Eurasia Press & News
The outbreak of war between Israel and Iran presents a profound geopolitical test for the People’s Republic of China (PRC), exposing the structural limits of Beijing’s ambitions in the Middle East and its global strategy.
Given its interests, many expected China to assume a more forceful political stance in defense of Iranian sovereignty, yet thus far, Beijing has opted for restraint.
China’s military cooperation with Iran remains limited and largely symbolic.
The conflict between Israel and Iran is a stark reminder of the geopolitical constraints that China faces despite its growing global footprint.
The outbreak of war between Israel and Iran presents a profound geopolitical test for the People’s Republic of China (PRC), exposing the structural limits of Beijing’s ambitions in the Middle East and its global strategy. Beijing has enjoyed strong economic, energy, and trade ties with countries in the region — walking a tightrope between rival factions — and even enjoying some diplomatic success in the 2023 brokering of the normalization of ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The agreement was built on long-standing ties between Tehran and Beijing. For Iran, the PRC presents an option to blunt U.S. efforts to isolate Iran economically and diplomatically. For the PRC, Iran is a vital energy partner and a cornerstone in realizing President Xi’s global infrastructure ambitions, including the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The current conflict between Iran and Israel, however, highlights the challenges Beijing faces in balancing its economic interests, strategic ambitions, and diplomatic posture amid growing geopolitical volatility.
For the PRC, Iran is a key strategic partner in the Middle East. Iran occupies a unique position in the PRC’s global infrastructure vision. It is not merely a geographic waypoint along the BRI’s transcontinental corridors, but a vital link connecting East Asia to Europe via land-based transport and energy routes. The “economic belt” of the BRI — which aims to reduce dependence on maritime chokepoints and U.S.-controlled sea lanes — cannot function effectively without stable access through Iranian territory. The PRC’s reliance on Iran is both logistical and material. The country offers essential overland access to Europe and hosts vast reserves of oil and gas resources that Beijing needs to fuel its domestic growth and diversify its energy imports. Disruptions to this strategic corridor due to armed conflict threaten to undermine the coherence of the PRC’s Eurasian supply chains and derail key BRI projects, with no viable alternative land routes that can replicate Iran’s centrality without incurring significant costs and risks.
Given its interests, one might expect the PRC to adopt a more assertive political stance in support of Iranian sovereignty. Yet, Beijing has thus far opted for restraint. Its response to Israel’s military campaign has been marked by cautious diplomacy: calls for de-escalation, expressions of concern, and appeals for multilateral dialogue. This is consistent with Beijing’s longstanding approach to Middle Eastern crises, which emphasizes conflict mediation rather than entanglement and confrontation. This tempered posture stands in contrast to the PRC’s more engaged stance in South Asia, particularly its support for Pakistan during past clashes with India. The different responses are rooted in both geography and political calculus. The India-Pakistan rivalry has a direct impact on Chinese national security, given its proximity to the PRC’s borders and ongoing tensions between China and India. Pakistan is not under sweeping Western sanctions, making support for Islamabad a lower-risk proposition for Beijing. By contrast, direct support for Iran would not only heighten friction with the United States — Israel’s principal backer — but also jeopardize the PRC’s relationship with Europe and other Gulf states, many of whom are key economic partners.
The PRC’s military cooperation with Iran remains limited and largely symbolic. Although the two countries have conducted joint naval drills — five between 2019 and 2024 — the exercises serve more as strategic signaling than evidence of deep operational integration. Moreover, arms exports to Iran are already constrained by international sanctions. Unlike Pakistan, Iran does not represent a significant market for Chinese defense exports; SIPRI data shows a sharp decline in Chinese arms deliveries to Tehran in recent years, with Russia emerging as Iran’s primary military supplier. China has refrained from providing Iran with cutting-edge systems, such as the PL-15 air-to-air missile, and there is little indication that Beijing intends to change course amid the current crisis. Iran’s aging air force and strategic focus on indigenous missile and nuclear capabilities further reduce the relevance of direct Chinese military support. While China may have offered technological assistance in dual-use areas, international scrutiny and the threat of secondary sanctions have likely discouraged overt cooperation.
Statements from Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials — while incrementally more assertive — have remained well within the bounds of traditional diplomacy. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian and Ambassador Fu Cong have condemned Israeli actions and reaffirmed the PRC’s support for a peaceful resolution. On Tuesday, Xi made his first public statement since the current conflict broke out, calling for de-escalation and announcing that “China stands ready to work with all parties to play a constructive role in restoring peace and stability in the Middle East.” Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has held phone calls with his counterparts in the region, including those from Iran and Israel on Saturday, and Oman and Egypt on Wednesday. Yet, there has been no suggestion that Beijing will depart from its carefully managed posture of neutrality and multilateral engagement.
The conflict between Israel and Iran is a stark reminder of the geopolitical constraints that China faces despite its growing global footprint. While Iran is indispensable to its Eurasian ambitions, Beijing’s strategic calculus is shaped more by caution than by commitment. The conflict has revealed that the PRC’s support for its partners — especially those in confrontation with the U.S. — is limited by a complex matrix of interests, including its desire to avoid alienating major economic partners and escalating tensions with the West. Beijing’s approach to the war has exposed a central tension in its foreign policy: the ambition to present itself as a counterweight to U.S. global dominance, while avoiding costly entanglements that could provoke direct confrontation. This ambivalence has drawn criticism, particularly among actors in the Global South who view Beijing as an alternative to Western hegemony. For many of these states, the CCP’s cautious diplomacy reinforces perceptions that Beijing is unwilling to act decisively when doing so entails strategic risk. In 2023, Iran became a full member of the PRC-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), but so far, the multilateral security forum has only issued a statement to condemn Israel’s military strikes on Iran and “advocate for the resolution of the situation surrounding Iran’s nuclear program exclusively through peaceful, political, and diplomatic means,” showcasing the limits of Beijing-led multilateral security cooperation.
As the global order becomes more fragmented, Beijing will continue to walk a tightrope between ambition and restraint. In the Middle East, this means managing its role as a key economic player while limiting its security obligations, regardless of how critical its partners may be to China’s long-term strategic vision.
