Eurasia Press & News
Located among the sprawling dunes of Israel’s southern desert is a central component of what Avner Cohen calls his country’s “worst kept secret.”
The Negev Nuclear Research Center, officially renamed in 2018 after late Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres and often referred to by the name of the nearby city of Dimona, is widely known to be the complex where Israel first underwent the project to obtain nuclear weapons back in the late 1950s.
The program emerged just a decade after the nation declared its independence and fought the first of several wars against neighboring Arab powers.
Since then, Israel has maintained a policy of strategic ambiguity concerning its nuclear arsenal, neither confirming nor denying its existence.
Cohen, a professor for non-proliferation studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey who authored several definitive books on Israel’s nuclear weapons history, argued this opaque strategy was partially informed by a desire to diminish the incentive of the other side, Israel’s enemies, to seek weapons of mass destruction.
While Cohen told Newsweek that “it’s indisputable” that Israel possess nuclear weapons, he explained that the country has maintained them in a way unlike any other nuclear power, establishing a critical separation between the capabilities and those who would be tasked with using them. He characterized Israel’s approach as a “benign monopoly,” one that “gives the others the very lowest incentive to go nuclear.”
“And I think that Israeli leaders are very much committed to keep Israel in that way,” he said, “on the one hand, that Israel will be the only one in the region with those capacities, and at the same time, to do their best not to nuclearize the remaining conflict in the Middle East.”
And yet the regional equation has shifted over time. The foremost conflict playing out across the Middle East today is between Israel and Iran, a nation that already possesses a sophisticated and large-scale nuclear program.
Iranian officials have always maintained their nation’s sprawling network of nuclear facilities were solely for peaceful purposes, yet fears of potential weaponization have for the third time in a decade brought the United States and Iran to the negotiating table.
Meanwhile, a number of other countries in the region are also vying to develop nuclear programs, all of which, like Iran, insist they only seek to obtain civil nuclear capabilities.
As the U.S. and Saudi Arabia discuss the possibilities of Washington’s support in this endeavor, Russia has already struck deals with Egypt and Turkey to aid in the development of nuclear reactors.
Now, Israeli officials are expressing concern that the growing interest in nuclear initiatives could spark a regional rush to attain capabilities that could forever reshape the Middle East.
“At the end of the day, we wouldn’t like to see some kind of nuclear race in the Middle East, whether it’s civil or military,” Tsach Saar, Israel’s consul deputy general in New York, told Newsweek. “We’re just afraid it’s going to lead to a nuclear race in the region.”
The Begin Doctrine
When faced with the development of rival nuclear programs, Israel has a lengthy history of taking matters into its own hands.
The origins of this strategy date back to the Mossad intelligence agency’s “Operation Damocles” campaign targeting former Nazi German personnel who assisted Egypt to develop its rocket program in the 1960s. But the doctrine has come to be defined by a 1981 raid, known as “Operation Opera,” against a nuclear reactor in Iraq early into its war with Iran.
Rather than mask responsibility, then-Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin took full credit.
“Tell so your friends, tell anyone you meet, we shall defend our people with all the means at our disposal,” Begin said at the time. “We shall not allow any enemy to develop weapons of mass destruction turned against us.”
Thus began the so-called “Begin Doctrine,” marked by an array of largely covert operations targeting potential nuclear capabilities across the Middle East. Among the most notable operations in line with this strategy include a 2007 raid against a nuclear reactor in Syria later named “Operation Outside the Box” and a still-undeclared campaign of cyberattacks and assassinations targeting nuclear facilities and personnel in Iran beginning in 2010.
In November 2020, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, viewed by many as the chief architect of Iran’s nuclear program, was slain in a remote-control machine gun attack in Iran that has been widely attributed to Israel.
Iran and Israel have simultaneously been engaged in a yearslong shadow war that was brought out into the open for the first time last year as the two foes twice exchanged direct strikes. As Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu now threatens to take unilateral action against Iran’s nuclear facilities amid the ongoing talks between Tehran and Washington, the Begin Doctrine appears to remain very much in effect.
“What is called the Begin Doctrine basically says that Israel should make every conceivable effort to prevent any hostile country in the region from acquiring nuclear weapons and so you look through the history of Israel,” Ariel Levite, a former principal deputy director general of policy at the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission who now serves as senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Nuclear Policy Program, told Newsweek.
“And you see that that was applied to Iraq, and that was applied to Syria, and that was earlier even applied to Egypt,” he said, “and now it’s being applied to Iran.”
Ephraim Asculai, a veteran of the Israel Atomic Energy Commission who is today a senior researcher at Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies, also spoke of how the Begin Doctrine remains active, particularly when it comes to Iran.
