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This personal assessment challenges whether Germany’s Zeitenwende has achieved its goals. While it reflects the author’s views, not necessarily the view of all members of DGAP’s Action Group Zeitenwende, the debate continues. In the coming weeks, DGAP’s magazine Internationale Politik Quarterly will invite more experts to explore whether Germany’s Zeitenwende has failed or what it needs to succeed.
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Evaluating the results of the “Zeitenwende,” Germany’s supposed security transformation, shows that it has failed. A two-year DGAP project concludes that the Zeitenwende, proclaimed by Chancellor Olaf Scholz, no longer carries political force and should be abandoned as a term of use. By presenting strategic continuity as change, it has left Germany unprepared to face major (geo)political and (geo)economic challenges, and has eroded influence with allies. Germany now needs a comprehensive strategic reset – and bold leadership in domestic as well as foreign policy – to arrest its decline and ensure its security, prosperity, and democracy.
Germany’s Zeitenwende has failed. That is the sweeping, yet inescapable, conclusion after a two-year evaluation by the German Council on Foreign Relations’ (DGAP) Action Group Zeitenwende (AGZ). The project brought together German and international politicians, officials, experts and business representatives in different formats, building a network as well as knowledge. In more than forty events and over thirty publications we analyzed and explored Germany’s geostrategic positioning and choices and presented options to help the country master its geopolitical and geoeconomic challenges in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022.
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz proclaimed, in a landmark speech just three days later, that Russia’s attack marked a “Zeitenwende”: a historic turning point. He demanded that, after years of neglect of its defense and recklessness or naivete (depending on your view) in its geopolitical positioning, Germany must now rise to the challenge of the changing times. Scholz outlined what grew into the five key elements of Berlin’s response to Russia’s invasion and Germany’s geostrategic repositioning, which also became known as the Zeitenwende:
Supporting Ukraine in its fight for freedom and democracy;
Reducing dependency on Russian energy while continuing to pursue climate goals;
Taking a tougher approach to Russia and addressing threats from authoritarian states;
Enhancing Germany’s role in strengthening the European Union (EU) and NATO;
Arming Germany to be able to defend itself.Based on discussions within the AGZ, the project team developed a framework for assessing these changes, evaluating whether their speed, level of ambition, durability and coordination with international allies was sufficient to meet the geopolitical challenges that prompted them. This underpinned a broad, integrated way of understanding the Zeitenwende and Germany’s geostrategic positioning and possibilities, beyond the narrow focus on defense policy that dominated discussion after Scholz’s speech.
Analyses by AGZ participants showed, in line with an interim assessment, that Germany’s change has not been completed on its own terms and is dangerously inadequate to meet both the challenges that triggered it and the wider tests that have subsequently emerged. Moreover, it has lost political and public traction. Continuing to use the term Zeitenwende is counterproductive as it pretends that real change is ongoing when, in fact, it is more urgently needed than ever.
The following analysis shows how and why the Zeitenwende has failed. It focuses on the role of the German coalition government’s policy and practice. It particularly examines the role of the Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, who explicitly made foreign and security policy Chefsache” – a matter for the boss, and thus for him – and it is primarily the Federal Chancellery that has made the Zeitenwende what it is, and isn’t.
Ukraine: Failure to Commit to Victory Undermines Substantial Support
Germany’s support for Ukraine has been central to assessing the Zeitenwende but, because it has failed to understand that this is a war that needs to be won and then acting accordingly, Chancellor Scholz’s government has fallen damagingly short in this key area. The government has repeatedly emphasized its progress – from sending the now infamous 5000 helmets to delivering powerful offensive weapons, (falsely) claiming this overcame a national taboo. Scholz even felt confident enough to demand that others step up and do more, while repeatedly complaining that Germany’s contribution to Ukraine was underappreciated. Ostensibly, the chancellor had a point. Germany has been the second largest donor after the US and, by June 2024, had spent EUR 33 billion on aid (civilian, humanitarian, financial, military) and nearly EUR 26 billion on hosting Ukrainian refugees – the highest level of support to Ukraine in absolute financial terms of any European country.
