Eurasia Press & News
If the polls are to believed, 2026 could finally see the end of the 16 years of dominance of Viktor Orban and his Fidesz party, and pave the way for a relatively unknown and definitely inexperienced new government. Yet defeating Orban at the ballot box might not be enough: retaining power for at least two years would be crucial for altering Hungary’s decade-and-a-half-long anti-democratic trajectory.
The parliamentary election, expected to be called in April, will dominate politics for the first half of year, as an unprecedentedly dirty and negative campaign will be fought both online and offline. Orban and his party will need to claw back a 5-7 point deficit in the polls currently enjoyed by the resourceful Tisza party led by former Fidesz insider Peter Magyar.
This is uncharted territory for the prime minister, who has won the last four elections with comfortable majorities and is unaccustomed to facing any serious challenger. Orban, who has lately put his focus more on international politics, will frame the election as a choice between “war or peace” and will build his campaign around convincing the Hungarian electorate about the imminent threat of war should he not be re-elected. The European Commission and Ukraine will continue to be cast as the principal villains, advancing a chilling pro-Russian narrative which would push Hungary further to the EU’s periphery.
Orban’s rival Peter Magyar will avoid geopolitics and focus instead on the ailing economy, systemic neglect of health care, and multiple scandals in the child-protection system, hammering at the essence of the government’s Christian-conservative ideals. He will also build on society’s growing weariness with the 16-year rule of Orban.
Don’t count him out
The key question ahead of the election is whether Orban can convince some of his disillusioned voters to return and attract new ones. Never underestimate a seasoned political warrior, say experts, especially one who can rely on huge financial resources, a well-oiled media machine, and backing from global leaders such as US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Disinformation, deepfakes and AI-generated content are expected to flood the online space. Russia – and possibly even the US – will invest heavily to keep Orban in power. An eventual “peace summit” in Budapest between Trump and Putin (not likely, but can’t be ruled out) could win Orban a few extra votes, but is unlikely to be decisive for the election outcome.
Regardless of the result, the country will lean further towards a two-party system, with most leftist and liberal opposition parties disappearing, leaving only Tisza, Fidesz and possibly the far-right Mi Hazank (Our Homeland) sitting in the parliament.
It won’t be a fair election – Orban and his nationalist-populist Fidesz party will fight until their last breath using every tool at their disposal. So will the opposition Tisza, making it an election of “life or death”. If the result is close, neither party will accept it and demand recounts, with supporters of both hitting the streets. This will paralyse political decision-making for weeks and further shake confidence in the economy. Political polarisation will deepen, at least until April.
However, given the peculiarities of the Hungarian electoral system, there is a greater probability of a clear-cut victory for one or the other.
Different scenarios
Under “Scenario A”, Tisza wins with a sizeable but not two-thirds constitutional majority, which would be insufficient to regain full control of the country’s institutions. It could easily become a kamikaze government that flames out: it will inherit empty budget coffers and obstruction from Fidesz-loyal institutions – the presidential administration, the prosecutor’s office, the Constitutional Court and the State Audit Office.
A new government could face a “Polish scenario”, where it will need all its legal and economic creativity to remove those obstacles, without resorting to undemocratic methods. No political grace period will be granted to this incoming government, which will have to deliver quickly on at least some of its campaign promises otherwise popular support will quickly evaporate.
The public media will be purged of pro-Fidesz propagandists to ensure more balanced reporting. However, the critical media will need to walk a fine line between supporting the re-democratisation of the country’s institutions and maintaining (justified) criticism of the new government. The first three months of a new administration will be decisive: launching high-profile corruption cases against beneficiaries of the regime could satisfy voters’ demand for social justice, but it is questionable whether substantial money can be recovered. The government will immediately request Hungary’s EU funds be unfrozen and announce the country’s intention to join the European Public Prosecutor’s Office.
