Eurasia Press & News
Türkiye has been a chief geostrategic beneficiary of the setbacks to Iran and its “Axis of Resistance,” but its expanded regional influence has fueled new tensions with another regional power, Israel.
Türkiye and Israel, despite some fundamental differences, recognize each other’s interests and respect their separate close relations with the Trump administration.
Trump has overcome Israeli resistance to giving Türkiye a major role in implementing his 20 Point Plan for a resolution of the Gaza conflict, which could include potentially deploying Turkish peacekeepers to the enclave.
Türkiye is the most influential regional player in Syria, where Ankara backstops the new government and operates against perceived threats posed by Syrian Kurdish groups.
Türkiye has been a primary beneficiary of the geostrategic reordering of the Middle East region since the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel. Israel’s successful campaign against the Islamic Republic of Iran and its non-state allies has altered the strategic architecture of the region, but its use of overwhelming force against Hamas in Gaza has left it isolated in the region and globally. Türkiye has been able to fill the power vacuum left by Iran’s strategic collapse, but without incurring any of the diplomatic or economic drawbacks from its assertion of influence that Israel has suffered. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s successful meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump at the White House on September 25 affirmed that Türkiye, a NATO ally, is emerging as a Trump favorite to help resolve conflicts in the region and to wield armed force in parts of the region where Trump wants to avoid direct U.S. military entanglement.
The sweep of Turkish influence and its ability to project power now rival those of any other state in the region. Yet, the expansion of Turkish influence has already significantly increased the frictions between Türkiye and Israel that stem from Erdogan’s assertion that Hamas, despite its October 7 massacre, is a legitimate Palestinian movement whose interests and ideology need to be accommodated. President Trump has overcome Israeli reservations to welcome a prominent role for Türkiye in helping stabilize post-war Gaza, including the potential deployment of Turkish troops as part of an international stabilization force that Trump’s team is trying to recruit for the enclave. Türkiye also exerts substantial influence in post-Assad Syria after helping power the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) faction of interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa to victory over the regime of President Bashar al-Assad last December.
Further east in the region, Ankara can project power in the Persian Gulf through its deployment of 3,000 troops at the Tariq bin Ziyad base in Qatar, augmented by the permanent deployment of F-16s in the country as of mid-2024. In the Maghreb, Türkiye wields significant influence in a divided Libya, where it maintains troops and supplies equipment to the UN-recognized administration in Tripoli — a rival of the Russia-backed eastern administration dominated by strongman General Khalifah Haftar. In the South Caucasus, Türkiye has emerged as an increasingly dominant — if not the dominant — actor, projecting influence to Iran’s doorstep after supplying its key ally, Azerbaijan, with the weapons and guidance needed to reclaim full control of the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region from Ankara’s longtime adversary, Armenia. In August, President Trump mediated an agreement highly favorable to Azerbaijan, under which a controversial land route, called the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), but often referred to as the Zangezur Corridor, will be assembled to connect Baku to a non-contiguous Azeri enclave, Nakhchivan. The route will limit Iran’s land connection to its only ally in the region, Armenia, and is viewed as a further blow to Iran’s geostrategic positioning. Türkiye’s Camp Turksom in Mogadishu, the country’s largest foreign base, hosts Turkish forces training and assisting the fragile government of Somalia against the al-Shabaab terrorist organization, an affiliate of al-Qaeda.
Erdogan’s geostrategy is benefiting from a positive relationship with Trump, who appears to welcome an expanded Turkish security role in the region, including to advance Trump’s 20 Point Peace Plan for Gaza. On September 25, Trump hosted Erdogan at the White House for the first time since 2019, telling reporters in the meeting: “We’ve had a very good relationship for a long time…This is a tough man. This is a guy who’s highly opinionated. Usually, I don’t like opinionated people, but I always liked this one.” Erdogan, for his part, said that he was “very pleased” to be returning to the White House and hoped to carry Türkiye-U.S. relations to “a much different level.” At the White House meeting, Trump held out to Erdogan the prospect that Türkiye could resume participation – suspended in 2019 over security concerns – in a program that would result in Ankara purchasing the sophisticated, fifth-generation F-35 combat aircraft. At the meeting, Trump stated: “I know he wants the F-35, and he’s wanted that…And we’re talking about that very seriously.” Trump also said he could lift sanctions against Türkiye’s defense industries “very soon.”
