Eurasia Press & News
Bottom Line Up Front
Over the course of the past month, unidentified drones — widely believed to be Russian — have menaced Europe, intruding into foreign airspace and causing major disruptions and having destabilizing effects, including temporary airport shutdowns.
The Kremlin has consistently denied that Russian drones have entered European airspace, but according to reporting by Bloomberg, Russian officials at a meeting in Moscow claimed the incursions were retaliation for Ukrainian strikes on Crimea.
Russia’s barrage of drones over European airspace represents only a fraction of the broader toolkit the Kremlin has employed for years to destabilize and disrupt Europe — an approach commonly described as Russia’s “hybrid war” against the West.
As Europe expands its defense architecture, it must also recognize that this growth will create new vulnerabilities; if the protection of social cohesion and democratic institutions is not addressed in parallel with conventional rearmament, then the very investments meant to enhance European security will be undermined.
In the past month, unidentified drones — widely believed to be Russian — have menaced Europe, intruding into foreign airspace and causing major disruptions, including temporary airport shutdowns. The wave of incursions began in earnest on September 9, when several drones flew over Polish airspace, prompting the closure of airports in Warsaw, Rzeszów, Lublin, and Modlin. In response, Poland invoked Article 4 of the NATO Treaty, a provision rarely used, which allows any member state to call for emergency consultations when it perceives a threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security. In the following days, Lithuania also reported drones crossing its border and later authorized its military to shoot down unauthorized drones violating its airspace. On September 19, in a related surge of airspace violations, three Russian MiG-31s briefly entered Estonian airspace, leading Estonia to invoke Article 4 as well.
Just three days later, large drones repeatedly appeared near Copenhagen Airport, prompting a nearly four-hour shutdown and widespread flight diversions; further sightings over the following week disrupted activity at Aalborg, Esbjerg, Sønderborg, and Skrydstrup Air Base. Toward the end of September, Germany and Belgium also began reporting suspicious drone overflights near sensitive infrastructure and military areas. The most recent major disruption occurred last Thursday night, when multiple drones over Munich forced the airport to suspend operations overnight, canceling 17 outbound flights, diverting 15 inbound flights, and delaying thousands of passengers.
The Kremlin has consistently denied that Russian drones have entered European airspace or that it is attempting to “test” NATO — offering no evidence or alternative explanation. During a recent meeting in Moscow, diplomats from the UK, France, and Germany reportedly warned their Russian counterparts that NATO was prepared to respond decisively to any further violations of allied airspace. According to Bloomberg, Russian officials at the meeting claimed the incursions were retaliation for Ukrainian strikes on Crimea — strikes they argued would not have been possible without NATO support. Despite this explanation offered behind closed doors, the Kremlin’s official public stance continues to deny responsibility for the incidents, sticking to a familiar playbook of rejecting accusations outright, even when credible evidence points squarely at Moscow.
Nevertheless, Russia’s barrage of drones over European airspace represents only a fraction of the broader toolkit the Kremlin has employed for years to destabilize and disrupt Europe — an approach commonly described as Russia’s “hybrid war” against the West. Hybrid war is a strategy that blends conventional military force with covert sabotage, cyberattacks, disinformation, economic coercion, and other non-military means to weaken adversaries by operating just below the threshold of open conflict, thereby avoiding a kinetic response. Moscow employs a range of tactics, which can also vary from country to country. Yet, its underlying goal remains constant: to undermine democratic institutions and erode social cohesion across the West. For the Kremlin, these efforts are part of what it sees as an ongoing war with NATO (and the West) itself. Western support for Ukraine –– from weapons transfers to intelligence sharing — is viewed by Moscow as no less threatening than direct participation in the conflict. By keeping up steady, low-level pressure, Russia seeks to test NATO’s resolve and signal that it can retaliate well beyond the battlefield in Ukraine.
