Eurasia Press & News
In a September 30, 2025 interview with the Iranian Tabnak website, reformist Sadeq Zibakalam, professor emeritus of political science at Tehran University, expressed criticism unusual for the Iranian political landscape. He attributed direct responsibility for the tensions in the region to the Iranian revolutionary regime instead of to its traditional enemies, namely Israel and the U.S.
Throughout the interview, Zibakalam stressed that since the beginning of Iran’s Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran has called openly for the destruction of Israel, and it was Iran that adopted a clear operational policy to accomplish this by creating an “axis of resistance” – Hizbullah in Lebanon, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza and the West Bank, the Shi’ite militias in Iraq, the Houthi Ansar Allah movement in Yemen, and the Assad regime in Syria that was recently overthrown – and by providing them all with military, financial, and political support.
On the other hand, he emphasized, Israel, on the contrary, had never sought to destroy Iran. He went on to note that even Israel’s most extreme officials have never announced this as a goal, even though Israel had taken action against Iran’s nuclear program which it perceived as an existential threat. Stating that the Hamas-led October 7, 2023 massacre in Israeli communities, and the scale of the murders there, had changed Israel’s attitude towards Iran and were the reason why Israel had attacked Iran’s nuclear facilities, Zibakalam also said, “The question now arises about ‘punishing’ Iran for the October 7 events.” This reinforces the view of Iran as responsible for, and complicit in, the events of that day.
In the interview, Zibakalam maintained that Iran’s waving the banner of Israel’s destruction is the cause of the great sensitivity in the world, particularly in the West, about Iran’s nuclear program. He also challenged the Iranian regime on whether its nuclear program was ultimately worthwhile, stating that the huge investment in it has neither improved the supply of electricity nor freed the industrial sector from its stagnation. The only thing it has done, he said, was to serve to increase Iran’s enmity and hatred towards the West.
He also disparaged Iran’s foreign policy vis-à-vis the U.S., stating that Iran’s persistent anti-U.S. hostility since the Islamic revolution was harming Iran’s national interests. Attempting to rebut the claim in Iran that the U.S. is hostile to Iran’s revolutionary regime, Zibakalam referred to the U.S.’s attempts at dialogue with the regime since its inception. He also criticized the regime’s policy of attributing to the U.S. involvement in or responsibility for every negative event in Iran, from the accidental downing of an Iranian passenger plane in 1988 to the regime’s claim of U.S. involvement in arson attacks during anti-regime protests in Iran.
With regard to Iran’s ethnic minorities, Zibakalam said that the Iranian regime, with its economic and political discrimination against them, had managed to cultivate and strengthen their distinct ethnic and/or Sunni identity. This was true, he said, for the Kurds in the west of the country, the Baloch in the east, and the Azeris in the north, and added that this had increased separatist sentiment among them.
In recent decades, Zibakalam has been known for his criticism of the Iranian revolutionary regime, and in 2018 he was sentenced to a year in prison and a two-year ban on political and media activity because he “spread lies” in his criticism of it in a German media interview. He has also held several government positions, and served as a representative of the provisional government in its attempt to resolve the Kurdistan problem. He was a member of the 1980-1983 Cultural Revolution that purged academia in Iran, for which he later apologized. In 2016, he refused to step on the U.S. and Israeli flags painted on the floor of the entrance at Azad Open University, the biggest university in Iran, where he taught.[1]
The following are the main points of Zibakalam’s statements in his interview with Tabnak:
Zibakalam: “After October 7, The Israelis Concluded That Their Problem Is Not Just Iran’s Nuclear Program… What Happened On October 7 Was Unprecedented In Israel’s History And These Developments Changed Its Point Of View”; “For Israel, The Question Also Arose Of ‘Punishing’ Iran For The Events Of October 7”
Q: “You said in one of your interviews that [Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu intends with all his might to solve the Iranian problem but America prevented him from doing so. While we were negotiating with America [prior to Israel’s June 13, 2025 airstrikes against Iran], the talks had been expected to continue and maybe an agreement would have been signed. Nevertheless, it was during those same days that we were attacked by Israel. It seems to me that your analysis of this matter did not come true. Why did this [Israeli attack on Iran] happen?”
Zibakalam: “For some time, long before Donald Trump entered the White House, Israel had been aspiring to operations like the ones it carried out during the 12 days [of the June 2025 Iran-Israel war]. In my opinion, even during the Obama presidency Israel was trying to bring about an end to Iran’s nuclear activity, as it perceives it. Even then, Netanyahu had plans to attack Iran, but the American president at the time, Barack Obama, essentially stopped him [from doing so]. Obama told Netanyahu: ‘We are now in negotiations, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Iran’s foreign minister, Mr. Zarif, are in serious talks. Let the negotiations arrive at an outcome. If they do not produce an agreement, then we will act in coordination with you.'”
Q: “That is, you think that Netanyahu was forced at that time to change his path?”
Zibakalam: “Netanyahu was forced to be patient. This patience continued until ultimately, after 21 months of negotiations, the talks between Iran and the 5+1 group ended, during the first term of [Iranian] president Hassan Rouhani, and the nuclear agreement [the JCPOA] was in July 2015. At the same time, there began extensive cooperation between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] on nuclear matters. Therefore, it can be said that the grounds for the attack on Iran were pulled out from under Netanyahu’s feet and that he no longer had a convincing reason for a military operation.
