Eurasia Press & News
The Kurdistan Region of Iraq finally held its long-overdue parliamentary elections on October 20, two years past the original due date. Final results announced by the Iraqi electoral commission on October 30 showed that the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) won 39 and 23 seats, respectively, out of the 100-member parliament. A relatively nascent opposition group, the New Generation Movement, won 15 seats, coming third. Islamist groups secured 10 seats, making up 10 percent of the newly elected parliament, in contrast to the Iraqi federal Parliament that is dominated by various Islamist forces. Despite the absence of significant political changes, the elections hold important implications for the Kurdistan Region’s future and broader US policy in the region.
Continuity and Renewed Legitimacy
The first significant takeaway from the election results is the continued dominance of the KDP and PUK, which have shaped Kurdish politics for over five decades. This duopoly, though frequently criticized for fostering corruption and nepotism, remains largely unshaken due to its entrenched patronage networks and the deep sentimental ties many Kurds have to the parties, rooted in their historical struggle for Kurdish rights. These election results suggest that these two parties will remain central players in Kurdistan’s political landscape for the foreseeable future.
Second, despite these enduring dynamics, the elections mark a crucial moment of renewal for the Kurdistan Region’s executive and legislative branches which have been in a lame-duck status for the past couple of years. The Iraqi Federal Supreme Court dissolved the Kurdish Parliament in May 2023, after it exceeded its four-year term. Despite not being a sovereign state, the Kurdistan Region has been an important actor within Iraq and its surrounding region, largely due to the de facto independence it has enjoyed since the end of the First Gulf War in 1991. Moreover, Iraq’s Kurds have played a pivotal role in shaping the country’s political and security dynamics, both before and after the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003. If managed effectively, this renewed popular legitimacy could strengthen Kurdistan’s hand in negotiations with Baghdad over revenue-sharing, oil exports, and confronting the threats posed by pro-Iranian factions within Iraq.
Third, despite some heated and at times inflammatory rhetoric—particularly from the PUK—the election process unfolded in a mostly peaceful, civic, and well-organized manner. Although the political playing field was uneven, and some smaller opposition groups alleged vote-rigging without presenting concrete evidence, the elections were, by most accounts, largely fair and transparent, setting a new standard for Kurdish elections since 1992. This was further confirmed by congratulatory statements from US and EU diplomatic missions in Iraq, which commended the success of the electoral process.
Fourth, these elections took place against a backdrop of increasing regional turbulence and the looming threat of escalation, possibly even all-out war, between Israel and the Iran-led camp. While Iraq officially remains neutral, powerful Iran-backed Shia militias, which wield significant influence over Iraq’s security and political sectors, have been active belligerents on Iran’s side, frequently striking Israeli and US targets since the outbreak of conflict in Gaza. The fact that the Kurdistan Region held elections amid such volatility signals a strong desire for normalcy and stability among Iraqi Kurds, as well as a clear declaration of their intent to remain distanced from escalating regional hostilities.
US Policy and the Need for Strategic Engagement
Now that the elections are over, the focus shifts to the formation of the new cabinet of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), which presents both challenges and opportunities for US engagement. The United States, which has long enjoyed a strong relationship with Kurds, should play a hands-on role in facilitating dialogue between Kurdish parties to ensure a timely and effective government-formation process. Kurdistan’s ability to form a stable government is critical not only for its own governance, but also for broader US strategic interests in Iraq and the Middle East.
Some policymakers in Washington might be tempted to see Kurdistan’s internal politics as a secondary concern, particularly in light of the more pressing regional crisis between Israel and Iran. However, the United States should recognize the strategic value of assisting Kurds. This moment in Iraqi Kurdistan should be understood within the broader historical context of US-Kurdish relations and the mutual benefits that have emerged and can continue to grow from this partnership.
Although the Kurdistan Region is a non-sovereign, non-state entity, it has maintained a unique relationship with the United States since the 1990s—one that, in some ways, parallels the US-Taiwan relationship, albeit at a smaller scale and with less formal commitment. Since the end of the First Gulf War, Washington has served as the guarantor of Kurdish security in Iraq. In return, Kurds played a crucial role in the removal of Saddam Hussein, were instrumental in the post-2003 political process, and helped develop Iraq’s political and security system. However, since the unsuccessful 2017 Kurdish independence referendum and in the face of sustained attacks by Iran and its Iraqi proxies, there has been growing concern in Kurdistan that the United States is not as committed to the relationship as it once was. This has created space for increased interference from Iran and Turkey, often to Kurdistan’s detriment. By assisting with the government-formation process in Erbil, the United States would signal its renewed commitment to the partnership with Kurds at this juncture and strengthen the autonomous region’s stability without any cost in terms of US resources or lives.