An enhanced role for Türkiye in resolving the Gaza conflict emerged from Erdogan’s participation in a meeting between Trump and Arab and Muslim leaders, held on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in late September, to discuss how to end the Gaza conflict. That meeting included, in addition to Türkiye, the two main Arab mediators of the Gaza conflict — Qatar and Egypt — as well as Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Subsequently, a wide range of reports indicated that Türkiye used its leverage with Hamas, including its hosting of members of the group’s Political Bureau, to successfully pressure the group to agree to return the remaining Israeli hostages. Erdogan later joined Trump, Qatar’s Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi as principal co-signers of the Trump 20 Point Peace plan for Gaza at an October 13 Peace Summit in Sharm el-Sheikh.
Yet, Trump’s inclusion of Türkiye as a major player in resolving the Gaza conflict has rankled the Israeli leadership, which resents Erdogan’s support for Hamas to play a role in the future of Gaza and in the Palestinian national movement, more broadly. Erdogan and his Islamist-oriented Justice and Development Party (AKP) consider Hamas a legitimate resistance movement and not a terrorist group. The Israel-Türkiye rift on this issue flared in Sharm el-Sheikh, when Erdogan reportedly ordered his plane not to land in Egypt unless Trump revoked his invitation for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to attend the summit. As Trump’s peace plan has advanced, Netanyahu and other Israeli leaders have sought to limit Türkiye’s involvement in postwar Gaza, arguing that an extensive Turkish role will permit Hamas to retain a governing and security role in Gaza. Still, recognizing Trump’s trust in and reliance on Ankara, Israel might not try to veto a Turkish peacekeeping role in Gaza. Turkish personnel are already participating in the international mission to locate the remains of the deceased Israeli hostages still unaccounted for. Last week, Türkiye’s defense ministry said: “Our forces, experienced in establishing and maintaining peace, are ready for any mission assigned to them.” On Tuesday, U.S. Vice President JD Vance suggested Türkiye’s role in postwar Gaza remains at issue, stating the U.S. would not “force anything on our Israeli friends when it comes to foreign troops on their soil,” while noting that Türkiye “has already played a very constructive role” in the peace process. Suggesting Netanyahu might acquiesce to a Turkish role in postwar Gaza since Israel and Türkiye have long been able to mitigate disagreements; Türkiye is Israel’s longest-standing Muslim state relationship, with diplomatic relations dating to 1949, a year after Israel’s founding.
Syria represents another arena in which Israeli and Turkish leaders are wary of each other’s intentions. Israel’s main objective in Syria is to prevent Iran and the Lebanon-based Hezbollah terrorist organization from re-establishing a permanent military foothold in Syria. Israel also seeks to prevent any strategic or terrorist threat emanating from the Golan Heights, an Israeli-occupied territory in southern Syria. Ankara similarly wants to permanently exclude Iran from Syria, but it also seeks to empower and influence the new government of Ahmed al-Sharaa in Damascus — a goal that conflicts with Israel’s apparent intent to keep Syria weak and divided. Trump’s praise for Türkiye’s expanded role in Syria, for now, constrains Israel’s ability to blunt Turkish influence in Syria. During their September 25 White House meeting, Trump stated: “?I think President Erdogan is the one responsible for Syria, for the successful fight in ridding Syria of its past leader…?I think this man is responsible. He doesn’t take the responsibility, but it’s actually a great achievement.”
Israeli and Turkish leaders, aided by Trump officials, have sought to avoid any potential for their forces or allies in Syria to clash. Türkiye has condemned Israel’s strikes on Syrian strategic assets and seeks to deny Israel a foothold in determining the future of Syria, but it has not sought to counter Israel’s activities militarily. Ankara has sought to focus its policy on northern and eastern Syria in order to protect itself against militant Kurdish groups that predominate there, and which Ankara accuses of affiliation with violent Turkish Kurdish organizations. Those areas of Syria are far from where the Israeli military has operated inside Syria. U.S. officials are attempting to broker a de-escalation agreement between Israel and Syria, which would not only pacify the Israel-Syria border but also relax tensions between Israel and Türkiye – the two regional powers still involved in post-Assad Syria. As one positive step, Israel and Türkiye have maintained a ‘hotline’ to avoid aerial incidents.