“Afterwards, we came to the era of the Joe Biden presidency. Trump, for his part, had dropped out of the nuclear agreement in May 2018, changing the situation. At the same time, Israel again returned to its previous position and again raised the idea of attacking Iranian nuclear facilities. In my view, just as Obama prevented Israel from acting, in the administration of Joe Biden, America effectively blocked Netanyahu’s path. Even during the Trump era, although America left the agreement, there were still similar barriers and such prevention.”
Q: “In your view, what element or elements led Netanyahu to the point where he decided to carry out his decision?”
Zibakalam: “The reality is that the events of October 7 broke many barriers. I think that after October 7, the Israelis concluded that their problem was not just Iran’s nuclear program. Up to that point, their main issue was the nuclear [issue], but what happened on October 7 was unprecedented in Israel’s history. Since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, no such operation had been carried out against it – some 1,255 people killed and 255 kidnapped and taken hostage.
“These developments changed Israel’s point of view. As a result, the issue for them was not just Iran’s nuclear program but something broader. It can be said that for Israel, the question also arose of ‘punishing’ Iran for the events of October 7. Therefore, this [previous analysis] was not disconnected from reality when I said that America was trying to solve the Iranian nuclear issue via negotiations and diplomatic means while Netanyahu wanted to dismantle it by force and with [his] teeth. As I mentioned, the Israelis had for a long time been looking for an opportunity to implement the 12-day operation but the Americans had always stopped them, and the events of October 7 lifted these obstacles. In addition, in America too Mr. Trump agreed to an attack. Thus, it can be said that I still think that if October 7 had not happened, and the nuclear issue had continued in a volatile and gradual manner, America, as in the past, would have prevented Netanyahu from acting, and the 12-day operation would never have taken place.”
“Since The Revolution, Israel Has Considered Iran A Potential And Even A Practical Threat… [Since] Even From Its [The Revolution’s] First Days, Iran Declared That Israel Must Disappear”
Q: “I think that October 7 in itself was not the axis and the root of all these things, because the Israeli regime’s leaders themselves said many times that they had been planning this [12-day] operation [in June 2025] for years. Obviously, there may have been some American obstacles, for example because of the ongoing negotiations, but what you say about the timing and perhaps about them being close to an understanding or an agreement on the first day [of the sixth round of the negotiations between the Trump administration and Iran] – this is a point that must be addressed: Why did Israel carry out this move exactly two or three days before this? What does this mean?”
Zibakalam: “If we want to look closely at the matter, the reality is that since the revolution, Israel has considered Iran a potential and even a practical threat. The reason for this is that from the first days of the revolution, the Islamic Republic [of Iran] has declared that Israel must disappear. The first statements in this context were by Imam [Ayatollah Ruhollah] Khomeini [the founder of the Islamic Revolution] around 1979, who said on various occasions that ‘if the Muslims would have united and each of them poured a bucket of water on Israel, it would be carried away by the resulting flood.'[2] Since the revolution, the slogan of ‘destroying Israel’ has become one of the symbols of Iran, together with the slogans of ‘Death to America’ and ‘we will export our revolution.’ Even during the war [with Iraq, 1980-88], the slogan ‘the path to Jerusalem passes through Karbala’ was raised – meaning that the war with Iraq served in effect as a preface and prelude to the real war with Israel.”
“Iran Has Not Relinquished The Slogan Of ‘We Will Destroy Israel’ – Leader [Khamenei] Even Declared That Israel Would Not Exist In Another 25 Years”; “Iran Has Taken Every Possible Measure To Harm Israel… But Israel Has Not Undertaken Any Practical Operation Against Iran!”
Q: “That is, the concept of resistance against Israel was from the outset part of the ideological strategy of the Iranian regime?
Zibakalam: “Over the years, Iran has not relinquished the slogan of ‘we will destroy Israel.’ Even when a more moderate line was adopted [in 2013, during the presidency of Hassan Rouhani], it was reiterated that ‘Israel will be destroyed, even if Iran does not undertake an operation, this will be Israel’s fate.’ [Supreme] Leader [Ali Khamenei] even declared that Israel would not exist in another 20-25 years. At Palestine Square [in Tehran], a timetable [digital clock] was erected [counting down the days] until Israel’s destruction, and it was announced that only about 1,000 days remain until then. And the same slogans were not voiced just to the public at home – during these years, Iran took every possible measure to harm Israel, that is, the resistance axis was created. But Israel has not undertaken any practical operation against Iran! Even Israel’s most senior religious and military officials, and its most extreme right-wing officials, have never, during the past 15 years, openly declared that their aim was Iran’s destruction. Even Netanyahu, despite his extremist positions, never aspired to destroy the Islamic Republic.”
Q: “What do you consider to be the difference in how each of the sides perceives this?”
Zibakalam: “Not only do we chant these slogans, we [also] created the resistance axis. I have explained about this resistance axis again and again in conversations, arguments, and discussions with others. They asked me, What is this resistance axis? My answer was that it means that Iran is investing in Syria and Lebanon. When I saw this being actualized, some people said, ‘Mr. Zibakalam, you don’t understand, this is exactly what we call strategic depth.’ I asked them, ‘What exactly is strategic depth?’ They said that it means woe to a nation whose enemy is on its borders and that we, in order to prevent the enemy from approaching our borders, have arrived at Israel’s borders. Iran has always seen Israel as an enemy and aspired to fight it. Every operation that we can carry out, we have carried out: We gave Hamas military and financial aid and, to the extent that we could, assisted Hizbullah financially as well.”
“The Main Point Is That Israel Has Never Sought To Destroy Iran!”