Yet, the overall figures don’t tell the full story, and frustrated allies have good grounds for criticizing Berlin. Germany has by far Europe’s largest economy and, if it were truly committed to Ukraine’s fight, would be expected to contribute by far the largest amount. Relative to GDP, however, Germany falls below the proportion allocated by twelve other European states. Many of these countries share the German foreign office’s position that “Ukraine’s security is our security,” but act on it more convincingly. It is also true that other European states, notably Italy and Spain but also France and the UK, should do more. Yet, as experts within the AGZ have argued, not doing what is in your country’s national and security interest, because others are not doing it, is poor strategy – a problem that has plagued Berlin’s approach.
In war, speed matters, and, to the despair of Ukrainians and the anger of allies, Germany has dragged its feet in delivering howitzers, infantry fighting vehicles (IVFs), rocket artillery and main battle tanks (MBTs) – while blocking other countries from sending tanks it had sold them. The cost of this delay was measured in Ukrainian lives and squandered strategic advantage, allowing Russia to dig in and regroup, lengthening both the war and Kyiv’s path to victory.
What Germany has (and hasn’t) provided also matters. Scholz’s refusal, in 2023 and 2024, to send Taurus cruise missiles hindered Ukraine’s strategic position. Spurning demands from his coalition partners, the opposition Christian Democratic and Christian Social Union parties and international allies, Scholz instead made unconvincing excuses. Despite delays, Germany has led on sending air defense assets, which help Ukraine survive. Yet, as AGZ members concurred, targeting the arrow, not the archer, does not stop Russia launching missiles in the first place – and does not help win the war.
And that is the key problem. Chancellor Scholz has never said that Ukraine should win – and his government’s policy reflects that. For AGZ members, this epitomized the failure of the Zeitenwende, and the wider and deeper strategic shortcomings that persist despite the promise of change. Berlin is now cutting future funding to Ukraine, ostensibly for budgetary reasons, but even the large absolute sums it has committed so far have not been aimed at securing victory. For allies who back Ukraine to win because they see it as essential to European security and the creation of a viable and robust future European security order, this has undermined what should have been a common goal. Like many AGZ members, they thus see Berlin’s approach as having been, in effect, an expensive way to make Europe less safe.
Energy Policy: Rapid Change Marred by Questionable Direction and Durability
Diversification away from Russian gas has been the biggest success of the Zeitenwende. Moscow stopped supplying Germany with gas in late 2022, capping a withdrawal process from the German side that proceeded faster than many in Berlin had thought possible. The rapid completion of two large liquified natural gas (LNG) terminals on the Baltic Sea coast to allow for alternative energy suppliers was hailed by Chancellor Scholz (and many AGZ members) as evidence of a “‘new German speed.”
AGZ members were less convinced by the government’s efforts to find a geopolitically, ecologically, and economically viable energy mix. The desire to both quickly get off Russian gas and to complete Germany’s nuclear power phaseout prompted Vice-Chancellor Robert Habeck (Green Party) to increase the use of high-polluting coal. Habeck and Scholz struck LNG supply deals with Norway, Qatar and Azerbaijan, with the latter two creating new dependencies on authoritarian regimes.
Berlin’s long-term plan hinges on renewables. While in 2023, Germany generated half its power needs from renewable energy sources, it has less than half the wind and solar capacity it needs to hit its target of an 80 percent renewables share by 2030. Furthermore, Germany’s fluctuating wind and solar power means additional, stable sources are needed as back up. Without a nuclear option, the sources of Germany’s gas will remain geopolitically pertinent. Its energy dependencies on authoritarian regimes were seen as problematic by many AGZ members.
