Eurasia Press & News
Asked earlier this week at a press conference about whether or not Hamas would lay down its weapons as part of the newly agreed-upon ceasefire deal, U.S. President Donald Trump said, “well, they’re going to disarm because they said they were going to disarm, and if they don’t disarm, we will disarm them.”
Disarming or decommissioning Hamas will be a complex and multidimensional process with an array of obstacles, including technical and strategic.
If Hamas members surrender their guns, they would be unable to protect themselves against rival Palestinian factions, tribes, clans, and criminal gangs, making disarmament even more unlikely.
There have been successful cases of disarmament, including in Northern Ireland, South Africa, and Colombia, to a certain extent, yet in each case, the armed group had a somewhat clear path to political legitimacy or power-sharing, which does not apply to Israel’s demands that Hamas be excluded from governance.
Asked earlier this week at a press conference about whether Hamas would lay down its weapons as part of the newly agreed-upon ceasefire deal, U.S. President Donald Trump said, “well, they’re going to disarm because they said they were going to disarm, and if they don’t disarm, we will disarm them.” It was unclear who President Trump meant by “we,” but if it were the U.S. military, that would seem like a complete non-starter. Few could imagine a U.S. servicemember trudging through the rubble in Gaza to take back weapons from Hamas militants physically. It seems unlikely that, despite apparently agreeing to disarm as part of the ceasefire, Hamas would willingly part with its weapons, especially as Israel has made denying any future political involvement of Hamas in Gaza a prerequisite of its terms of the agreement.
It remains uncertain where the disconnect began; some suggest Hamas only agreed to decommission heavy weapons as part of Trump’s 20-point peace plan, and not its arsenal of small arms and light weapons (SALW), anti-tank weapons, rockets, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Moreover, many of the weapons are made from dual-use components, given their improvised nature, which will compound the challenge. There is also the possibility that Iran attempts to send weapons shipments to Hamas members or Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fighters in the West Bank, in an effort to instigate further conflict and instability. Given the military setbacks Iran has suffered over the past two years, Tehran is likely to begin rebuilding its proxy forces that comprise the ‘Axis of Resistance,’ including Hamas, PIJ, Lebanese Hezbollah, and the Houthis in Yemen.
Disarming or decommissioning Hamas will be a complex and multidimensional process with an array of obstacles, including technical and strategic. The group’s weapons are all dispersed throughout a vast tunnel network set deep beneath Gaza. It is a significant challenge to locate, verify, and secure the weapons. Which entity will do this? No country has yet made a firm commitment. The lack of a viable international force is a concern, and there isn’t even unity among the major players on how to address it. Getting the United States, the European Union (EU), Arab States, and potentially even the United Nations to agree on what comes next will be extremely difficult. Still, according to a recent Politico report, the top contenders include Indonesia, Azerbaijan, and Pakistan, all of which have discussed contributing troops to a future stabilization force in Gaza. However, if Hamas does not agree to forfeit its weapons willingly, this changes the dynamics of any peacekeeping effort in the territory. And while it is helpful to have the troops come from Arab or Muslim countries, there are complications if Palestinians see these forces as collaborating too closely with Israel. The U.S. will work with Egypt and Jordan on developing a Palestinian police force that, at least in theory, would be able to aid in the disarmament process.
Hamas has been battered by two years of war with Israel, many of its senior leaders have been killed, and its command-and-control is significantly weakened. Even if the group’s remaining leaders ordered them to disarm, it remains uncertain if field units would follow orders. Another complication is that, if Hamas members surrender their guns, they would be unable to protect themselves against rival Palestinian factions, tribes, clans, and criminal gangs, making disarmament even more unlikely. Since the deal was announced, Hamas remnants have engaged in firefights in Gaza with other Palestinian groups, while also conducting public executions of individuals it accuses of spying for Israel.
Hamas is also a hybrid organization, part political force, part armed insurgency. Since the group’s founding in 1987, armed resistance has been its identity. If the group disarmed, it would also seemingly risk forfeiting its political legitimacy within Gaza. Also, with no security guarantees, disarming would make Hamas vulnerable to both Israeli strikes and rival Palestinian groups. There have been successful cases of disarmament, including in Northern Ireland, South Africa, and Colombia, to a certain extent. Yet in each of those cases, the armed group had a somewhat clear path to political legitimacy or power sharing. That’s not the case here with Hamas in Gaza. Gaza could look more like failed cases of disarmament, which occurred in South Sudan and in Libya. There have been cases that achieved ‘mixed success,’ including in the Balkans. In some instances, insurgent and militia groups hand over old stocks of rifles or antiquated guns in an effort to placate international observers, while hoarding more modern weaponry for further use in the future.
Achieving positive results and a sustainable peace requires exquisite choreography and detailed negotiations that can drag on for years. Many observers doubt that the Trump administration has the focus to see this negotiated settlement through to the end, especially given the litany of other foreign policy challenges it is currently juggling, from Venezuela to Ukraine. If Hamas refused to disarm, the ceasefire agreement could break down irreparably, leading the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to ramp up a military campaign in Gaza. If this occurs, Hamas will continue fighting as an insurgency, perpetuating the cycle of violence and humanitarian suffering.