Zibakalam [con’t]: “The main point is that Israel has never sought to destroy Iran! Who assigned you the task of destroying Israel? This mission that you have taken upon yourself since the day of the revolution – who told the Islamic Republic that Israel should be destroyed? Were you to conduct even a simple poll, and half the respondents said ‘we want the regime to destroy Israel,’ then this might be all right. But you have no other logical answer to this question.”
“You Say That Israel Aspires To Destroy Islam, That Israel Wants To Dismantle Iran… All These Claims Are Only To Justify The Unjustifiable – That Iran Wants To Destroy Israel”
Zibakalam [con’t]: “You say that Israel aspires to destroy Islam, that Israel wants to dismantle Iran, that Israel is cooperating with the Kurds and the monarchists, that Israel has aimed all its missiles at Iran. All these claims are only to justify the unjustifiable – that Iran wants to destroy Israel.”
Q: “It is expected that you, as a respected political science professor, to at least address ideas [attributed by Iran and others to Israel] such as ‘from the Nile to the Euphrates’ in your analyses. It should be recalled that the [Western] sanctions and [Iranian political] assassinations began the first day of the revolution…”
Zibakalam: “What do all these issues have to do with Israel? The sanctions and assassinations did begin on the first day of the revolution, but by what logic or justification do you attribute everything to Israel? How was Israel connected to [Iran’s] problems in Kurdistan, Azerbaijan, and, to some extent, also Khuzestan, and among the Arabs? There wasn’t even a direct connection [between these] and America.
“According to my analysis, in modern Iran, the central government in Tehran has controlled the Kurdish areas and ethnic minorities primarily by force and with weapons. Whenever Tehran’s central authority has weakened, provinces such as Kurdistan and Azerbaijan have raised their heads. If we want to follow the historical process of the [Turkmen-origin] Qajar dynasty [1794-1925], [we see that] despite its many shortcomings and weaknesses, it succeeded in establishing a kind of relatively stable overall authority for Iran. Nasser Al-Din Shah [the fourth Shah of Qajar Iran, who ruled from 1848 to 1896 and whose approach included openness to the West and reform combined with totalitarianism and political and religious persecution] was an example of this capability.
“But the [Persian] Constitutional Revolution [1905-1911] damaged and undermined this stability. The constitution did not manage to maintain the regime’s central rule, and afterwards came a period of instability, World War I, and events in whose aftermath the central power remained weakened for some time. For 15 years, instability prevailed – in Khuzestan, Sheikh Khazal seized power, as did Ismail Agha Shikak (Simko) in Kurdistan and Sheikh Mohammad Khiyabani in Azerbaijan and the [Kurdistan] Democratic Party. Also, in Khorasan, Mohammad Taqi Pessian emerged, and in the north, Mirza Kuchik Khan Jangali was active.
“After that came a man named Reza Khan [Pahlavi, Reza Shah Pahlavi, the father of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi] emerged; some say that the British brought him in, but I think that he was a product of Iranian society at that time. He succeeded in restoring unity and territorial integrity; he suppressed Ismail Agha Simko, defeated Sheikh Khazal, and also destroyed Jangali’s men. Thus, relying on force and the sword, he recreated unity and cohesion in the country.
“After his [Reza Khan Pahlavi’s] fall, the central authority was again undermined. Following this, unrest broke out in Kurdistan, Azerbaijan, and Khuzestan. In Kurdistan, an independent republic even arose; in Azerbaijan, autonomous rule [the Azerbaijan People’s Government] arose, headed by [Mir Jafar] Pishevari, and in Khuzestan, political movements were also active. This situation continued until after the August 19 (1953) rebellion.
“After that, with the restoration of government power under the rule of [Pahlavi’s son] Mohammad Reza Shah, the repression [of Iran’s ethnic minorities] was reinstated, [Iran’s] territorial integrity was to some extent reestablished, and there were nearly 25 years of stability and relative unity.
“But the Islamic Revolution of 1979 again toppled the authority, [and we saw] a return to what happened after the Constitutional Revolution and after September 1946 [the year-long Autonomous Government of Azerbaijan in the north of the country]. During the period of the [Islamic] Revolution, and despite the fact that it [the revolution] created some measure of unity and cohesion across Iran, in some of the regions, such as Kurdistan, unique problems arose. [An example of this was] the slogan ‘The Kurdish People Is Victorious, Reaction Is Extinguished’ and the demand for ‘Democracy for Iran, Autonomy for Kurdistan.’ I myself, as the representative of the provisional government in Kurdistan [following the revolution], was there and dealt with serious problems in this region.
Q: “There is a need to rethink the concept of ‘ethnic minority.’ In fact, I do not accept this term at all, because ‘minority’ has more to do with religious matters. In Iran, the ethnic groups are not a minority – they [the Sunni minorities] own this country, from Sistan and Baluchistan [Province] to Kurdistan, Khuzestan, and other places in the country. I also accept that over the past four decades the dignitaries and elites of these regions have not been treated as they should be; the allocation of resources has been unjust; and they have been seriously disregarded. I do accept these things, and there is no dispute about them.”
Zibakalam: “When the day of the revolution came [in 1979], the entire country called ‘May Khomeini be blessed.’ But in Kurdistan, the Kurds said, ‘Mr. Khomeini! What about the things that you promised us? What happened to them?’ A similar situation happened in Azerbaijan, with a few differences. There, the Party of the Republic of the Muslims was established, as opposed to the Party of the Islamic Republic established by the Militant Clerics, the followers of the Imam [Khomeini]. The son of the late Ayatollah [Mohammad Kazem] Shariatmadari [d. 1986] who is today considered an oppositionist, and other associates of the late [Shariatmadari the elder], established this party, and in Tabriz, activity began to [actualize] these ethnic demands.