Under this scenario, Orban is unlikely to withdraw from politics and will plan a rapid comeback. Fidesz will continue to increase the polarisation of Hungarian society and work on widening splits within the governing party. Still only 63 in May 2026, Orban will continue leveraging his international network with Trump’s MAGA community and via the Patriots for Europe party grouping in the European Parliament. But his reputation as an invincible political warrior will take a blow.
A Tisza government will face a hostile regional environment, with Czechia’s Andrej Babis and Slovakia’s Robert Fico leading two Orban-friendly governments in the Visegrad Group (V4), and Janez Jansa poised to return to power in Slovenia. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, a potential ally for Magyar, is battling his own domestic problems.
A new Hungarian government will clearly distance itself from Russia and China, but finding a pragmatic working relationship with the Trump administration could be challenging. Relations with the EU will be more constructive, though it will remain firm on migration and cautious vis-a-vis support for Ukraine in the war.
Facing a stagnant economy
Under “Scenario B”, Fidesz wins, but without an absolute majority, meaning it might have to rely on a coalition with the far-right Mi Hazank. This would push Hungary further towards becoming an autocracy, with doubts rising about whether this government would ever be voted out in a democratic manner.
Critics, opposition politicians, the independent media and NGOs will face increased persecution; the illiberal but so-far suspended “Transparency law” will be fully implemented. Tisza will struggle to curb Fidesz’s excesses, and as a party that draws its support mostly from providing an illusion of regime change, it could disintegrate. Social disappointment, especially among the younger generations, will trigger an exodus of talented professionals, further aggravating Hungary’s demographic problems.
Orban will continue to campaign against the European institutions, strengthen his Patriots for Europe movement and seek strategic victories abroad. His party’s main German ally, the far-right AfD, is poised to win the elections in Lower Saxony next year and stage the party’s first ever leader at a regional level.
Hungary’s EU funds will remain frozen and the Article 7 procedure could move forward – although not reach the final stage of suspending the country’s voting rights at EU institutions. Even so, Orban’s fifth term would push Hungary further to the fringes of the EU, with political discussions intensifying about “life outside the EU”. The debate over the EU’s next seven-year budget will enter its final phase, gifting Orban an opportunity to wield or even just threaten to wield his veto power to block the process should he not get what he wants. However, he could quickly find out that his V4 allies, Babis and Fico, are much more pragmatic when it comes to EU finances.
Regardless who wins the election, they will need to address a stagnant economy, a high budget deficit and growing state debt. Even if long-awaited investments come to fruition, like China’s BYD car plant in Szeged, they will not be enough to lift the economy out of its doldrums. The government will need to rectify the economic strategy and diversify beyond cheap manufacturing.
The delay of the EU’s 2035 deadline on the ban of combustion engine vehicles will provide some breathing space for the country’s large car industry, but it won’t be enough to hinder the shift towards electrification. Significant money is also expected to come from the EU’s expanded 150-billion-euro SAFE defence fund – 16 billion euros (in loans) – although it is yet to be seen who will ultimately benefit from this flow of money. Hungary’s 4iG, whose ownership is close to the government, is well placed to get much of the EU funds, but in practice major Western defence companies like Germany’s Rheinmetall and France’s Thales could ultimately benefit most from SAFE, even from allocations made to those member states like Hungary on the EU’s eastern flank.
By the end of 2026, Hungary will need to come up with a strategy to diversify away completely from Russian energy sources, as stipulated by the EU. With a Tisza government in place such a process would be accelerated, but a Fidesz government will cling to the remote possibility that Russian-EU energy relations can be restored if there is a ceasefire in Ukraine.
This year will not only be about who wins the election, but how possible it is to reverse more than a decade of democratic backsliding in the short to medium term. In this sense, Hungary could serve as an example for other countries, both inside and outside of the EU, that are experiencing democratic backsliding.
2026 will also be decisive about Hungary’s (and the V4’s) room of manoeuvre within the EU at a time seen as existential for the bloc, as it seeks to confront Russian aggression, faces the complete loss of its transatlantic partner, and struggles with its own internal divisions.
