Turkey is once again stoking tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean – this time by undermining the sovereignty of Greece and Cyprus while wagering that Washington and Brussels will look the other way. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s government is maneuvering through Libya, where it hopes to secure support from both Tripoli and Benghazi to enforce a 2019 maritime pact that expands Turkish claims deep into disputed Mediterranean waters.
That pact, signed with the Tripoli-based government of Fayez al-Sarraj at the height of Libya’s civil war, was no ordinary maritime deal. Turkey provided weapons, advisers, and even deployed troops to shore up al-Sarraj’s fragile regime. In exchange, Ankara walked away with an agreement granting itself exploration rights far beyond its internationally recognized maritime boundaries. The deal enraged Greece, Cyprus and Egypt, who rightly saw it as a direct assault on their sovereignty.
Now Erdogan is doubling down – courting his former adversary, Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, and his Libyan National Army in the east. Ankara hosted Haftar in July, and Turkish intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin paid him a surprise visit in Benghazi on August 25, even meeting Haftar’s son Saddam. Reports indicate Turkey is considering dispatching military trainers and advisers to his forces. Last month, a Turkish warship docked in both Tripoli and Benghazi, hosting senior officials from both governments. And Turkish Airlines has resumed commercial flights to Benghazi – another signal that Ankara intends to normalize relations across Libya.
Erdogan will argue these overtures serve stability, providing channels between two rival Libyan authorities that the United Nations has failed to unify. Turkey also sees profit: Turkish firms are positioning themselves for postwar reconstruction contracts in Libyan cities. But make no mistake – these moves are designed to entrench Ankara’s illegal maritime pact and secure recognition of its claims from both sides of a fractured Libya.
If successful, Turkey will have carved out legal cover for gas and oil exploration across swaths of the Mediterranean that overlap with Greece’s and Cyprus’s exclusive economic zones (EEZ). This raises the risk of direct confrontation not just between Turkey and its neighbors but between NATO allies in contested waters. The EU condemned the 2019 deal, but its response stopped short of real consequences. Washington, distracted by Ukraine and China, has also largely ignored Ankara’s maneuvers.
This is not uncharted territory. From 2019 to 2022, Erdogan repeatedly threatened military action against Greece and Cyprus. Turkish drillships, escorted by navy vessels, roamed inside Cypriot and Greek waters. Erdogan boasted that Turkish forces could “come in the middle of the night” to seize Greek islands – territory Turkey formally relinquished in 1923. By late 2022, however, Ankara pulled back. Its economy was floundering, and its belligerence had spurred neighbors to form the East Mediterranean Gas Forum, cementing recognition of existing boundaries, and to back the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor, an ambitious trade initiative countering Chinese influence.
Today, Erdogan calculates the balance has shifted in his favor. Since the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Damascus last December, Turkey sees itself as better positioned to assert power. Ankara has cultivated close ties with Syria’s new leadership under Ahmed al-Sharaa and envisions tapping Syria’s offshore gas reserves. Together with partners such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, Erdogan hopes to advance a pipeline project carrying regional gas to Europe – one that would turn Turkey into the indispensable energy hub for the West.
Greece and Cyprus would contend that Turkey’s ambitions to dominate the Mediterranean reach back well into the past. Both EU members point to Ankara’s “Blue Homeland” naval doctrine, which aims to revise maritime boundaries in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean in ways that would drastically curtail their territorial waters. For years, Turkey has promoted a maritime vision that refuses to recognize the territorial waters and EEZ’s granted to Greece and Cyprus under international law. Within the framework of “Blue Homeland,” Ankara advances a map that seeks to overturn established and internationally recognized maritime borders, awarding itself a vastly expanded maritime domain previously unacknowledged. Originally conceived by former senior Turkish naval officers and political allies, this nationalist vision has since been elevated to an official policy under the Erdogan government. Its prominence is underscored by the fact that the 2025 theme of “Teknofest” – Turkey’s annual defense industry showcase – is explicitly dedicated to “Blue Homeland.”
Turkey’s maneuverings in Libya should not be viewed in isolation – they are part of a broader ambition to dominate the Middle East and North Africa. In July 2025, Erdogan announced deepened ties with Somalia, where Turkey has poured resources into infrastructure, education and healthcare. Far more consequential, however, is the military footprint: Ankara operates its largest overseas base in Mogadishu, training Somali forces while securing a strategic platform on the Horn of Africa.
For Israel, this is alarming. Turkish forces could use Somali territory as a launchpad for operations against the Jewish state, deploying medium-range ballistic missiles and other precision weapons capable of striking Israel’s major population centers. Ankara’s hostility toward Israel, sharpened by the war in Gaza, is matched by its broader ambition to step into the vacuum left by Iran’s decline and Assad’s fall in Syria. Israeli officials now see Turkey positioning itself as the new regional hegemon – Syria’s patron and Israel’s direct challenger.
Cyprus, too, finds itself caught in Ankara’s crosshairs. Turkey has occupied the northern third of the island since 1974, but what was once a Cypriot problem has become a wider security dilemma. Since 2021, Turkey has stationed armed drones such as the Bayraktar and Akinci in northern Cyprus, systems able to target Israeli gas rigs, naval assets, and critical infrastructure. Adding to the threat, Ankara has deployed ATMACA anti-ship missiles, their 200-kilometer range covering Israel’s offshore energy fields.
The pace of Turkish weapons development intensifies these concerns. At the 2025 International Defense Industry Fair, Ankara unveiled the Tayfun 4 missile – marketed as capable of reaching Israel – and the Gazap, its most powerful aerial bomb, designed to pierce hardened bunkers and deployable by Turkish F-16s. Each unveiling underscores Ankara’s determination to back rhetoric with muscle.
In this context, Turkey’s push to enlist Libya’s support for redrawing maritime boundaries in the Mediterranean looks less like a diplomatic maneuver and more like a prelude to enforcement. With bases in Somalia, drones and missiles in Cyprus, and expanding ballistic capabilities at home, Ankara is steadily building the force posture to impose its revisionist claims. For Israel, Greece and Cyprus, Turkey’s message is unmistakable: Ankara intends to dictate the new balance of power across the Mediterranean and beyond.
The danger is that Erdogan’s ambitions rest not on cooperation but coercion. By rewriting maritime borders unilaterally and courting both sides of a divided Libya, Turkey signals that it does not accept international law when it stands in the way of its geopolitical designs. With Europe preoccupied and Washington spread thin, Ankara is exploiting distraction to normalize behavior that only heightens the risk of armed conflict in the Mediterranean.
Erdogan’s brinkmanship is not merely about energy resources. It is a bid for regional dominance at the expense of NATO allies, international law, and stability in the Mediterranean. Ignoring these provocations – as Brussels and Washington seem inclined to do – will only invite further escalation.