“The Begin Doctrine, that was declared as the result of the Iraqi nuclear ambitions, says, in essence, that no Middle East state will be permitted to have a nuclear weapons development program,” Asculai told Newsweek. “As far as I know, this is still in force today and dictates Israeli actions. This is especially true in the case of Iran, a declared mortal foe of Israel.”
The Saudi Question
Asculai emphasized that “Israel does not oppose nuclear power development in the region,” rather “Israel does oppose any development that could lead any state into nuclear weapons ambitions.” He added: “This relates, in particular to nuclear enrichment programs that could lead, if misdirected, to nuclear weapons.”
Among the region’s nuclear aspirations currently garnering the most attention are those of Saudi Arabia. While far from a declared adversary of Israel, which seeks to normalize ties with the kingdom, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, sometimes referred to simply as “MBS,” has hinted at nuclear weapons ambitions in the past, particularly his declarations that he would seek such capabilities immediately if Iran were to acquire them.
“The case of Saudi Arabia is somewhat different,” Asculai said, “since MBS declared that if Iran was to have a nuclear weapons development program, so would he, and if Iran was to have a uranium enrichment program, so would he.”
As Levite pointed out, Saudi Arabia is widely believed to have a tacit agreement with the world’s sole Islamic nuclear power, Pakistan, through which Islamabad would deploy nuclear weapons to the kingdom “if push comes to shove.” Both nations have denied such a pact.
Saudi Arabia is also a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), as is the case with Iran and the top nuclear weapons states, the U.S., Russia, the United Kingdom, France and China, while India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea remain non-parties to the NPT.
Saudi Arabia has struck preliminary agreements in recent years with both China and Russia in exploring a nuclear energy program.
The prospect of Saudi Arabia pursuing uranium enrichment on its own soil, as it has repeatedly expressed interesting in doing, would be a first for the Arab world, defying what Levite referred to as “the U.S. gold standard” set by the United Arab Emirates when it opened the Arab world’s debut nuclear power plant in 2020. The UAE had pledged to forego enrichment and reprocessing at home as part of the earlier “123 Agreement” reached with the U.S. in 2009.
“What generates some proliferation concern in Israel is not the Saudi interest in nuclear power plants as such,” Levite said, “but more in the Saudi desire to engage in enrichment activity.”
And while he stated that “generally, the level of anxiety about nuclear energy in Arab hands is rather limited to safety and security concerns,” he argued that there is “far greater apprehension over the potential that those countries would actually be engaged in nuclear fuel cycle activities.”
“Not only are you creating a dangerous precedent of creating and potentially helping build enrichment capability in Saudi Arabia, but also others would say, ‘OK, so the gold standard is now broken. If the Iranians have it, we should have it too. If the Saudis have it, we should definitely have it,'” Levite said.
Today, the primary area of contention between Israel and Saudi Arabia pertains not to nuclear issues, but the war in Gaza. Saudi protests over Israeli actions in its operations against the Palestinian militant group Hamas have proven a sticking point for normalization talks and have incited an escalation of Saudi condemnation of Israel.
And though few expect this anger to transform into military threats, Levite felt Saudi Arabia remained vulnerable to instability that could make its nuclear bid more problematic for Israel.
“Saudi Arabia is inherently unstable politically, and so the regime may one day become much more of a threat to Israel,” he added. “From a security and safety point of view, having those things in Saudi Arabia is not a particularly attractive option.”
Newsweek has reached out to the Saudi Embassy in the U.S. for comment.
Other prominent Israeli figures have voiced concern that a U.S.-Saudi nuclear deal could push other countries to seek their own programs. Last month, former Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid, who currently serves as head of the opposition, told Israel’s Army Radio that allowing Saudi Arabia to develop a civil nuclear program would “lead to a Middle East nuclear race.”
He alleged that Emirati officials had already communicated to him that, “if the Saudis accept this—we will do it too.”
Meanwhile, Iranian officials have also proposed a nuclear fuel sharing consortium among regional countries, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, along with multi-billion-dollar investments to support President Donald Trump’s vision of a “nuclear renaissance” at home.
Friends and Foes
Thus far, the U.S. has yet to strike a nuclear agreement with either Iran or Saudi Arabia, and such an arrangement with the latter was notably absent from the series of deals reached during Trump’s recent trip to the kingdom.
But the visit did reinforce indications of another trend that has elicited concern among some Israeli observers. As Trump’s decision to skip Israel on the regional tour that also included the UAE and Qatar already raised questions, the U.S. leader moved to lift sanctions on Syria, despite Netanyahu reportedly asking him not to.
It was the latest instance of the two men diverging on key issues in recent weeks after the U.S. engaged in direct talks with Hamas to secure the release of a dual U.S.-Israeli national being held in Gaza and struck a ceasefire deal with Yemen’s Ansar Allah movement, also known as the Houthis, that did not include the group’s ongoing strikes against Israel.