“But their activity and their political ‘business’ did not succeed, and they crashed to the ground. Do you know why? Because [in the choice] between, on the one hand, the Party of the Muslim Republic and [its leader] Ayatollah Shariatmadari, and on the other, Imam Khomeini, the residents of Azerbaijan, Tabriz, Ardabil, and others chose the Imam and were disinclined to follow the [separatist] idea. The Party of the Muslim Republic was quickly erased from the arena and eventually it disbanded. But in Kurdistan, the situation was different. There, the question of ethnic identity was more deeply rooted. So between ‘the Islamic Revolution and the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini’ and ‘the historical and ethnic demands of the Kurds,’ the latter option was chosen.”
“When The Islamic Revolution Happened, The Sunnis In Zahedan Were Not Aware That They Were Sunnis… [But] The Art Of The Islamic Republic Was Such That It Made The Sunnis Aware Of Their Sunni Identity”; “Not Only Has The Islamic Republic Failed To Solve The Problem Of The Ethnic Groups – It Added Another Six Problems Concerning Them”
Zibakalam [con’t]: “Each time over the past seven, eight, or 10 years that I was invited to lecture at the University of Sistan and Baluchistan, I would go on my own initiative to meet with [Sunni Baluchi leader Sheikh] Molavi Abdolhamid. At that time many did not know him and he was not yet a particularly well-known figure. Of course the hosts, that is, the university administration, the provincial governor, and the IRGC did not like this idea very much, but I went anyway.
“One time I went to see him, it was on a Friday, and my lecture had been scheduled for that same day. This did not happen 100 years ago – it was probably in 2019, or at the latest 2018, that is, during Hassan Rouhani’s second presidential term. I got there without noticing that it was Friday and that Friday prayers were taking place at that time. When I got there, this was precisely at Molavi Abdolhamid’s mosque in Zahedan [the capital of Sistan and Baluchistan Province, which is the poorest, most neglected province in Iran].
“When they noticed me, they said, ‘Professor, Friday prayers are underway now.’ It was about 12 o’clock. I saw that the prayers were in progress, and metal partitions had been set up, and fabric-covered scaffolding. It was summer; I said my prayers.
“Afterwards two or three young men in long white Baluchi dress came up to me and said, ‘Professor. Zibakalam, Molavi wants to see you.’ Apparently they had told him that Zibakalam had arrived, was praying there, and would probably leave right after the prayer and not stay for the sermon. I put my shoes on and went to sit in the front row of worshipers. I kissed him on the face and sat down. Before the sermon, someone else spoke, and after 15-20 minutes, Molavi began his sermon. This was apparently in 2019, because by 2020 the coronavirus had already broken out. I listened to his sermon; his first sermon was about Aisha, the Prophet’s wife. At the start of the sermon he said: ‘Today we have a guest, Professor Zibakalam. Whenever he comes, he graciously comes here, unlike many others, and we are pleased by his visit.’
“After the end of the first sermon, I saw two or three people stand up and leave. I turned to the people next to me – I think it was his son or son‑in‑law – and asked, ‘Would it be all right if I go?’ They replied that there was no problem: between the first and second sermons there is a break during which anyone who wants to can leave. One of them brought me my shoes and one or two others escorted me outside. I nodded in farewell and took my leave of Molavi Abdolhamid.
“My body was trembling. Do you know what I was trembling from? From the crowds of people who had come to the Friday prayer. It was in the month of Khordad or Tir [June or July] of 2019. I know you will find this hard to believe, but there were more people there than at the Friday prayer in Tehran – waves of worshippers as far as the eye could see. When I arrived, I had not at first noticed the size of the crowd, but people kept coming and the mass kept growing.
“One thing that happened and created an opportunity to leave was the moment when Molavi Abdolhamid announced his intention to establish a new library and asked the public for donations for it. Four people held out a blanket – two on one side, two on the other – and people threw money into it. The money was in 50- and 10-toman bills, and it was all collected in a bag. The blanket was really full of money.
“That day, the IRGC invited me to lunch. The IRGC commanders in that region were more moderate people; they did not see me as an apostate to be fought. They had heard I was coming and told me I should come for lunch.
“There really was a planned meal. When I arrived, I apologized profusely for being late. They said, Yes, we understand – you went to Friday prayers and…’ Then they began talking about how they had thwarted the Saudis’ plots [amid the alleged Saudi connection with the Iranian Sunni Balochi population there] and about additional measures they had taken. And because it was very hot that day, all I ate were apricots, cherries, and similar fruits during the visit.
“The IRGC members kept talking, and at some point I realized I should say something too. I told them: ‘Brothers, the problem is not that the Saudis sent some people to spread [anti-regime] propaganda, or that some of them may have tried to approach Molavi Abdolhamid [to recruit him].’
“The main problem is that when the Islamic Revolution happened, the Sunnis in Zahedan were not aware that they were Sunnis. [That is,] they were Sunnis, but their next-door neighbors were Shi’ites, and they intermarried and coexisted, like Azeri families [in northeastern Iran] who live together in the same residential complex. [But] the art of the Islamic Republic was such that it made the Sunnis aware of their Sunni identity.’
