Eurasia Press & News
Whereas Ukraine never intended to implement the Minsk Accords and was preparing for an invasion this entire time, the dual deceptions of which have ended disastrously for it as is known, Georgian Dream wants Russia to help create a framework for bringing Georgia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia back together.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov praised the Georgian Dream’s policy of pursuing reconciliation with Abkhazia and South Ossetia against whom prior ruling parties waged wars that ultimately led to Moscow’s recognition of those two as independent states in summer 2008. The country’s upcoming parliamentary elections on 26 October are being watched closely after the West decisively turned on Georgian Dream as punishment for its pro-sovereignty policies. Here are some background briefings:
- 8 March 2023: “Georgia Is Targeted For Regime Change Over Its Refusal To Open A ‘Second Front’ Against Russia”
- 11 March 2023: “Russia Called The US Out For Double Standards Towards Georgia-Moldova & Bosnia-Serbia”
- 4 October 2023: “Armenia’s Impending Defection From The CSTO Places Georgia Back In The US’ Crosshairs”
- 2 May 2024: “The West Simply Shrugged As Rioters Tried Storming The Georgian Parliament In A J6 Redux”
- 25 July 2024: “Georgia Is The Next Country That Might Face A High-Profile Assassination Attempt”
If Georgian Dream retains control of the government, bans the foreign-backed opposition like it promised in accordance with its new US-inspired foreign agents act, and apologizes for the 2008 war that former President Mikhail Saakashvili provoked at the US’ behest, then reconciliation is indeed possible. If it loses control of the government, including through a Color Revolution, then Georgia will revert to being an American proxy and possibly try to open up a “second front” to help Ukraine.
It’s here where it’s important to contrast Ukraine and Georgia’s policies to their respective separatist regions that have since either joined Russia or been recognized by it as independent states. It was assessed in August 2022 that “The 2008 Georgian Conflict Was The US’ Template For The 2022 Ukrainian One”, both of which were disastrous, the second much more so than the first. Georgian Dream’s patriotic leadership didn’t want their country to follow Ukraine’s path and therefore bravely pioneered another.
They refused to sanction Russia and open up a “second front” against it last year to support Ukraine’s failed counteroffensive. These principled policies triggered a Color Revolution attempt in spring 2023 on the pretext of protesting the proposed US-inspired foreign agents law at the time, which subsequently entered into law this year. Targeted sanctions were also implemented and some Western governments made no secret of their desire to see Georgian Dream overthrown.
This pressure had the opposite effect than intended since it convinced the ruling party to double down on their pro-sovereignty policies, which were then expanded to their country’s former regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by investigating Saakashvili’s infamous war against them in 2008. Upon determining that he was to blame but adding that this was “on instructions from the outside” in a clear allusion to America, the stage was then set for founder Bidzina Ivanishvili to propose an official apology.
This truly patriotic leader wants to do what Ukraine never sincerely considered, and that’s reconcile with the separatists whose cause in both cases was fueled by the government’s injustices against them. Whereas Ukraine never intended to implement the Minsk Accords and was preparing for an invasion this entire time, the dual deceptions of which have ended disastrously for it as is known, Georgian Dream wants Russia to help create a framework for bringing Georgia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia back together.
Its approach is commendable and embodies the way in which most long-standing separatist conflicts should be resolved, namely through goodwill and diplomacy instead of threats and force. Georgian Dream might not succeed in reuniting with its breakaway regions since they might not agree and Russia can’t pressure them without discrediting itself, but the importance is that the direct state-level culprit wants to apologize for the sake of historical justice, resume dialogue, and try making amends.
Even if reunification doesn’t happen, more socio-economic cooperation might emerge from these efforts, which would benefit their people while also representing a victory for Russian diplomacy and soft power. Not only would the Kremlin help restore stability to this part of the South Caucasus, but it would also show the world that its special operation isn’t about territorial conquest like the West claimed. It was always about resolving the Ukrainian dimension of the NATO-Russian security dilemma.
The original plan was to coerce Zelensky into agreeing to the military demands that were made of him through an impressive show of force, but when that didn’t succeed yet Russia still remained committed to prioritizing political goals over military ones, an improvised “war of attrition” followed. Readers can learn more about this sequence of events here and here. It was during this second stage of the conflict that four former Ukrainian regions voted to join Russia in September 2022.
That had the effect of partially compensating for what Russia was unable to achieve during the initial stage of its special operation and helped justify the rising costs of this conflict among its people. Just like the “war of attrition” was improvised, so too were those four regions’ referenda on joining Russia. How this relates to Georgia is that any Russian-facilitated reconciliation between that country and its two former regions after late October’s parliamentary elections would prove Moscow’s peaceful intentions.
This could in turn lead to more Westerners realizing that they were lied to about its goals in the special operation, which were always about resolving the Ukrainian dimension of the NATO-Russian security dilemma, ideally through the initial stage’s impressive show of force. When everything turned out differently than Russia expected, it improvised the way in which this conflict was fought as well as some of the supplementary goals that it sought to achieve, the latter of which included territorial ones.
The importance of Georgian Dream learning from Ukraine’s disastrous policy towards Donbass and consequently pursuing reconciliation with its two former regions instead is that it discredits the rationale behind the West’s military support for Kiev from 2014-2022. It’s now known from the emerging Georgian example that continuation wars aren’t always inevitable. The West could have pressured their proxy to implement the Minsk Accords as opposed to secretly arming in preparation of a final offensive.
As times goes on, it’ll become more obvious to all objective observers that the NATO-Russian proxy war in Ukraine was the direct result of Western policy, with the question being over whether this was intentional or due to incompetence. Whichever side of the debate one finds themselves on, they’ll be able to cite Georgian Dream’s reconciliation policy as proof that an alternative path always existed. Another Donbass War, let alone the larger proxy war that followed, was never inevitable.
