Eurasia Press & News
Toplines
An X account attributed to Mossad claimed on October 30 that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Political and Security Affairs, Ali Asghar Hejazi, and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Mohammad Pakpour have sidelined Khamenei and are “making decisions independently.”[1] CTP-ISW cannot verify this report. This claim follows reports that senior Iranian officials were unable to contact Khamenei during the Israel-Iran War.[2] Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf reportedly assumed at least partial command of the Iranian armed forces after Israeli airstrikes on June 12 killed several Iranian military leaders, possibly without Khamenei’s approval.[3] Both Hejazi and Pakpour hold senior positions in the regime. Hejazi is reportedly one of Khamenei’s closest advisers and is considered the “most powerful intelligence official” in Iran, according to five sources familiar with Khamenei’s decision-making process.[4] Pakpour previously served as the IRGC Ground Forces commander and Khamenei appointed Pakpour as IRGC commander after Israel killed former IRGC Commander Hossein Salami during the Israel-Iran War.[5] The X account attributed to Mossad previously accurately reported that Khamenei had appointed Ali Abdollahi Ali Abadi as the new Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters commander before the regime officially announced the appointment.[6] The account’s claim that Pakpour and Hejazi have sidelined Khamenei, if true, would be extremely noteworthy as it would indicate that Khamenei is currently not the main decision-making authority in Iran.
Hezbollah is reconstituting its forces and weapons capabilities, according to the Wall Street Journal.[7] This report comes amid recent concerns about a potential resumption of fighting between Israel and Hezbollah. Unspecified sources familiar with Israeli and Arab intelligence told the Wall Street Journal on October 30 that Hezbollah is restoring its weapons stockpiles and rebuilding its military forces after the Israel-Hezbollah conflict in late 2024.[8] Israel destroyed over half of Hezbollah’s weapons stockpile during the conflict.[9] The unspecified sources stated that Hezbollah is restocking its rockets, anti-tank missiles, and artillery via smuggling and domestic production.[10] Hezbollah has reportedly acquired some of these weapons via Lebanese seaports and ground lines of communication between Lebanon and Syria.[11] Senior Israeli officials recently noted that Hezbollah has managed to smuggle “hundreds” of rockets from Syria into Lebanon in recent months.[12] Iran has historically supplied Hezbollah with weapons and funding using ground lines of communication that cross Syria.[13] Hezbollah is also domestically manufacturing new weapons, according to one of the sources.[14] Israeli security sources recently told an Israeli journalist that Hezbollah has resumed producing precision and long-range missiles.[15] Arab intelligence officials stated that Hezbollah is returning to a more decentralized structure similar to how the group operated in the 1980s. The sources noted that Hezbollah has recruited new fighters to fill its ranks, but that its military leadership remains in disarray.[16] Israel killed a significant number of Hezbollah’s senior leadership during the conflict in late 2024. Israel was reportedly “angered” by the new intelligence findings and lamented that the issue has shifted from Hezbollah’s disarmament to rearmament in “just a few months.”[17] Israeli media reported on October 30 that Israel is considering intensifying its attacks in Lebanon to respond to Hezbollah’s attempt to reconstitute.[18] US and European officials recently warned about the possibility of a large-scale Israeli operation targeting Hezbollah.[19]
Delays in the implementation of the Lebanese Armed Forces’ (LAF) plan to disarm Hezbollah likely enabled Hezbollah to reconstitute some of its capabilities. Hezbollah has been reconstituting its forces and capabilities since the November 2024 Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire agreement.[20] Hezbollah has increased its reconstitution activity in recent weeks due to a ”significant slowdown” in LAF operations, according to Israeli military intelligence.[21] The LAF plan, which the Lebanese government approved in September 2025, stipulates that the LAF will disarm Hezbollah south of the Litani River by the end of 2025. The LAF has conducted basic seizures of Hezbollah weapons caches, but CTP-ISW has not observed any instances of Hezbollah fighters turning weapons over to the state.[22] Israel and Lebanon have also been unable to reach an agreement on the timeline for disarming Hezbollah, which has reportedly caused delays in the implementation of the LAF’s plan.[23] The Lebanese government has consistently claimed that Israeli airstrikes have prevented the LAF from fully deploying its forces to southern Lebanon and efficiently disarming Hezbollah.[24] Any delay in the implementation of the LAF disarmament plan gives Hezbollah more time to try to reconstitute as a military organization.