“The people in this crowd [of Sunnis in Zahedan on that day] were saying, ‘See us.’ But they didn’t come to demand to be seen, they came to protest politically. They were told when the revolution broke out [in 1979] that there was a problem called Kurdistan [in northwestern Iran] with names like [leading Kurdish cleric] Sheikh Ezzadin Hosseini [and Kurdish political leader] Abd Al-Rahman Ghassemlou, and the Kurdistan Democratic Party. But because of Iran’s policy over the last 45 years, today there is not only the problem of Kurdistan, but you have also revived the cry of ‘Long live Azerbaijan’ [in northern Iran], along with reviving the consciousness of the Sunnis and breathing life into their identity. And then you saw in Zahedan [in eastern Iran] the ‘Woman, Life, Freedom’ protests by the Sunnis and Molavi Abdolhamid…’
“When I was left-leaning, I believed that socialism could solve the ethnicity problem. Awhile later, I believed that Islam and the Islamic Republic had solved the ethnicity problem. Today, I maintain that socialism has failed to solve that problem. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1999 to this day, and in Armenia with Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan with the Chechens, socialism has failed to solve the ethnicity problem.
“Not only has the Islamic Republic failed to solve the problem of ethnic groups – it added another six problems concerning them. During the Islamic Revolution, we had no Sunni problem with Molavi Abdolhamid, but today he too joins in the cry of ‘Long live Kurdistan.’ Neither the Islamic Republic nor socialism nor the monarchy nor Reza Shah managed to solve the ethnicity problem.”
Q: “Everything you are saying is just politics. Are you really comparing the situation of Kurdistan and of our [i.e. Iran’s] border areas and neglected regions in the era of the Islamic Republic era to the situation during the Pahlavi era?”
Zibakalam: “Yes, because nothing has changed. After the revolution, I served as a representative of the provisional government, and that was the first time I understood that Mahabad [the capital of West Azerbaijan province in Iranian Kurdistan in northwestern Iran] is different from Sabzevar [in Khorasan Razavi, in northeastern Iran]. Like it or not, the Kurdish cities of Mahabad, Sardasht, Sanandaj, Bukan, and Piranshahr are a different kind of region. They are not like Qom, Mashhad or Rasht [the major Shi’ite cities]. They are different, and in 1979 I already realized this.
“Time passed, and Mr. [Sadeq] Khalkhali [head of the revolutionary courts, known as ‘the hanging judge’] said that I was an agent of the [Kurdish] Democrats and therefore was no longer allowed to enter Kurdistan. On the other hand, the Kurdish extremists – [the] Komala [party], Ashraf Dehghani [leader of the Iranian People’s Fedai Guerrillas], Mojahedin-e Khalq and others who operated in Kurdistan – opposed me because I would not negotiate with them. I told [Dr. Mustafa] Chamran [Iran’s first defense minister, who was killed in 1981], the provisional government, and the council – only the Democratic Party of Kurdistan is worthy. I would visit [Kurdish] Sheikh Ezaddin Hosseini; I respected him, I prayed with him in the main mosque in Mahabad, but I saw no need to consult with them [i.e. him and others beside the Democratic Party] about what should be done. So they kidnapped me because I did not take them seriously, and finally the Democratic Party of Kurdistan rescued me and said there was no longer any need for me to stay there…
“Time passed, and I no longer had any contact with Kurdistan. Later I went abroad to study for a doctorate, and when I returned, as it happened, in 2019, the year before the coronavirus, the Kurdistan Bar Association held a ceremony for those who had completed their attorney internships and received their licenses to practice law. They held the ceremony in Sanandaj, and invited both me and Ebrahim Asgharzadeh[3]…
“I talked about there being hope that the situation would improve and that everything would work out, and general statements like that. The ceremony ended, and then we were told that the Kurds wanted to meet me and Asgharzadeh and talk with us. This was in 2019, while I had been in Kurdistan in 1979 – that is, nearly 40 years earlier. So we got there, and our Kurdish friends invited us [speak].
“Among those present were Kurdish representatives who had served in the fifth and sixth Majlis, as well as some journalists, writers and a former provincial governor. In total, there were 20-30 people present. [At the meeting] Asgharzadeh said… ‘I am certain that there are hands in Tehran that are deliberately working to prevent Kurdistan’s growth and development.’ He then gave several examples: ‘For instance, one of the wealthy Kurds living in France wanted to build a big hotel in Sanandaj, establish a poultry operation, and invest, [but he] left after a year or two. The same thing happened with another man who came to invest in Mahabad. This is no coincidence. Understand that this is deliberate…’
“I was speechless, because in 1979 the [Kurdish] hostility to Tehran was not as great as it is today. Over the past 20, 30, 40 years, we have regressed in our treatment of the Kurds. That is, the Kurds’ hatred, resentment, and anger vis-à-vis Tehran were, in 1979, much less, but now they are stronger. This is what the Islamic Republic has achieved.”
“Following The Islamic Revolution, It Was Iran That Chanted ‘Death To America’ And Declared That ‘Israel Must Be Destroyed’; “How Does Enmity Towards America, From The Day Of The Islamic Revolution To This Day, Benefit Iran’s National Interests? What Achievement Has This Enmity Towards America Brought Us?”
Q: “Given that Israel’s attack came as negotiations were underway in Oman, can this move be seen as separate from the desire of the U.S., or should it be considered part of a coordinated [Israel-U.S.] scenario? Why are you not seriously criticizing U.S. policy in this sphere?”
Zibakalam: “I am not criticizing Israel or America because of their political choices vis-à-vis Iran. What I mean is that following the Islamic Revolution, it was Iran that chanted ‘Death to America’ and declared that ‘Israel must be destroyed.’ It was you [the Iranian regime] who said you wanted to destroy Netanyahu, and you did everything in your power [to achieve this]. When you ask why I am not attacking America, I reply: Because it was you who, after the revolution, raised the slogan ‘Death to America,’ which continues to this day.”