AGZ members were also concerned that Germany would remain dependent on Chinese materials and components for its wind and solar installations. In the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, there would be extreme pressure on allies, including Germany, from the United States to cut business with China, which would derail Berlin’s green transition (and much else). AGZ experts further highlighted that fragmented capital markets and consequent lack of scaling-up of domestic and European green innovation also means that Germans, like other Europeans pay for rather than profit from their green transition.
Despite its impressive speed, the change in German energy policy may portend trouble, including with allies who feel un-consulted on Berlin’s approach, including its unilateral EUR 200 billion intervention to keep domestic prices down. Like the rapid construction of the LNG terminals, the size of that intervention – more than total support for Ukraine and the Bundeswehr special fund combined – shows that political will and leadership are the main determinants of change, or lack thereof.
Approach to Authoritarian States: Shaky in Practice, Misguided in Strategy
From the start, the Zeitenwende’s claim of radical change in Germany’s approach to authoritarian states was in doubt. Despite the imperative to abandon the country’s disastrous Russia policy – which allies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and AGZ members agreed had contributed to the full-scale war in Ukraine – Chancellor Scholz declared in the Zeitenwende speech that: “in the long term, security in Europe cannot be achieved in opposition to Russia.”
While condemning Russia’s barbaric prosecution of its war in Ukraine, Chancellery officials also emphasized the importance of future relations with Russia, and used Moscow’s perceptions as spurious excuses to not send tanks to Ukraine. Despite his Social Democratic) Party’s (SPD’s) deep ties to Russia, Scholz insisted there would be no return to business as usual, but nonetheless expressed his desire to “come back” to “the peace order that worked” with Russia. AGZ members argued that this order had mainly worked to Germany’s short-term economic benefit and to enrich, entrench and enable the authoritarian regime in Moscow.
AGZ members also strongly criticized the Chancellery’s repeated signaling of fears that Russia might use nuclear weapons, noting that it displayed a failure to understand both how NATO deterrence works and the need to signal resolve. Echoing veiled criticisms from allied leaders, the experts in the AGZ emphasized that, while risk averse in intent, this actually increased risk by projecting weakness and making Germany a target for authoritarian coercion.
Calls from senior SPD politicians to find ways to “freeze the war and end it later,” without Kyiv’s victory, prompted charges of appeasing and rewarding Russian aggression. The government’s opposition to seizing frozen Russian assets and Scholz’s adoption of a peace chancellor mantle strengthened the impression that Germany was too weak to deter authoritarian bullying, and thus undermined European security.
On China (the other major authoritarian threat), the much-anticipated government strategy (2023) failed to deliver, and Germany’s economic dependence has continued. While acknowledging the danger of such dependency, the strategy in practice left de-risking up to individual businesses, several of which instead seized the opportunity increase their exposure to China. This has led to rapid growth in German companies’ investment in China, despite the geopolitical risk that this imposes on German society.
Instead of stepping in to mitigate this risk, the Chancellery has sought to avoid an impression of China-bashing and intervened to water down collective EU action to place tariffs on Chinese Electric Vehicles (EVs) in response to unfair Chinese practices. Experts within the AGZ further pointed to: the long-delayed but weak proposal to phase out Huawei equipment in Germany’s 5G network; and the controversial decision to allow a Chinese company’s purchase of a significant stake in the port of Hamburg. Overall, both AGZ members and allied policymakers have been concerned that Berlin is repeating mistakes it made with Moscow in its relations with Beijing. Experts within AGZ argued that this also affected Berlin’s approach to Taiwan which needs urgent attention to help head off danger both to a fellow democracy and Germany’s own interests.
Germany’s approach to authoritarian states may superficially seem characterized by strategic incoherence. The National Security Strategy (2023) highlighted both growing systemic rivalry between democracies and autocracies (emphasized by the Greens) and a multipolar vision of poles, formed not around values but around geography, that trade freely with each other (emphasized by the Chancellery). In practice, though, it is Scholz’s multipolarity that has driven German policy and prevented a properly robust approach to the authoritarian threats.
