Eurasia Press & News
- Baghdad is trying to balance its relations with regional and global powers that wield substantial leverage over Iraq.
- Iraq has downplayed its opposition to Turkish military operations against Kurdish oppositionists inside Iraq to further its bilateral agenda with Ankara.
- Iraq’s relations with Türkiye are intertwined with tensions between Arab Iraq and the Kurdish-run semi-autonomous region of northern Iraq.
- As a moderate new president takes office in Iran, Washington continues to try to compel the Iraqi government to distance itself from Tehran and its Axis of Resistance.
Iraq’s efforts to emerge from decades of war, sanctions, and regional isolation are complicated by the ambitious agendas of powerful neighbors and global mentors. U.S. officials and experts have tended to focus on the influence Tehran wields in Iraq, working through a network of mostly Shia Muslim militias that are advised and funded by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – Qods Force. Strains between Iraq and Türkiye are viewed in Washington as secondary, despite the presence of some Turkish forces over the Iraq border pursuing armed Kurdish militants of the anti-Ankara Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Washington’s double standard is not hard to understand: Iran and its “Axis of Resistance” are U.S. adversaries, whereas Türkiye, despite President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s differences with U.S. policy, is a member of NATO that hosts U.S. bases.
Earlier in July, Turkish forces expanded an offensive against PKK bases in northern Iraq, moving deeper into Iraqi territory following escalated air and artillery strikes over the border. The incursion comes ten weeks after Erdogan’s landmark visit to Baghdad, during which he and Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani discussed steps the two countries could take against the PKK, and Türkiye welcomed Iraq’s designation of the PKK as a banned group. However, the July expansion of Türkiye’s moves into northern Iraq was not coordinated with Baghdad, and Iraq reacted angrily. A high-level Iraqi government delegation, led by National Security Advisor Qasim Al-Araji, visited the Kurdish enclave’s capital in Erbil on July 11 to coordinate Baghdad’s positions with regional Kurdistan authorities about the widening Turkish offensive.
Baghdad’s reaction to the Turkish move appeared intended to satisfy Iraq’s Kurds amid ongoing tensions between the Kurds and Iraq’s much larger Arab community. In particular, negotiations between Baghdad and the Kurdish north to resume oil exports from the Kurdistan region to Türkiye have made little progress since the Iraq-Türkiye oil pipeline flow was halted in March 2023. Baghdad halted the exports because, in Baghdad’s view, production-sharing agreements between the Kurds and foreign companies are illegal. The Iraqi federal government insists that foreign oil companies negotiate new contracts with the Iraqi oil ministry and deposit all revenue from oil sales in Central Bank accounts. The prolonged pipeline closure has resulted in significant losses for Baghdad and Erbil by stopping 450,000 barrels of crude oil per day in exports.
Yet, most experts and global officials assessed Baghdad’s reaction to the expanded Turkish incursion as relatively muted – a downplaying intended to prevent differences over the Turkish operations from injuring the broader Iraq-Türkiye relationship. Iraq’s government is seeking to host the first meeting in more than a decade between Erdogan, and his Syrian counterpart, Bashar al-Assad, according to Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein. The Minister added: “There was a meeting with the foreign ministers of the two countries (Syria and Türkiye) and it was agreed in principle to meet in Baghdad, but a date has not been set yet. When I return [to Baghdad from the NATO summit in Washington], a date will be set.”
According to observers, Iraq benefits from mediating between the two countries on Iraq’s border. A rapprochement between Syria and Türkiye would enhance regional stability, reflecting positively on the security and economic situation in Iraq. Mediating a meeting between Assad and Erdogan would also significantly elevate Iraq’s regional profile.