Q: “Personally, even though it might cause problems for me, I do not agree [i.e. am critical of] the incident of the climbing over the embassies’ walls [i.e. the attacks on the U.S., U.K., European, and Saudi embassies in Iran over the years]. I also have criticism regarding the story of the [1979] U.S. Embassy takeover. But, also, it was you [Zibakalam personally] who did those things. Don’t you accept the [alleged evidence of] espionage documents [presented by Iran as proof of American espionage]? Has America made no mistakes in this country?! Have you forgotten the coup of 28 Mordad [the 1953 CIA coup that overthrew Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh]?”
Zibakalam: “A few months after the revolution, there were two versions [of events] regarding America, Iran, and the Islamic Revolution. One version [of the events] belonged to the opposition, the monarchists, and similar streams, who argued that ‘America stabbed Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi in the back, America joined hands with the Iranian revolutionaries and made a deal with them.’ That is one version.
“The second version is the Islamic Republic’s version, according to which ‘the Americans supported the Shah until the last moment, repressing and killing [Iranians], and when they realized that there was no longer any benefit from this, they told the Shah, Do whatever you want. The Shah, seeing that there was no point, boarded a plane and left.’
“If someone had landed from Mars, their first question would have been: ‘Excuse me, how many Americas are there? Isn’t there only one America?’ Then he would add, ‘If that is so, why are some Iranians saying that this America killed and repressed to the end to prevent the revolution, while others say that this same America caused the revolution? Are there two Americas?’
“The answer is that both versions are political versions. The monarchists and some of the young people of the 1980s who think ‘what revolution? It was the Americans who brought these [Islamists] to power’ are mistaken, and you [the regime], who say ‘the Americans killed for as long as they could and supported the Shah,’ are also promoting political version.
“A few months after the revolution came the [celebration of the] anniversary of Algeria’s revolution [Algeria’s 1954-62 war of independence against France]. A delegation from Iran was also invited [to the event]. At that time, Algeria was very important to us, [and this anniversary] was almost the same [in importance to us] as the anniversary of [Iran’s] Islamic Revolution.
“The delegation to Algeria included the late Mehdi Bazargan, who was prime minister, [then-defense minister] Dr. Mostafa Chamran, the late Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi [deputy prime minister and first foreign minister in Bazargan’s provisional government until he resigned in November 1979 over the hostage crisis], and one or two others.
“When they arrived at their accommodations, their Algerian hosts informed them that the American delegation was very keen to meet with them. The Iranians asked who was in the American delegation and were told that [one member was] Zbigniew Brzezinski, the U.S. National Security Advisor – that is, No. 2 in [President] Jimmy Carter’s administration. With him were [then-Secretary of State] Cyrus Vance and [then-Secretary of Defense] Harold Brown. [That is,] senior government figures had arrived.
“The Iranians sat and discussed amongst themselves whether or not to meet [with the Americans]. Finally they said that meeting would not be a commitment [to anything, so] let’s meet and see what they have to say. The meeting took place, and because it was an official diplomatic meeting, there is a record of what we said and what the Americans said.
“The main points of the Americans’ statements was: We have no hostility toward you, we have no hostility toward your revolution. Although we would have preferred Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi remain in power instead of the current revolutionaries in Tehran, there is nonetheless no hostility between us. The revolution was the will of the majority of the Iranian people and we recognize it.
“[They said:] The reason we wanted to meet you is, first of all, to say we have no hostility. Second, we had many contracts with Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, some in arms deals but also in civilian sectors such as raw materials, machinery, and other things. Now all those contracts are suspended. Some of the orders were paid in full by you and some were paid partially, but everything remains unfinished and frozen. In addition, Iran’s assets in various U.S. accounts were frozen. Those assets belonged to Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi’s government but now have no clear status. We request that you appoint on your side a special delegation with full powers from Imam Khomeini or any other authorized body to sit and discuss solutions to these problems. On our side we will also set up a committee with full powers to handle these financial and legal matters.
“They added one more point, [because] we wanted to ask why the Shah came to America [because] this aroused a great deal of sensitivity. Many in Iran think that bringing the Shah to America was aimed at preparing a coup, but [according to the Americans] the truth is that he was ill and hospitalized and was unable to carry out a coup.
“The meeting ended and the Iranian delegation returned to Iran.
“The moment [the delegation] landed at Mehrabad Airport [in Tehran], a wave of protests began. [Protestors shouted]: ‘Death to Bazargan, crazy old man, how dare you speak with the Americans? Who gave you permission? You should have gotten permission from the Imam [Khomeini].’ So a strong wave of opposition formed, because at that time the hatred and hostility toward America were at their peak.
“This happened in November 1978, even before the student takeover of the American embassy [in November 1979]. The late engineer [prime minister] Mehdi Bazargan responded to all these attacks with a single line, saying in response to all the insults leveled at him for talking with the Americans – which did not come from any one stream but, interestingly, from various organizations and movements… from the [pro-communist] Tudeh Party, the National Front, the Islamic Republic Party, the Muslim students loyal to the ideology of Imam [Khomeini], and [reformist politician] Behzad Nabavi…
“When asked why he had negotiated with the Americans without asking permission from Imam Khomeini, Bazargan replied with a sharp and precise answer: ‘Imam Khomeini is not Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, and I am not [the Shah’s prime minister] Amir Abbas Hoveyda who would ask permission from his superior even to drink water.’
