Ethno-nationalism often fuels religious and far-right extremism by crafting a unifying narrative centered on identity, grievances and perceived victimhood.
These narratives are frequently rooted in historical conflicts and territorial disputes. In some cases, these stories escalate into violence.
However, violent extremism in the Western Balkans – whether religious or far-right – is not only about ethnicity and ideology.
It is also about complex financial networks that combine external patronage, legitimate businesses, illicit profits, contributions from the diaspora, state contracts and cash flows that are difficult to track.
A recent study by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, GI-TOC, which I worked on, highlights how funding for violent extremism in the Western Balkans has become increasingly diverse and adaptable – and underscores that little has been done to disrupt these funding channels.
Religiously motivated violent extremism in the region has decreased since 2018. During the height of the conflicts in Syria and Iraq, from 2011 to 2018, the Balkan region was a significant recruiting hub for fighters. More than a thousand people joined Islamic State operations in Syria and Iraq.
Funds were raised and moved through external sponsorship, charity fronts, diaspora donations and intermediaries using money-transfer services.
Despite the decline in this threat, challenges still linger. Some returnees, radicalized preachers and ideological influencers remain active in the region, increasingly turning to self-financing and crowdfunding. They leverage personal assets, businesses and informal donations – small sums that stay under the radar but are enough to fund their activities.
Decline doesn’t necessarily mean less vigilance is required. Circumstances can quickly change due to external factors. Current issues such as the Gaza war or growing tensions between Iran and Israel can reactivate dormant networks or foster new supporters.
On the other hand, violent far-right extremism is increasing in the region, aided by greater funding opportunities, and, in some cases, bolstered by the participation of individuals from the Western Balkans in the war in Ukraine on both sides.
Such violent far-right groups operate openly under the guise of patriotic associations, football fan associations, or humanitarian organisations, while building financial companies in construction, hospitality, sports and IT services.
While involvement in organised crime is rare among violent religious groups, far-right groups show a greater tendency to engage in criminal enterprises. While these collaborations can bring advantages to both parties, they also heighten exposure to risks, such as intensified scrutiny from law enforcement.
Some benefit from public procurements and access to state-owned enterprise budgets. It is still difficult to calculate the exact amount that these entities are funding extremist activities.
Nevertheless, the threat of violent far-right extremism is increasing, and money flows in sophisticated patterns. Political backing shields some of the figures from being held accountable, which implies less effective law enforcement.
Financial support enhances the resilience of violent extremist groups, making them harder to detect and more capable of exerting long-term influence. The line between legal and illegal funding, as well as between mainstream and extremist entities, becomes increasingly blurred, giving rise to a grey zone where extremist financing can flourish.
Unexamined, these groups can heighten tensions and undermine not just safety and security but also the formal economy, sports and culture. They threaten the integrity of the rule of law when they operate with impunity, especially when backed by influential political and religious figures.
Financiers of extremism are rarely convicted