This multipolar approach seeks to ignore rather than deal with Germany’s contradictions by charting an impossible middle course between the US and China. It is in effect a futile effort to preserve as much as possible of the pre-2022 world, from which Germany seemed to prosper even if, in reality, Berlin was storing up trouble for the future. Continuity through multipolarity goes against the meaning Scholz ascribed to the Zeitenwende in his speech: that “the world afterwards will no longer be the same as the world before.”
EU and NATO: Insufficient Change Leaves Germany Adrift of European Allies
Poor strategy has accentuated the contradictions of Berlin’s geopolitical positioning. Germany has kicked its energy dependency on Russia but is reluctant to truly confront Moscow and remains reliant on the US for its security. The latter is true for many European allies, but few see themselves as being so economically beholden to China as Germany does. Amid sharpening geopolitical competition, Berlin’s lack of a credible vision shared with European allies has hobbled Germany’s influence in its key international institutions – the EU and NATO – and diminished the effectiveness of its cooperation with key partners.
Under the current government, Berlin’s relationship with Paris has been consistently dysfunctional and, even when aligned, has caused trouble with others, such as when Olaf Scholz and Emmanuel Macron recently sought sweeping last-minute changes to the EU’s Strategic Agenda without consulting other leaders. While some in Berlin tried, with mixed success, to brush off criticism from Poland’s previous government as unfair Germany-bashing, such accusations are not credible now that Germanophile Donald Tusk has taken over the helm in Poland. It was thus striking that Tusk made public his recent closed-door criticism of Scholz’s approach to both European and German defense – and then further publicly upbraided the Chancellor at a bilateral meeting.
Olaf Scholz promised to be a bridge builder in the EU but, together with Free Democratic Party (FDP) finance minister Christian Lindner, has instead shown an appetite for obstruction and ineffective or uncoordinated action. Between its Germany-first-style energy subsidy and the controversy over tariffs on Chinese EVs, Berlin tried to block the already agreed EU combustion engine phase-out, putting domestic coalition politics and the country’s car industry ahead of constructive European cooperation and environmental goals.
Yet, the most strategically egregious example is Scholz and Lindner’s flat refusal to consider joint debt to fund increased defense spending, which prompted Tusk’s ire. Many European allies see a pressing need to build a capabilities-based European pillar of NATO – to keep the US engaged and to mitigate the effects of either a gradual or a sudden decline in Washington’s commitment. They see common EU funding, procurement and defense industry cooperation as central to achieving this aim. While it was bad enough that Germany prioritized its debt brake over properly investing in its own defense capabilities, its attempt to generalize this problem to the European level was seen as beyond the pale, which is why it drew stinging criticism from Tusk and others.
Nonetheless, Chancellor Scholz claims that his government is in lockstep with the US on Ukraine and Russia, thus making Germany a good ally. AGZ members disagreed, as while the two countries’ positions may be aligned on Ukraine and Russia, they diverge significantly on China, which bodes ill for the future given the intensifying hostility between Washington and Beijing. They also argued that, as Europeans are more directly exposed and drastically more vulnerable than the US to both the outcome of the war and future Russian aggression, we need a tougher approach than Washington’s to avoid creating a destabilizing geopolitical gray zone. Yet, Germany has sided with the US in not committing to Ukraine’s victory and in jointly blocking Kyiv’s NATO ambitions at the 2023 Vilnius summit. This set Germany apart from the position of many European allies, including France, the UK, Poland, the Baltic states and others, whom Scholz has since further irritated by speaking (unrepresentatively) for them, undermining useful “strategic ambiguity,” and referring to some who take a tougher line as reckless or even “foaming at the mouth.”