As the Sudani government manages its relations with Iraq’s Kurds and with NATO member Türkiye, it is also assessing Iraq’s relations with Tehran – a relationship that is of paramount concern in Washington. As are U.S. leaders, Iraqi officials are attempting to discern whether any Iranian regional policies might change as a result of the unexpected election of reformist figure Masoud Pezeshkian to the presidency, following the death of hardliner Ibrahim Raisi in May. After his election on July 5, Pezeshkian contacted Iraqi President Abdul Latif Rashid, technically his direct counterpart, to highlight the strong bonds between Iran and Iraq. Pezeshkian stated: “The extent of political, economic, cultural and religious ties between Iran and Iraq needs no explanation.” Rashid congratulated Pezeshkian on his election victory and described the relationship between the two countries as “deep, strong, and in line with the interests of the two nations.”
The Pezeshkian outreach notwithstanding, Baghdad remains deeply ambivalent about its relations with the Islamic Republic. Even though Pezeshkian advocates a less aggressive Iranian regional stance, Washington will continue to pressure the Iraqi government to distance itself from Iran, which exerts political, economic, and strategic influence on Baghdad. Several Iran-aligned Shia militia groups are part of the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance” that says it will stop fighting Israel and the United States when Israel ends its offensive in Gaza against their ally, Hamas.
Washington has sought to compel the Sudani government to demobilize the pro-Iranian militias, but the groups are part of powerful political movements with a strong base among the majority Shia Iraqi population, and Baghdad does not want to risk civil conflict by moving against Iran-aligned militias militarily. Baghdad and Tehran – which does not want conflict with the United States – seem to have prevailed on the network of Iran-backed Iraqi Shia militia groups to cease attacking bases in Iraq where 2,500 U.S. military personnel train Iraq government forces fighting Islamic State. U.S. retaliatory attacks might have contributed to the apparent choice by the Iran-aligned groups to stand down from attacking U.S. forces.
Even though most Iraqi citizens strongly oppose Israel’s operations in Gaza, Iraqi officials have taken into account the country’s broader diplomatic alignments in formulating its policy on the Gaza war. In particular, Iraqi officials, while strongly criticizing Israel, strenuously deny they have approved or backed efforts by Iran-aligned Iraqi militia groups to coordinate anti-Israel operations with Lebanese Hezbollah and other Axis partners. In late June, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah said in a speech that militant leaders from Iran, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and other countries had offered to send tens of thousands of fighters to help Hezbollah. Thousands of such Iraqi militia fighters have already been deployed in Syria as part of Iran’s effort to support the Assad regime, and these fighters can easily move from there into Lebanon.
Iraqi government efforts to distance itself from Iran’s post-October 7 Axis of Resistance operations reflect the wariness of Washington’s pressure. Iraq acknowledged, yet again, its continued dependence on the U.S. for security support by sending Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein to the NATO Summit in Washington from July 8-11. Since 2018, NATO has deployed a non-combat advisory mission in Iraq that “advises relevant Iraqi defense and security officials in the Ministry of Defense, Office of the National Security Advisor, and Prime Minister’s National Operations Center,” according to the mission’s website. In August 2023, at the request of the Sudani government, the mandate of NATO Mission – Iraq was expanded to include supporting Iraq’s Ministry of Interior and Federal Police Command. Sudani has also made clear to the Iran-aligned Shia factions, which are part of his governing coalition, that his government will not request that Washington withdraw its forces from Iraq in negotiations underway on a bilateral strategic framework agreement. Expelling U.S. forces from Iraq has long been a goal of Tehran and its allies inside Iraq.
Iraqi leaders also see Washington as a conduit for re-integration into the Arab fold after many years of estrangement under the regime of Saddam Hussein. Most of the moderate Arab states are allies of the United States – particularly the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. U.S. leaders have sought to move Iraqi and moderate Arab leaders closer together, both to benefit Iraq’s economy and infrastructure and to reduce Iranian influence in Iraq. A rift with Washington over Iraq’s ties to Iran, were a rift to occur, could lead Iraq back to isolation within the Arab camp. Iraq expects to take a large step in its reintegration into the Arab world by hosting the next Arab summit in the spring of 2025, after the Arab League approved Baghdad’s bid to host the event.
