Eurasia Press & News
The visit of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian to Iraq raises several questions about the future of Iraqi-Iranian relations. Is Iraq heading towards radical and decisive changes? However, a reading of the factors and variables indicates that change in Iraq will not affect its relations with Iran politically or security-wise. The relations between the two countries are closely linked and transcend political changes and internal and external circumstances.
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian headed to Iraq on September 11, 2024, on an official visit, his first abroad since assuming office on July 6 , which comes in light of many complex issues in the region, coinciding with the war in the Gaza Strip, and in light of several common issues that bring the two countries together at the security, economic and political levels. This visit to Iraq is the third by an Iranian president since the “Iranian Revolution” in 1979, as well as since the change of the regime in Iraq in 2003. The first visit was by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2008, the second by President Hassan Rouhani in 2019, while the late President Ebrahim Raisi visited in 2021 in his capacity as head of the judiciary. In May 2024, official news circulated that a visit to Iraq was on the president’s agenda before his death in the presidential plane crash on May 20, 2024. On the other hand; All Iraqi presidents since 2003 have visited Iran at least once, and this applies to prime ministers who visit Iran on average once every 6 months.
Implications of choosing Iraq as the first destination
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s visit to Iraq is linked to the visit that was scheduled for his predecessor, Ebrahim Raisi, and reflects the importance of relations between the two countries, and the common security, economic and political files that link them. However, it comes in a context in which security issues dominate the Iranian agenda, especially in light of the anticipation of its response to the assassination of the head of the Hamas Political Bureau, Ismail Haniyeh, while hosting him in Tehran on July 31, 2024, which revealed the extent of Israeli information and intelligence superiority, which Iran has long accused its neighbors of feeding, specifically Azerbaijan and the Kurdistan Region, as they are the main arenas for the activity of the Israeli intelligence services against it. In addition, the visit carries many messages and implications that can be highlighted, as follows:
First : The visit sends a message to both the United States and Israel about Iran’s vital and strategic interests in Iraq, and about its priority in Iran’s security and defense arrangements for the next phase of the war in the Gaza Strip. Therefore, the president’s visit includes a tour of most of the main Iraqi cities, including the capital Baghdad, Basra, and Erbil.
Second : The visit reflects the rise of Iranian influence in Iraq, and the peak of its involvement in its internal affairs, as indicated by his extensive tour inside Iraq, compared to other presidents, as Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who visited Iraq for the first time in nearly a decade on April 22, 2024, did not visit Basra, despite Turkish officials indicating the possibility of Erdogan visiting it, and its pivotal location in the development road project extending from Basra to Turkey.
Third : The visit confirms Iran’s commitment to supporting its agents from the armed factions in Iraq, which before the war in the Gaza Strip was limited to the support provided by the Revolutionary Guards and the Quds Force, but now includes openly the political level represented by the Iranian presidency and government. This comes after some observers believed that the reformist government in Tehran may be more cautious in supporting and backing the armed factions in the region. It seems that the course of the war in the Gaza Strip, and the involvement of the Iraqi factions in it as a secondary front, has prompted Tehran to provide all forms of material and moral support to them, especially after the mutual strikes between those factions and the American forces , and for their role in the broader Iranian strategy to pressure the American forces to leave Iraq and Syria . In addition, Iran’s delay in responding to the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, and perhaps postponing it indefinitely, especially after the preemptive Israeli strike that obstructed Hezbollah’s response to the assassination of its leader Shukr , requires Tehran to strengthen its communication with those factions to strengthen their morale and roles in the region.
