli strikes on Syria and the territory of Iran itself.

The demonstrative neutralization of Iranian air defense batteries by Israeli special services was more psychological than dictated by military necessity. The same special services played a key role in the elimination of representatives of the Iranian military elite. The already outdated Iranian air force was virtually completely destroyed, and it was not expected that they would be able to seriously counter Israeli attacks.

At the same time, Israel was unable to achieve the stated goal of destroying the Iranian nuclear program. This in itself is not surprising, since the key objects for uranium enrichment in Fordow are out of reach of Israeli weapons. The question arises: What is Israel’s real strategy? Despite the IDF statements about the serious damage to the Iranian strategic arsenal, on June 14-15, Iran still managed to conduct several series of rocket attacks on Israeli cities.

Perhaps Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu hoped to convince US President Donald Trump to join the war after Iran’s expected retaliatory strikes on Israel. If so, he was wrong – Trump refused, although he continues to hesitate.

It has also also become clear that Netanyahu hopes to address the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear program by completely destroying its statehood. On 15 June, he hinted that one of the options for ending the current conflict could be a “regime change” in the Islamic Republic, and since then it has repeated this several times. At the moment, only such a scenario is most likely to bring Netanyahu’s victory.

Why Iran Missed the June 13 Attack

The Islamic Republic was at an extremely disadvantageous position: Israel again managed to apply the beheading strategy used against Hezbollah in 2024. This is impressive in itself, and against this background, the statements of the Iranian leadership look unconvincing, that Trump misled them, assuring that there will be no strikes while the negotiations are underway.

Israel again managed to apply the beheading strategy used against Hezbollah last year

According to sources close to the regime, on the eve of the attack among Iranian officials there was concern – some “friendly state”, probably Russia, warned of an imminent Israeli strike. Perhaps the Netanyahu government has given this information to Moscow in advance in order to maintain good relations with it. Why did Iran not take any precautions? Given the previous Israeli strikes against Iran and Hezbollah, it is hard to believe that Tehran seriously expected a limited attack exclusively on nuclear infrastructure.

Perhaps the country’s top leadership — probably Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei — has decided to ignore the warnings. However, there were other signs of preparation of the attack: the evacuation of employees of U.S. embassies in the region, Trump’s warnings and the IAEA’s June 11 statement that Iran has denied access to its nuclear facilities and continues to enrich uranium up to 60%.

All these signals were to prompt Tehran to take precautions. However, nothing was done, and as a result, a number of high-ranking military and nuclear scientists were killed by Israeli forces – some in their own bedrooms.

The fact that Khamenei may not fully be aware of the real situation is not surprising. After spending 36 years at the top of power, since September 28, 2024, he actually lives in a bunker isolated from the outside world. Information, including on the state of the armed forces, he receives mainly from his advisers, and most of the most trusted of them are officers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Most likely, they did not dare to frankly inform the Supreme Leader about the shortcomings of the air defense system and presented the country’s readiness in an overly optimistic light. After all, if he were told a more realistic assessment, the ever-increasing IRGC funding could be questionable.
Weaknesses of Iran

Israel, of course, managed to achieve amazing success in the introduction of its special services on the territory of Iran, although the Iranian authorities knew about the presence of Israeli agents in the country at least since 2007. The activity of Israeli operatives inside Iran increased markedly in 2024, particularly with the murder of Ismail Haniyeh from Hamas. Obviously, Israel has a wide network of agents in Iran, and it is quite possible that it recruits individual representatives of the Iranian army.

After previous Israeli attacks, Iran had mass arrests of alleged spies and collaborators — mainly among the military. The Iranian army is competing with the IRGC for resources and has suffered in recent years due to the redistribution of funding in favor of the latter.

After previous Israeli attacks in Iran were mass arrests of alleged spies and collaborators

Its political loyalty is also in doubt: during the mass anti-government protests of 2022-2023, numerous cases of desertion were recorded in its ranks, and the recruitment of recruits, according to army sources, actually stopped. The position of the army has been seriously shaken, and now it is in the second roles regarding the IRGC.

Israeli positions reinforce not only the successful strikes on Hezbollah in 2024, but also signs of decomposition of the Iranian regime — this is indicated by the increasing penetration of Israeli agents into its structures. Disappointment in the mode is observed even in the ranks of the IRGC.