For example, just this week, Serbian authorities dismantled a cell of 11 nationals accused of carrying out hate-driven provocations in France and Germany on the instructions of an unnamed foreign intelligence service, believed to be Russia. The group reportedly vandalized Holocaust memorials, synagogues, and restaurants in the Paris area, defaced the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin, and left pig heads outside Parisian mosques — acts calculated to stoke and further inflame religious tension between Jewish and Muslim communities. French investigators believe some of these actions were designed to “serve the interests of a foreign power.”
In late September, former Welsh politician Nathan Gill — a former member of the European Parliament (MEP) for the UK Independence Party and later the Brexit Party — pleaded guilty to eight counts of bribery. UK prosecutors said Gill accepted payments in 2018–2019 from Oleg Voloshyn, a Ukrainian national tied to the Kremlin-backed Yanukovych government and sanctioned by the UK and U.S. in 2022 for spreading Russian disinformation. Gill admitted to making pro-Russia speeches in the European Parliament that echoed Kremlin talking points, defending pro-Russian Ukrainian politician Viktor Medvedchuk, and criticizing Ukraine’s government. He also arranged a July 2019 presentation by Medvedchuk in the European Parliament, which was later praised by Russian President Vladimir Putin. This is just one example of Kremlin influence in British politics. Russia has long been accused of conducting covert campaigns to sway Western democracies — including alleged efforts to influence the UK’s 2016 Brexit referendum — and has mounted similar operations across Europe and the United States to shape public opinion and weaken political cohesion.
Kremlin tactics can also target physical infrastructure, aiming to damage or disrupt it either covertly — through sabotage and cyber-attacks — or via military or proxy actions. Oftentimes, these operations are meant to retaliate against countries for their support of Ukraine, as evidenced by Bloomberg’s reporting on the recent meeting in Moscow, or to cause disruption to daily life in order to erode a population’s trust in its government to keep its citizens safe — a tactic it has used most aggressively in Eastern Europe.
Last week, Polish media publicized a foiled plot that Polish security services believe was orchestrated by Russia’s military intelligence services (the GRU). In the summer of 2024, authorities arrested a Ukrainian national who allegedly ferried explosive-filled containers, each with the destructive power of over a kilogram of TNT, disguised as food tins from Lithuania to sites along Poland’s A2 highway. The individual was allegedly taking orders from a Telegram user named “Warrior,” which authorities believe is an alias referring to GRU headquarters. Parallel courier shipments linked to the same network ignited during transport in Germany’s Leipzig Airport and at a warehouse in Birmingham, UK.
A recent Financial Times investigation revealed that Russia’s military spy ship “Yantar” — operated by Moscow’s secretive military deep-sea “research” directorate GUGI — has been conducting covert voyages around Europe to map and potentially disrupt undersea cables and energy pipelines critical to NATO countries. The ship was tracked in November 2024, loitering for hours over three major data cables in the Irish Sea, and earlier along the undersea cable routes linking to Norway’s Svalbard archipelago, using submersibles capable of tapping or sabotaging communications lines. UK military assessments, viewed by Financial Times reporters, indicated that Yantar was part of a broader 13-month Russian naval presence (October 2023–November 2024) that surveilled infrastructure around the UK and Ireland. Western naval officials interviewed by the Financial Times warn that GUGI’s seabed mapping — combined with Russia’s proven interest in hybrid operations — could allow Moscow to cripple internet, energy, and military communications during a crisis.
In response to the surge of Russian drone incursions and other hybrid threats, European leaders have begun exploring new defense measures. At two high-level summits in Copenhagen last week, EU and NATO officials endorsed the concept of a continent-wide “drone wall.” The proposal envisions a network of mobile radars, sensors, and rapid-fire air-defense batteries designed to detect and neutralize low-flying drones. Some NATO members are also investing in emerging technologies such as high-energy laser weapons, while front-line states like Poland have already authorized their militaries to shoot down unauthorized drones.
European leaders, including Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, have called for greater rearmament, innovation, and spending throughout Europe to keep pace with the Kremlin’s evolving threat. However, as Europe expands its defense architecture, it must also recognize that this growth will create new vulnerabilities. If the other hybrid tactics Russia utilizes to target social cohesion and democratic institutions are not addressed in parallel with conventional rearmament, then the very investments meant to enhance European security will be undermined.