Trump and Netanyahu also appear to have drifted in their messaging on Iran nuclear talks. The Israeli premier’s call during their last meeting in April to pursue an Iran nuclear deal “the way it was done in Libya” drew headlines as Trump had previously criticized his then-national security adviser John Bolton’s reference to a “Libya model” during talks with North Korea that ultimately collapsed in 2019.
Longtime Libyan leader Muammar el-Qaddafi forfeited his nation’s budding nuclear program in exchange for better ties with the U.S. in 2003, the same year the U.S. invaded Iraq and toppled President Saddam Hussein over allegations of weapons of mass destruction. Qaddafi was later overthrown and slain in a 2011 rebellion backed by NATO.
Even as the White House increasingly adopts a harder public line against the prospect of Iran being able to enrich on its soil as part of a potential deal, reports have surfaced suggesting greater U.S. flexibility on this issue, as previously indicated by Trump and a number of his top officials, including Vice President JD Vance and Middle East Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, who is leading the U.S. negotiating team.
In a stark revelation last week, Trump confirmed that he warned Netanyahu not to pursue military operations against Iran as negotiations continue. It is at least the second time the U.S. leader has openly discussed discouraging the Israeli premier from taking action against Iran since taking office in January.
Still, U.S. and Israeli officials have downplayed the notion of gaps emerging between the two leaders, including on nuclear issues.
“We work on these issues with our allies, and we have a very open and honest dialogue about these issues,” Saar, the Israeli diplomat, said. “And I do believe that we see that there’s no daylight between the current administration and our government on these issues.”
Saar said the two nations also continued to see eye-to-eye as it relates to the Trump administration’s view on what a deal with Iran should look like, a position the White House has also voiced to Newsweek throughout the talks, the fifth round of which were held last week in Rome.
“The negotiations are still ongoing, and, at this point, I don’t believe it has changed. Ultimately, the United States and Israel are on the same page,” Saar said. “Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon, period, and we agree with that.”
Levite, however, was less convinced that Trump and Netanyahu were in complete harmony.
At a time when Netanyahu was facing growing international and domestic pressure over his criminal court proceedings, handling of the war in Gaza, including calls for new elections, Levite felt Israeli leader was becoming more assertive in his attempts to pressure Trump into a stricter deal that was less likely to be accepted by Iran, while his threat of resorting to force if negotiations fail or yield a “bad deal” may ultimately push the White House toward an agreement.
“I think it reaffirms the rationale that the U.S. should actually seek a deal—and seek a deal quickly—with Iran that would make it kind of politically unacceptable for Israel to contemplate a strike against Iran that will get the U.S. involved,” Levite said.
At the same time, he compared the position of Netanyahu, sometimes referred to by his nickname, Bibi, today to that of Begin when he ordered Operation Opera just two months before an election.
“I mention this because the sense is that you’re the prime minister, your legacy is defined by [whether you have] dealt with the greatest threats to Israeli security, and if you think that your time in office is actually shrinking, which I think it is, and you think that Iran poses such a threat and is more vulnerable now than it would be in a year’s time, because we pierced its armor, you can see why in Bibi’s mind, it’s now or never,” Levite said.
Cohen, the Israeli-American author, also argued that Netanyahu’s thinking may be tied to considerations over his political future and legacy.
“The only thing that he could show before an election, and I believe that he’s going to have an election in the next nine months, I don’t think he’ll be able to postpone it much longer, is to have some show that ‘I defied the Americans, and I went into an operation against Iran,'” Cohen said. “I think the complication of that would be such that the U.S. would have to be involved.”
Even a reluctant Trump administration may find it difficult to avoid becoming entangled in such an operation, Cohen said, as he believed Israel lacked the sufficient capabilities to single-handedly take out Iran’s vast, complex network of nuclear facilities, many of which are deep underground.
Unlike operations carried out in Iraq and Syria in 1981 and 2007, respectively, Israel may also face a formidable retaliation from Iran’s vast missile and drone arsenal that could be unleashed for days on end, far exceeding what was witnessed during the previous confrontations between the two nations last year.
Thus, Cohen argued that the fundamental issue was less about whether or not the U.S. would come to Israel’s aid in the event of a new conflagration, but more as to the distance between the two leaders’ objectives. Trump, he said, “does not want to move into a kinetic war,” while Netanyahu embodies “the Israeli instinct that has always been to take kinetic action.”
“Both sides are trying to conceal the rift, but there is mutual fear, mutual lack of trust and it’s growing. That’s my sense,” Cohen said. “I believe strongly that the question is how fast and when are you going to see it more in the open.”
“I think there are many signs that it’s boiling and when it will come out to the surface is difficult to say,” he added. “And, yes, I think Bibi knows he has to be very cautious about that.”