It can be assumed that Israel also sought to establish contact with Iranian opposition groups – probably initially with the aim of recruiting whistleblowers. If Netanyahu really counts on the collapse of the Islamic Republic, then cooperation with the internal opposition should be an integral part of such a plan.

The peaceful opposition in Iran is fragmented into many small groups and does not have a single leader, making it mobilized extremely difficult. Sources close to the regime report the activation of groups of monarchists who are trying to arrange demonstrations, but without much success.

Iran’s internal security apparatus still remains fully operational, but neither the strength of Iranian nationalism nor the scale of the support that still remains with the regime. Eyewitnesses report that opposition supporters tried to call for protests from the windows of their homes, but they were quickly besieged and surrendered to the police by neighbors loyal to the regime.

The Iranian borders have armed opposition groups – in particular, Kurdish in the western regions and Baluchi in the east. Sources in the main Beluche group Jaish ul-Adl have been reporting funding from Israel for several months and that they were instructed to prepare for a major offensive after the start of an Israeli or American attack on the regime.

Pakistan’s black market arms dealers confirm that Jaish’s al-Adl purchases increased dramatically in early 2025. Among the Belju Minority, the reaction as a whole turned out to be mixed: the religious leader Mavlawi Abdulhamid, known for his criticism of the regime, after the June 13 attack, supported him.

After Iran responded to the attack by shelling of Israeli territory with ballistic missiles, Israel began to attack economic infrastructure, primarily the oil industry. If the Israelis manage to cause serious damage to the economic and transport infrastructure of the enemy, they can count on undermining the regime’s ability to effectively respond to both the rebel offensives and possible mass protests.

Nevertheless, the positions of the Iranian regime seem to have bolstered somewhat when it managed to strike at Israeli territory and thereby demonstrate that it is not as helpless as it seemed at first. It is unclear what Iran’s real stockpiles of ballistic missiles are. Officially, Tehran announced two thousand units, but after the first massive waves of retaliatory strikes reduced the number of missiles launched. However, this may be dictated by the desire to preserve the ammunition for the next weeks of the war.

It is also unclear how long Israel will be able to maintain the current pace of strikes. The surprise effect has already been lost, and it is becoming much more difficult to attack the Iranian armed forces than at the beginning of the campaign. It can also be assumed that Tehran has already developed plans in case of a large-scale air operation against the country. To seriously undermine Iran’s ability to suppress any active internal resistance, a long and large-scale campaign will be required – and it is not yet clear whether Israel will be able to conduct it alone.

Threats to Israel

The risk that Iran will bring nuclear weapons to the end remains: as Netanyahu claims, Tehran was already working in this direction and at the time of the beginning of the Israeli attack was two months from the creation of a warhead. If the air campaign against Iran drags on, Israel is likely to be able to exhaust the stockpile of Iranian ballistic missiles. However, if Netanyahu is right, during the same time, Iran will be able to enrich enough uranium to build several nuclear bombs.

If Israel’s air campaign drags on, Iran can enrich enough uranium to build multiple nuclear bombs

Another threat to Israel is that the decapitation strategy and a devastating air campaign could push the leadership of the Islamic Republic to an attempt to restore its legitimacy through a new policy based on Iranian nationalism.

The main supporters of the militaristic approach of the regime – the IRGC – in the first days of the Israeli attack were seriously weakened and discredited. Their reputation has already been shaken after the failure in Syria, as well as the concept itself, according to which the best factor in deterring opponents for Iran is the “axis of resistance”.

The IRGC is seen as the main beneficiary of the regime’s foreign policy expansion, as well as sanctions that, at least in part, were the result of this expansion and from which the rest of the country suffers. The IRGC specializes in circumventing sanctions and smuggling — activities that are believed to have allowed it to accumulate a significant fortune.

The Supreme Leader of Khamenei seems unlikely to take such a radical step as confrontation with the IRGC and a return to the origins of the Iranian revolution. However, he had already tested such a scenario in 2024, when he supported the nomination of reformist Masuda Pezeshkin and even allowed him to win, despite the fact that for many years he did everything to weaken and marginalize supporters of reforms. Sources within the regime then claimed that Khamenei was aware of the increasing isolation of power from Iranian society. Therefore, it is not necessary to exclude this scenario.