Experts within the AGZ flagged two important positive exceptions: the agreement to permanently deploy a full combat brigade to Lithuania to bolster NATO’s defense of its Eastern flank, which was unambiguously welcomed; and Berlin’s European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI), a promising step toward improving European air defense to which twenty countries have signed up. Unfortunately, both come with caveats. The brigade lacks its tanks, which will take time to be delivered and may eventually be stationed in Brandenburg rather than Lithuania, and the Bundeswehr currently lacks the necessary logistics, enablers, military mobility and funds to make the brigade effective, alongside its other commitments. Like Poland, France will not join ESSI, and it has expressed legitimate and still unresolved concerns over how ESSI’s ballistic missile defense elements will affect Europe’s nuclear balance and Russia’s calculations.
Overall, Germany is not living up to Chancellor Scholz’s promised “special responsibility” for Europe’s success and for European security. Too often, Germany has assumed a right to lead, while in fact failing to do so – and also failing to follow the lead of others who have a strategy that is appropriate to the geopolitical situation. Berlin’s approach shows a significant degree of continuity, while the world, and Germany’s European allies, have changed. This diminishes Germany’s influence, as others move forward without it, and puts its own contributions and capabilities – or lack thereof – under the spotlight.
Re-Arming Germany: Too Little, Too Slow, Too Uncertain
The centerpiece of the Zeitenwende speech was the EUR 100 billion special fund which would, supposedly, give teeth to Germany’s much-neglected armed forces, and to Scholz’s intent to build a “powerful, cutting edge, progressive Bundeswehr that can be relied upon to protect us.” Scholz expanded this aim and undertook to become a security guarantor for Europe by creating “the largest conventional army within the NATO framework in Europe.” “The goal,” as Scholz confirmed, “is a Bundeswehr that we and our allies can rely on.” Moreover, he asserted that to achieve this, and break its habit of flouting NATO defense spending guidance, “Germany will invest two percent of our gross domestic product in our defense.”
Even if the fund was mainly spent on items from an older shopping list, AGZ experts concurred that the 35 F-35 fighter jets, 60 Chinook helicopters, 123 Leopard 2A8 MBTs, 50 Boxer armored personnel carriers, various naval assets and missiles, and upgrades for communications systems all improve the Bundeswehr’s capabilities. IRIS-T, Patriot and Arrow-3 systems and interceptors help improve Germany’s air defenses as part of ESSI. Yet, these purchases barely touch the sides of the real gaps in Germany’s defense capabilities which still need a “quantum leap.” AGZ members agreed that the current level of procurement doesn’t match Scholz’s stated level of ambition and is put in the shade by the scale, speed and added combat power of Poland’s re-armament program.
Some experts estimate that Germany has underinvested in defense by more than EUR 600 billion, and AGZ experts argued that a similar amount would be needed for the country to fulfil its NATO commitments. Yet, neither AGZ nor other Germany-based experts and industry leaders are convinced that Germany will even sustain 2 percent spending after the special fund runs out in 2027, when an extra EUR 20-30 billion will need to be found annually. Like many allies, AGZ members saw this 2 percent as outdated and insufficient for NATO’s needs. Defense Minister Boris Pistorius has been clear that Germany needs to be “war ready” within five years, and that doing so in the context of failing to defeat Russia in Ukraine would require 3-3.5 percent of GDP to be spent on defense – as much as EUR 120 billion compared to 2024’s EUR 72 billion.
These figures put Germany’s latest budget compromise (after a high-profile row) in perspective: the increase of only EUR 1.2 billion on defense was far less than the EUR 6.5 billion requested by Pistorius. This failure to seriously budget for defense, the central pillar of the Zeitenwende, fell like a hammer on the idea of meaningful German change. Despite the multiple warnings of impending war from German military officers and experts, leaders of allied states, and even his own defense minister; despite the obvious shortcomings in Germany’s capabilities and its risky over-reliance on the United States; despite Pistorius’ best efforts and the demands of politicians from across the democratic parties; and despite allies, especially Poland and the Baltic States, showing the way, Olaf Scholz and his government have prevented rather than enabled Germany from re-arming in a way would make good on the promise of the Zeitenwende, fulfil its responsibility to allies, and equip the country to defend itself.