Fourth : Strengthening the economic relationship, which is an important message directed to the Iranian interior first, as Pezeshkian’s election campaign focused on economic issues, and in light of the country’s need to find a way out of the US sanctions that are severely pressuring various economic indicators and infrastructure, Iraq is considered the first gateway to achieving that goal. The economic aspect is evident in the level of the delegation accompanying the president, which includes the ministers of foreign affairs, oil and housing ministers, and the governor of the Central Bank of Iran, and in the statements of the Iranian ambassador to Iraq, Muhammad Kazem, that Iran will sign 30 comprehensive agreements on security, trade, energy, and water. In addition to the joint strategic projects between the two countries, most notably the railway link project (Basra-Shalamcheh), which did not move much during the eras of previous Iraqi prime ministers, with the exception of the government of Mustafa Al-Kadhimi, which witnessed the signing of a joint agreement that included an action plan to complete the railway link.
In addition to the economic level, the issue of finding a solution to the issue of Iranian funds in Iraq, estimated at $11 billion, will be one of the most important files on the visit’s agenda. After Iraq used to pay Iran directly for gas and electricity, the tightening of US monetary sanctions on Iran led to the accumulation of those Iranian debts owed by Iraq during the years 2021-2022, and although Iraq was able to find alternative mechanisms by using the Iranian funds accumulated in the Iraqi TBI Bank to purchase goods for Iran. However, the Iraqi government has stumbled in paying the Iranian debts, especially with the strict controls imposed by the US Federal Reserve on the circulation of the dollar in 2023. Which limited the ability of Iraqi banks, especially TBI Bank, to trade in dollars, in addition to the fact that Iranian funds are held in Iraqi dinars, and therefore Iran cannot use them to purchase goods that are not subject to sanctions from other countries.
Iraq and playing in lost time
For Iraq, this visit may represent a challenge to the government of Prime Minister Mohammed al-Sudani, and additional pressures, especially since the Iraqi government constantly needs the parliamentary umbrella of the forces of the “State Administration” coalition, especially the Coordination Framework. Despite the government’s achievements in the economic, service and developmental fields, some of the Iraqi forces supporting it are considered traditional allies of Tehran, and this is included in the government’s considerations, especially in several issues, including:
First: Scheduling the withdrawal of US forces
The US withdrawal from Iraq is among the top issues on the Iranian agenda, and it is likely that the government anticipated Pezeshkian’s visit and outlined its visions regarding the issue of the withdrawal of US forces. On September 8, Iraqi Defense Minister Thabet al-Abbasi stated that the US withdrawal will end in 2026. While this statement may have been made for political purposes and to reduce the pressure exerted by Iran and its allies in Iraq on the government, it will cast a shadow over the course of the relationship with the United States, which is going through a phase of repositioning and a radical change in dealing with issues in the region after the US elections in line with the course of the conflict in Gaza. Iraq may not be in its best condition with the new US administration.
Second: The file of Kurdish opposition groups on the Iranian border
The file of the Kurdish opposition, which has its bases in the border areas with Iran, is one of the thorny files in bilateral relations. Iraq signed a security agreement with Iran in late September 2023 stipulating the evacuation of the headquarters of the Kurdish opposition located on the border, which is of great concern to Tehran. Due to the importance of this file, Iraqi National Security Adviser Qasim al-Araji revealed hours before Pezeshkian’s visit Iraqi plans to settle the Iranian Kurdish opposition in a third country, in coordination with the United Nations, in an attempt to resolve this file.
Third: Mediation and appeasement
Iraq plays a pivotal role in conveying messages of mediation and calm between the various countries and actors in the region. It previously played a role in reducing escalation between the United States and Iran , and is currently acting as a mediator between Turkey and Syria . The Sudanese government also previously sponsored an Iranian-Egyptian meeting with diplomatic representation in 2023.
Finally , the Iranian president’s visit raises questions about the future of the Iraqi-Iranian relationship. Is Iraq heading towards radical and decisive changes? However, reading the factors and variables indicates that the change in Iraq will not affect its relations with Iran politically or security-wise. The relations between the two countries are closely linked and go beyond political changes and internal and external circumstances. This relationship may deepen in its borders and roles, especially in light of the major changes the region is witnessing, which increase the two countries’ need for their strategic and security relationship.