Key Takeaways
Iranian Decision-Making: An X account attributed to Mossad claimed on October 30 that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Political and Security Affairs, Ali Asghar Hejazi, and IRGC Commander Major General Mohammad Pakpour have sidelined Khamenei and are “making decisions independently.” CTP-ISW cannot verify this claim. The account’s claim, if true, would be extremely noteworthy as it would indicate that Khamenei is currently not the main decision-making authority in Iran.
Lebanese Hezbollah Reconstitution: Hezbollah is reconstituting its forces and weapons capabilities, according to the Wall Street Journal.Delays in the implementation of the Lebanese Armed Forces’ plan to disarm Hezbollah likely enabled Hezbollah to reconstitute some of its capabilities. The Wall Street Journal report comes amid recent concerns about a potential resumption of fighting between Israel and Hezbollah.Iran
Iranian media confirmed on October 30 that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi as the new Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) deputy chief.[25] Vahidi replaced Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Ashtiani, who had served in the position since August 2024.[26] Vahidi is a long-time member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and has previously held numerous senior military and political positions, including IRGC Quds Force commander, defense minister, and interior minister.[27] The United States and European Union sanctioned Vahidi in 2022 for his role in directing the Law Enforcement Command to suppress protests.[28] Vahidi’s appointment marks the first time in the Iranian regime’s history that an IRGC officer is serving as the AFGS deputy chief under an Artesh officer, AFGS Chief Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi.[29] The Artesh is Iran’s conventional army that defends the country from outside threats, while the IRGC is an ideological force created after the 1979 Revolution to protect the Iranian regime from internal and external threats.[30] Both the Artesh and the IRGC report to Khamenei through the AFGS.[31]
Iran is taking steps to strengthen the defense of its civilian infrastructure to address vulnerabilities that Israel exploited during the Israel-Iran War. Passive Defense Organization head Brigadier General Gholamreza Jalali stated on October 31 that Iran will soon hold three exercises designed to test Iran’s banking, public warning, and national communications systems against enemy attacks.[32] Jalali stated that the Passive Defense Organization has identified a significant number of weaknesses and is engaging with agencies across the Iranian government to develop countermeasures to address them.[33] Anti-regime groups, including a pro-Israeli hacker group, conducted several cyberattacks targeting Iran’s banking and communications infrastructure during the war.[34] These exercises reflect Iran’s heightened paranoia about Israeli infiltration following the war.
Iran and Turkey signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on October 30 to strengthen border security cooperation, which likely reflects Iranian concerns about the presence of Kurdish militant groups along its northwestern border. Iranian Deputy Interior Minister Ali Akbar Pourjamshidian met with Turkish Deputy Interior Minister Munir Karaloglu at the seventh meeting of the Iran-Turkey Security Working Group.[35] Iran and Turkey both perceive Kurdish armed groups in the region as a threat to their security. The MoU comes after the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is based in Kurdish-majority areas of Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran, announced in May 2025 that it would dissolve itself and “end its armed struggle.”[36] The Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), which is the Iranian branch of the PKK, announced in May that it would not adhere to the PKK’s decision to dissolve.[37] PJAK seeks to establish an “autonomous Kurdish region within a federal political structure in Iran” and has previously targeted Iranian security forces.[38] Iran has previously accused Kurdish opposition groups of inciting protests in western Iran and cooperating with Israel to facilitate attacks in Iran.[39]
Possible Jaish al Adl fighters attempted to kill a Shahouzehi tribal leader, Mohammad Shahouzehi, in Khash, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on October 31.[40] A human rights organization that monitors developments in Sistan and Baluchistan Province reported that Shahouzehi played a significant role in the regime’s crackdown on protesters in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, in 2022.[41] Possible Jaish al Adl fighters recently killed a prominent Sunni tribal leader close to the Iranian regime in Iranshahr, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on October 19.[42] Jaish al Adl is a Baloch, Salafi-jihadi militant group that frequently attacks Iranian security forces in southeastern Iran.