Conclusion: After the Failed Zeitenwende, Germans Need Real Change
The analyses of AGZ members have shown that the Scholz government has failed to deliver meaningful change that could durably address the serious problems laid bare by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. On support to Ukraine, defending democracy and freedom against authoritarian threats, playing a greater role in strengthening the EU and NATO and arming Germany to defend itself, the changes made have been dangerously inadequate. Even on energy policy, significant question marks remain over how the country can source energy in ecologically, economically and geopolitically viable ways.
The failed Zeitenwende puts Germans’ security, prosperity and freedom at risk and has diminished Berlin’s influence with key allies and partners in Europe. Many of those allies, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, the Baltic states and the Nordic countries have been through a larger change of mindset and approach. Not on Russia – as they didn’t need to – but on the need for Europe to take care of its own security to a far greater extent than in the past. Moreover, while they are looking for coordinated, joint European ways to act together, the other big change is that they will no longer wait for Germany to come on board. Berlin’s reckless strategy, failure to commit to team goals, and obstructive attitude mean that Germany risks isolation as its allies leave it behind. The Scholz government’s failed Zeitenwende means that Germany is categorically no longer Europe’s “indispensable nation.”
The good news is that, like the politicians and experts involved in AGZ, many Germans know they need real change. In AGZ focus groups, conducted in Spring 2024 by the independent research agency D|Part (report forthcoming in September 2024), both general and engaged publics lamented Germany’s lack of leadership and government competence. This extended across both publics’ key concerns, from the war in Ukraine to Germany’s economic weakness and dependence, perceived domestic decline and waning image and influence abroad. Significantly, the engaged public saw the Zeitenwende as having been poorly defined and delivered, while the general public didn’t even know what it was. Yet, both groups knew they wanted clearer communication on the big issues they cared about, from Ukraine to defense, the economy, migration and climate change – and action to deal with them.
There is, therefore, a political market for change. And there are different ideas about what that change should look like, including the following ideas discussed by AGZ members.
Real Change, Strategic Shift and National Renewal
Committing to Ukraine’s victory and Russia’s defeat (in Ukraine) was the first priority for many AGZ members, as it would have the greatest positive, immediate strategic effect. Bringing these twin goals about requires a definition of victory, which AGZ members agreed means restoring Ukraine’s internationally recognized 1991 borders and ensuring the country is safe from future attack, which would also imply NATO and, later, EU membership. It also requires a “theory of victory” – a clear plan for how we get from the current situation to that desired victory – and the means to implement it.
Any theory of victory should include: removing the over-cautious restrictions imposed on how and where Ukraine can use certain weapons; seizing frozen Russian state assets to help sustain Ukraine financially and fund its victory as well as recovery, including through development of its defense industrial capacity; providing more weapons and munitions (including fighter jets and long-range strike weapons, such as Taurus) from stocks or purchased, quickly, from any available sources. Germany’s contribution to Ukraine’s victory should be commensurate with its economic weight and the responsibility it should shoulder for European security.
AGZ members were clear that a genuine German re-armament is both essential and must be made complementary rather than put in competition with arming Ukraine to win, as both are essential for the country’s security, which underpins its future prosperity and freedom. They concurred that Germany’s defense investment should go much further and proceed much faster, particularly learning from Poland’s example. Placing significant orders for both Ukraine and for its own re-armament would provide a significant incentive to industry to increase both production capacity and speed. Jointly procuring the capabilities and enablers to build the European pillar that NATO needs should also be a priority and would benefit from joint EU debt as well as defense industrial coordination, which Germany should support.