“No one asked him whether he had permission to speak with the Americans. What’s the big deal? The Americans ask to meet you and want to negotiate. What are you supposed to do, not talk to them?’
“Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi later reported the meeting to the Imam. Because the Imam [Khomeini] greatly trusted Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi and was in constant contact with him, Yazdi went and reported the meeting to him. At that meeting – unless you are saying that Dr. Yazdi lied – Yazdi asked the Imam [Khomeini], ‘Do you want us to raise the proposal to break off relations with America?’ The Imam replied ‘No’ and did not say it in any other way [that is, he was completely clear about this]. After the meeting [between the Iranians and the Americans] ended, Dr. Yazdi reported to the Imam what had been said and what had happened there.
“When the students stormed the American embassy… the Imam asked Dr. Yazdi, ‘Who are these people and what are they doing?’ Because earlier, during the seven or eight months prior to the revolution, there had already been two or three similar incidents. Dr. Yazdi had answered: ‘These are our boys, young Muslims.’
“You may not agree with them politically, but Ebrahim Asgharzadeh [who was also a leader of the students’ takeover of the U.S. Embassy, see Endnote 3] and others, as well as Mohsen Mirdamadi [another student leader and then-editor of the reformist newspaper Nowruz, who was later imprisoned], admired Imam Khomeini.
“The Imam was silent for a moment and then said [to Yazdi], ‘Go and get them out of there’ [i.e. out of the embassy].”
“In all the political storm and chaos of that time, Dr. Yazdi had already quit his position in the government. Forty-eight hours later, the Imam called this [the U.S. Embassy takeover] the ‘second revolution.’ During the 46 years that have passed since then, in which the West has investigated and analyzed every detail, we [in Iran] have not even examined how it happened that this imam, who even a day previously had said ‘Get them out of there,’ had changed his mind, adopted the slogan ‘Death to America,’ and declared that no one was entitled to negotiate with the Americans.
“And anyone who thinks that Dr. Yazdi was lying needs to know that it was he who was the truth-teller – because he was the liaison between the Imam and those who climbed the walls of the embassies. The man with whom he was in touch was [Ayatollah] Mohammad Mousavi Khoeini-ha [founder of the reformist movement of the Assembly of Militant Clerics and aides to Khomeini] and Ebrahim Asgharzadeh and others were with him.
“At the meeting of the final decision they told Mousavi Khoeini-ha: ‘As long as we do not have permission from the Imam, we will not carry out any operation.’ They said that the Imam had the last word. Khoeini-ha replied to them: ‘The imam would not approve your act [the takeover]. Go and take over the embassies, I am authorized by the Imam to give permission.’
“During these 46 years, we have not investigated the real facts. For the past 46 years – actually 56 – [the takeover] was in your hands, today’s reformists and liberals, and that it was the Americans who persecuted us [and not the other way around].
“Everyone says: Mr. Zibakalam, everyone knows about the 28th of Mordad [the U.S. August 1953 coup in Iran] – America was involved in that. But you [the Islamic regime] have always had a problem with the Kurds. I told you that after the [1905–1911] Constitutional Revolution you had problems with the Kurds; during the era of Reza Shah there were also problems with the Kurds; and even now you have a problem with the Kurds. What does that have to do with America?
“America hasn’t been in this country for 46 years – but there were widespread strikes and protests in Kurdistan. In Kurdistan there were executions, arrests, and repression. Some [of those arrested] are still imprisoned in Evin [where political prisoners are held] in Tehran. Compare how many people were there [in Evin] from Mashhad [northeastern Iran] with [how many were there from] Isfahan [central Iran]. Your problem is in Kurdistan. Only there do we have a problem.
“The problem deepened because their [the Kurds’] elites emigrated and then returned and said, We are certain that people in Tehran are preventing Kurdistan’s development and progress. I was silent; I had nothing to say. I didn’t want to explain further. I said: Why would they do that in Tehran? I said that it was so that the Kurdish elites would not remain in Mahabad, Sanandaj, Kermanshah, and Piranshahr – so that that the engineers, doctors, and jurists would leave [Kurdistan], because if they stayed there would be civil claims, but if they left who would remain in Kurdistan except for the people who sell alcoholic drinks or cards at the Mahabad junction [i.e. the uneducated poor]. Those are the people who would remain. I said no more. I listened to the colleagues’ analysis and said nothing further.
“When we parted and they apologized and said sorry for bothering you, one of the older men, I don’t remember his name, turned to me and said: Professor, this evening you were very quiet. I said: what you said shook me so much, until I understood, oh woe, oh woe, a thousand mercies on Iran and a thousand mercies on Tehran and Mahabad. In 1979, there was in the name of God such Kurdish darkness, malice, and hatred towards Tehran.”
Q: “In my opinion, if you, as an academic and an intellectual, compare [the situation in] Kurdistan and Mahabad in 1978-1979 to their situation in 2021 and recent years, the result is surprising. I’m not saying there aren’t problems, but a fair perspective is needed, and there’s no reason to despair. I follow your discussions closely, and I wonder why you sometimes deliberately ignore reality. Is that mostly due to lack of awareness on your part?”
Zibakalam: “I believe that today’s distrust, chill, and lack of faith between the Kurds and Tehran are immeasurably greater than in 1979. Now tell me, you can call them separatists, but it was the Islamic Republic of Iran that acted like a separatist, planning the hostility toward America after the revolution. Anyone who has tried over the past 46 years to moderate that hostility has been beaten and silenced. May God have mercy on the late Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani,[4] with whom I had discussions over five or so years. The results of these discussions are documented in audio and in writing, and from them came the book Hashemi Undisguised.