Iraq
Popular Mobilization Committee Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh separated a primarily Christian regiment from the Asaib Ahl al Haq-affiliated 50th Population Mobilization Forces (PMF) Brigade, possibly in an attempt to increase goodwill among the Christian population in the Ninewa Plains ahead of the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections.[43] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service primarily comprised of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, many of which report to Iran instead of the Iraqi Prime Minister.[44] Fayyadh separated the primarily Christian 13th Regiment from the 50th PMF Brigade on October 19 and restored the Ninewa Plains Protection Units as an independent force.[45] The PMF forced the 13th Regiment to join the 50th Brigade in 2023.[46] The 13th Regiment and the 74th Regiment had previously fought the Islamic State in the Ninewa Plains area under the banner of the Ninewa Plains Protection Units.[47] The 50th PMF Brigade mostly consists of Shias from southern Iraq and is associated with its former commander, Rayan al Kaldani, who is sanctioned by the United States for human rights abuses.[48] The separation of the 13th Regiment from the 50th Brigade reportedly follows the 13th Regiment’s refusal to help the 50th Brigade secure seats in the upcoming elections.[49] Kaldani has historically used the 50th Brigade to support candidates from the 50th Brigade’s Babylon Movement in past elections.[50] The Babylon Movement controls four out of five quota seats reserved for Christians in the Iraqi Parliament.[51] The Ninewa Plains local population has urged the Iraqi federal government to reverse the 13th Regiment’s integration into the 50th PMF Brigade in recent years.[52] The 13th Regiment’s reported unwillingness to aid the Babylon Movement’s electoral prospects in an area in which the 50th Brigade is already unpopular may have motivated Fayyadh to sever the link between the two forces to secure more Christian votes in the elections.
Syria
The Syrian Justice Ministry will soon hold public trials for individuals who committed atrocities on the Syrian coast in March 2025. These trials will test the Syrian government’s ability and willingness to implement transitional justice and restore minority trust. Syrian Justice Minister Mazhar al Wais told Emirati media on October 29 that the Justice Ministry will soon put individuals who committed atrocities during the Syrian coastal massacres in March 2025 on public trial.[53] Wais invited the media to monitor the trials to ensure that there is no impunity for the perpetrators.[54] The Syrian National Inquiry Commission, which was created to investigate the coastal violence, previously announced that it had referred 298 individuals to the Syrian judiciary for their attacks on Alawites in March.[55] The Syrian transitional government has arrested some Ministry of Defense fighters accused of atrocities but has not publicized these arrests.[56] The trials will test the government’s judicial independence and procedural transparency. Prosecuting perpetrators of sectarian violence would help the transitional government restore trust among minority communities, particularly Alawites, by showing that the state is willing to prosecute members of its own institutions alongside Assadist insurgents.
Arabian Peninsula
Iran likely attempted to supply the Houthis with chemical materials and military equipment to support the Houthis’ domestic drone and missile production. The Yemeni National Resistance Forces (NRF) intercepted a shipment of chemical materials and military equipment on a small vessel in the Bab el Mandeb Strait that was en route to the Houthi-controlled Hudaydah Port on October 9.[57] The NRF reported that the vessel originated from the Port of Djibouti, but it suspected that the shipment was from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.[58] The shipment reportedly included chemicals that absorb electromagnetic waves and reduce drone radar signatures.[59] Iran has previously supplied military equipment and chemical materials to the Houthis via smugglers at the Port of Dijbouti to bolster the Houthis’ domestic drone and missile production capabilities.[60]
Palestinian Territories & Lebanon
Senior Lebanese officials reiterated their willingness to negotiate with Israel to resolve the two countries’ outstanding issues over the US proposal to disarm Hezbollah. Lebanese President Joseph Aoun emphasized on October 31 the Lebanese government’s willingness to discuss outstanding issues, including the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, with Israel despite recent Israeli operations in Lebanon.[61] Lebanese Foreign Minister Youssef Rajji stated that a diplomatic solution with Israel is necessary to ensure lasting security and stability in southern Lebanon.[62] The Wall Street Journal reported on October 30 that Lebanese leaders informed Israel that Lebanon is willing to increase intelligence sharing and coordination.[63] Lebanon and Israel have previously failed to resolve their disagreements about the US proposal to disarm Hezbollah.[64] Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam told Saudi media on October 19 that indirect Israeli-Lebanese negotiations had reached a “dead end” due to Israel’s continued operations in Lebanon.[65] Israeli officials have repeatedly emphasized that the IDF will continue to operate in Lebanon until Hezbollah is disarmed.[66]