These changes would themselves require at least two other major shifts underpinned by further, more fundamental strategic transformations in both foreign and domestic policy. First, Germany would have to become a better team player, especially in its key institutions (the EU and NATO) by, inter alia, committing to common goals, following (not obstructing) when others lead to drive the team forward, and providing leadership in areas where it is strong but in ways that others can follow and contribute to. Becoming such a “team power” entails a different mode of foreign policy and diplomacy, but would play to many of the country’s strengths. Most importantly, it would require a shift in strategic worldview toward that of allies who have understood that democracies are involved in a systemic competition and must throw their weight into ensuring the free world prevails against authoritarian threats.
Second, Germany would have to commit (much) more money to defense, focused on meeting its alliance commitments. Many experts and politicians within AGZ agreed that Germany should spend at least 3 percent of GDP annually on defense for the foreseeable future. This runs up against another need for a deeper domestic transformation: the (in)famous debt brake, which constitutionally limits the fiscal flexibility of the government, has been repeatedly used as a reason – or an excuse – for not spending more on defense, on Ukraine, or even on fixing Germany’s creaking infrastructure or accelerating its technological and green transitions. Adhering to the debt brake even when, according to leading economists, it has become a risk for both German and European security, also reflects an ideological position that lies behind the refusal to accept common European debt for defense.
AGZ members were divided on this issue, but that actually reflects an opportunity for constructive political debate about a crucial dimension of Germany’s future that will affect its geopolitical positioning as well as the character of its own society. Those who wish to ditch the debt brake will have to work hard to construct the necessary two-thirds majority in the Bundestag. They will need to compellingly explain and support their spending plans and how loosening the rules would not simply lead to throwing money at problems that (also) need other solutions, as well as how they would prevent runaway debt or the kind of destabilizing economic policy that so damaged Germany (and Europe) in the past. On the other hand, those who would keep the debt brake need to explain how they will fund defense, properly contribute to European security and invest in Germany’s future prosperity – and how they will do so without exacerbating domestic social problems, which would provide fertile ground for anti-democratic forces. Several advocates of this approach also argue for cutting social spending, which needs to be considered in the context of voters’ concerns over rising prices and economic disenfranchisement, as well as income and wealth inequality. For those who would rely on economic growth, the situation is further complicated by the need to source energy in geopolitically responsible ways and rethink the country’s economic and trade models to reduce the security and alliance risks posed by dependence on China.
Whichever route Germany’s next leaders choose, they will not be able to avoid the need for major investment, including in infrastructure, to renew the basis of the country’s competitiveness and future prosperity. Nor will they be able to escape the reality that social spending to try to maintain the status quo has failed to stem the growth of anti-democratic parties. Instead, future investment, complemented by capital market reform to encourage, reward and scale up innovation, should focus on updating and upgrading Germany’s growth model including by accelerating the green transition, embracing technological change, and developing the skills profile and regulatory framework needed to drive prosperity.
After the failed Zeitenwende, Germany faces thoroughgoing challenges across numerous policy fields. Scholz’s multipolarity strategy of continuity in a changed world has failed to align Germany’s security with its prosperity – and now risks both. Worse, the wasted opportunity for change, confused messaging on exposure to authoritarian threats and their potential impacts, failure to explain that necessary change implies costs which nonetheless must be borne, and fractious and ineffective government have created a risk to Germany’s democracy. To master these challenges, Germany needs a true Grand Strategy to restore and marshal the sources of its power, and harmonize foreign, domestic, defense, and economic policy in pursuit of clear goals.
Presenting a clear vision for a future Germany and the kind of world it wants to help shape, and then setting the strategy and committing the resources to achieve it, would create a genuine, democratic alternative to both the inadequate status quo and to the dangerous vision proposed by anti-democratic parties. It is incumbent on politicians and experts, such as those involved in the AGZ, to properly debate, in public, what that vision should be and to propose credible ways to achieve it. The task now at hand is no less than reinventing Germany’s collective identity and reinvigorating its societal purpose to ensure Germans’ future security, prosperity and freedom and their country’s place in the democratic world.