From a broader regional perspective, Washington must consider the significant role Iran and its allied groups have played in undermining KRG autonomy in recent years. As Tehran has expanded its political and military influence across Iraqi Kurdistan—especially areas under KDP control—it remains the only region resisting Iranian domination. Notably, these KDP-controlled areas also host two of the four key sites for US military presence in Iraq. Iran and its proxies, through a combination of lawfare, economic/financial pressures, and political maneuvers, have systematically attempted to erode the KRG’s economic foundation and exert control over its internal political dynamics. This interference is perhaps most visible in the Federal Supreme Court’s politicized rulings that targeted Kurdistan’s energy and financial sectors. Additionally, the Court’s redesign of the KRG electoral law have further deepened Kurdistan’s internal tensions, making it difficult for any single party to secure a majority and exacerbating instability.
Furthermore, it is essential to recognize that while US military presence in Iraq faces growing hostility in many regions, Kurdistan remains a steadfast ally. The United States and Iraq have agreed to withdraw most American forces by 2026, yet Kurdistan’s Harir airfield is expected to remain a key base for US troops beyond that deadline. The strategic importance of Kurdistan becomes even more apparent when considering its role in the US-led campaign to counter the Islamic State, better known as ISIS. For the past couple of decades, Iraqi Kurdistan has played a vital role in countering Sunni jihadism across Iraq and the broader region. It also serves as a crucial logistical hub for the US mission in Syria, where ISIS remains a serious and resurging threat, and continued US cooperation with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces is essential for maintaining regional security. The US mission in Syria, which also monitors and contains Iranian and Russian expansionist efforts, heavily relies on the stability and support of Iraqi Kurdistan.
The unwavering Kurdish commitment to its partnership with the United States has intensified animosity from Iran and pro-Iran factions in Baghdad, as these groups have led efforts to expel US troops from Iraq. This push is part of Iran’s broader strategy to reshape the regional order and diminish US influence. To apply pressure on the Kurds, Iran and its Iraqi proxies have launched numerous drone and missile attacks on Kurdish targets, including energy fields and business figures. Kurdistan’s energy sector is crucial to Iraq’s energy independence and electricity supply—key issues driving public frustration and discontent with the government. Despite immense pressure from Iran and its allies, Kurdish parties have consistently resisted supporting or voting for the expulsion of US forces from Iraq, both in 2020 and more recently in Februarythis year.
Given these dynamics, it is critical for the United States to support the timely formation of a broad-based KRG cabinet with a strong popular mandate, especially in its dealings with Baghdad. This will help ensure the Kurdish region can resist external pressures while maintaining its autonomy.
In promoting dialogue and compromise, Washington should particularly urge the PUK, under its new leadership, not to obstruct the government-formation process by holding unrealistic expectations about its share of power. Weakened by internal divisions over the past decade and a half, the PUK—now with nearly half the popularity of the KDP—still expects an equal share of power in the Kurdistan Region’s governing institutions. The party’s new leaders are holding onto this maximalist stance to signal strength to their base, harking back to the party’s heyday from 1991 to 2009, despite their significantly diminished share of the votes. In an effort to compensate for their shrinking popular support and to counterbalance the KDP’s dominance, the PUK has increasingly leaned on Iran and Iran-backed actors in Iraq. This dynamic risks turning the PUK into a vehicle for destabilizing Iranian influence in the Kurdistan Region, deepening internal divisions and potentially prompting greater political intervention from an increasingly more assertive and concerned Turkey. US mediation should encourage the PUK to adopt more realistic expectations, while ensuring that the KDP remains flexible in expanding the government’s power base and accommodating meaningful participation and partnership by others, particularly the PUK, in the governing institutions. Amid escalating regional instability and a wider region becoming less amicable to the United States, it is critical to maintain the Kurdistan Region as a stable safe haven and to avoid it becoming a political battleground for regional powers to settle scores. Therefore, it is essential to prevent Iranian and Turkish intervention, which would further complicate an already challenging but still manageable situation.
The US embassy in Baghdad should take an active role in mediating the government-formation process, but support and engagement from higher levels of the US government are equally crucial. This includes senior officials from the State Department in Washington, the White House, and the National Security Council’s Middle East team. For this process to succeed, Kurdish leaders must recognize the strategic value of maintaining strong ties with the United States and avoid jeopardizing the relationship for personal or factional gains. For Washington, this is a low-cost, high-reward opportunity to strengthen bilateral ties during a time of uncertainty. Ultimately, it would send a clear message to regional actors, in Baghdad and beyond, that the United States remains committed to its distinctive relationship with Kurds and will not allow the weakening of the KRG.