“In one of our conversations, he said there were two issues he had wanted to resolve back in the days of the Imam [Khomeini]. One was the [1980-88] war with Iraq, and the other was the hostility toward America. About the first, the war with Iraq, he said he had succeeded in managing and ending it, because he believed that if the Imam were gone, no one could bring an end to the war with Iraq and to the slogan ‘Death to America.’ He said he had ended the war with Iraq and that the Imam had agreed to a ceasefire. That was the poisoned cup [that Khomeini] said that he drank, but [Rafsanjani] said he had not managed to resolve the enmity toward America.
“The late Hashemi said these things when I spoke with him around 2002-2003. Anyone who has, over the past 46 years, asked, ‘How long will this hostility toward America last? What benefit does it bring to our national interest?’ has been attacked and criticized by the extremists and various streams.
“I ask you only one question, nothing more: How does enmity towards America, from the day of the Islamic Revolution to this day, benefit Iran’s national interests? What achievement has this enmity towards America brought us? On the other hand, I can show you dozens of examples of how insisting on this enmity towards America has harmed our national interests.”
“You [The Iranian Regime] Have Invested Billions Of Dollars In The Nuclear Program – Has This Increased The Electricity Supply… [Or] Brought Our Industry Or Mines Out Of Stagnation?” “Why Is There All This Sensitivity [In The West] About Iran’s Nuclear Program, But Not The Same Sensitivity Towards Pakistan, India, Brazil Or Argentina, Which Have [Actually] Made Bombs? The Answer Is Clear: Iran Has Openly And Publicly Declared That It Will Destroy Israel”
Q: “I have just one thing to say against your argument: You are ignoring the problems of the policy, plans, and planning by those who stand against Iran, and saying that all this stems only from the Iranian side.”
Zibakalam: “We have built a lengthy indictment of ‘America’s hostility towards Iran’ and have reiterated this indictment many times over the past two years.
“For example, one of the crimes committed by the Americans was the downing of the Iranian Airbus with 300 passengers aboard [Iran Air Flight 655], which was mistakenly shot down on July 3, 1988 over the Strait of Hormuz by a U.S. Navy warship. We all talk about it, even though any idiot could see that [unlike what the Americans claimed, it was a plane and] wasn’t a missile. The point is that if you examine this issue today you might say: ‘America shot down the airliner so later it could demand we negotiate, and if needed, it would shoot it down a second or a third time.’ That is our analysis.
“But the reality is that some 600-700 pages of examinations, studies, and investigations were produced by the Senate, the Pentagon, and other U.S. bodies, including the ship’s commander, Captain Rogers. Those documents explain how, at that moment, he erred and thought the airliner was an [Iranian] Phantom fighter plane approaching them. In other words, there was no deliberate intent to shoot down the airliner to force us to accept UN Resolution 598; it was a mistake in identification.
“The Americans themselves investigated it so that no such incident would ever happen again. They examined how an experienced senior officer misinterpreted the data on the screen in the last seconds. I accept that. The Americans wanted to understand why it happened.
“But what does the Islamic Republic say? It’s as if Sadeq Zibakalam is holding a glass and it slips and breaks. The Americans will say, ‘Let’s investigate why it fell from his hand,’ but the official [Iranian] policy says, ‘You idiot, you did it on purpose!’ These are two completely different approaches, and it’s the same on every issue. You yourself said they ‘set off a civil war [in Iran],’ but the truth is that it was not the Americans who started a civil war.
“If you are talking about the Kurds, this is rooted in Iran’s history. And if you are talking about groups such as [Maryam] Rajavi [the leader of the anti-regime Mujaheddin-e Khalq organization], or the terror attacks [that the MEK carries out], this too has nothing to do with America. These are small exiled groups linked to Israel… The indictment that Iran has built against America over the past 46 years is [just] a collection of accusations that can all be attributed to it. I accept that in America there are people like [former national security advisor] John Bolton, [and presidents] Bush and Trump, who had anti-Iran positions.
“In the past 20 or so years, you have invested billions of dollars in the nuclear program. Has this increased the electricity supply? Has it brought our industry or mines out of stagnation? The reality is this: The only achievement of [Iran’s] nuclear [program] is that it provided [the Iranian regime] with a tool for boosting hatred of America and encouraging hostility towards the West.
“Why is there all this sensitivity [in the West] about Iran’s nuclear program, but not the same sensitivity about Pakistan, India, Brazil or Argentina, which have [actually] made bombs? The answer is clear: Iran has openly and publicly declared that it will destroy Israel. When there is such a position, and at the same time we say ‘our nuclear program is for peaceful and civilian purposes’ but at the same time imply ‘we might also build a bomb,’ it is natural for global sensitivity to increase.”[5] [1] See MEMRI TV Clip No. 5746, Iranian Reformist Intellectual Zibakalam Refuses to Step on American, Israeli Flags, November 5, 2016.
[2] Imam-khomeini.ir/en/n51045/Imam-Khomeini-If-the-Muslims-would-have-united-and-each-of-them-poured-a-bucket-of-water-o, November 25, 2023. [3] Ebrahim Asgharzadeh, political activist and Majlis member 1988-1992, was a leader of the students who took over the U.S. Embassy in 1979; he later criticized that action and the Iranian regime’s policy and called for advancing Iran-U.S. relations. [4] Hashemi (d. 2017) is thought to have been assassinated as a result of his criticism of the policies of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. He was Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s right‑hand man and served as Iranian president/ [5] Tabnak (Iran), September 30, 3035.
