Eurasia Press & News
Donald Trump’s re-election as U.S. President in 2024 sparked wide discussions regarding possible shifts in Washington’s foreign policy. It is worth noting that the three South Caucasus countries – Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia – each have distinct expectations from the new administration.
During Trump’s first term (2017-2021), the South Caucasus was not among the top priorities of U.S. foreign policy. Historically, the region has often remained in the shadow of more globally significant issues, with Washington directing its resources mainly toward the Middle East, China, Russia, and other major challenges. The Trump administration’s approach during his first term lacked a consistent and comprehensive strategy for the region; U.S. actions were largely episodic.
Although the South Caucasus has not been a central theme in U.S. foreign policy strategy, it holds a crucial place in Washington’s broader Eurasian geostrategy. Several key factors shape U.S. interests and policies toward the region.
One of the major priorities in the U.S. regional strategy has been energy security and transport corridors. It is expected that this strategy will remain unchanged under the Trump administration. The South Caucasus, due to its geographic location, holds strategic importance in terms of energy and transport. Located along the “New Silk Road” connecting Asia to Europe, the region hosts critical infrastructure such as oil and gas pipelines, railways, and highways. For years, the U.S. has viewed the South Caucasus as vital for diversifying Europe’s energy supply.
Specifically, the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline delivers Caspian oil directly to the Mediterranean via Georgia and Turkey, while the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (South Caucasus) gas pipeline transports natural gas from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz field to Turkey and onward to Europe via the Trans-Anatolian (TANAP) and Trans-Adriatic (TAP) pipelines. These corridors have become an integral part of Europe’s strategy to reduce its dependence on Russian energy. It is highly likely that the Trump administration will continue to recognize the importance of these energy routes and support their security in line with U.S. interests.
Additionally, the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, also known as the “Middle Corridor,” has gained prominence in recent years. This route enables cargo from China to reach Europe bypassing Russia, traveling through Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus, and Turkey. In the context of global trade flow shifts, the significance of this route is growing. Especially due to the Russia–Ukraine war, the Northern Corridor (Trans-Siberian Railway) under Moscow’s control is seen as risky, and the Middle Corridor is receiving increased investment as a viable alternative. This route is important not only for trade but also for energy security, as it serves as a conduit for transporting oil and gas from the Caspian region to Europe while avoiding Russia and Iran.
Although the Biden administration had begun providing some political support for the Middle Corridor’s development, its efforts lacked a unified strategic framework, allowing Moscow and Beijing to continue strengthening their positions in the region. Trump’s return to power may prompt Washington to fill this vacuum. Increased interest in the Middle Corridor could become part of a broader U.S. global competition strategy against China and Russia. Given Trump’s hardline stance on China, the U.S. may seek to promote investment in the Middle Corridor as a counterbalance to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
Potential U.S. Mediation in the Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace Process
Since the Second Karabakh War (2020), one of the key questions in the South Caucasus has been whether a lasting peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia can be achieved. The trilateral statement signed in November 2020 (between Russia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia) not only ended the conflict but also created a new status quo in the region. In 2022-2023, some progress was made in negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan mediated by the European Union and the United States. However, the Biden administration’s Armenia-centric policy and its biased approach to post-conflict issues ultimately rendered Washington’s mediation efforts ineffective.
Trump’s re-election could significantly impact the trajectory of the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process. On the one hand, the Azerbaijani leadership views the Trump administration favorably and hopes that during his term, the U.S. will abandon its critical stance toward Baku and adopt a more rational policy. Indeed, some analysts believe that under Trump, the risk of U.S. sanctions against Azerbaijan has considerably diminished. While under the Biden administration, there were discussions in Congress about punishing Azerbaijan for its counterterrorism operations against illegal Armenian armed groups in Karabakh – through measures like halting military assistance or imposing sanctions – the Trump administration is less inclined toward such actions. This provides Baku with greater flexibility and reduces the urgency of rushing the peace agreement.
On the other hand, Armenia approaches Trump’s presidency with neutrality and caution. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan explicitly stated that he supported no candidate in the U.S. elections, instead emphasizing the importance of developing U.S.–Armenia relations. Yerevan’s primary objective is to secure security guarantees from the Trump administration and maintain the current status quo. Having lost the 2020 war, Armenia’s greatest fear is that Azerbaijan might use its military superiority to exert force once again. While Baku has declared its commitment to peace talks and the likelihood of new military operations seems minimal, Yerevan remains uncertain. The Pashinyan government hopes that the Trump administration will continue the mediation role traditionally undertaken by previous U.S. governments – both Democrat and Republican. Armenia’s expectations from Trump are also driven by the presence of a powerful Armenian lobby in the U.S. and certain individuals within the new administration who are viewed favorably by Armenian circles (e.g., Marco Rubio, Tulsi Gabbard).
Furthermore, shortly before Trump took office the U.S. and Armenia signed a Strategic Partnership Charter on January 14, 2025. This document was deliberately finalized just before Trump’s inauguration to ensure it would take effect during the transition. The aim was to institutionalize U.S.- Armenia relations and prevent a sharp policy reversal by the incoming administration. Armenia hopes that this charter will serve as a foundation for continued cooperation, and that the Trump administration will not easily disregard its terms.
As for the U.S. role in the peace process, it remains unclear how much personal attention Trump will devote to the South Caucasus. Overall expectations suggest that Trump is unlikely to dramatically shift policy or engage actively in the process. His top priorities are likely to involve “the great game” with Russia and China, while localized issues like the Armenia-Azerbaijan disputes may remain secondary. Nevertheless, Trump might still involve himself. Known for portraying himself as a “master dealmaker,” he may view a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan as a potential foreign policy achievement and seek to expedite the process. During his first term, Trump’s administration brokered the Abraham Accords in the Middle East. Similarly, the prospect of ending a decades-long conflict in the South Caucasus could attract his attention.
Georgia’s Complex Position
While Georgia has traditionally been seen as the South Caucasus’s pro-Western country, recent internal political tensions and shifts in foreign policy have somewhat tarnished this image. Especially following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the Georgian government (led by the Georgian Dream party) openly refrained from joining the Western sanctions regime, avoided direct confrontation with Moscow, and undertook domestic actions disapproved of by the West. This strained Tbilisi’s relations with its traditional Western partners. The results of the October 2024 parliamentary elections were not recognized by the U.S. and EU. Consequently, the Biden administration imposed certain sanctions on the Georgian government, including visa bans on individual officials – a serious warning for Tbilisi.
In this context, Trump’s return to the presidency served as a “breath of fresh air” for the Georgian government. The leadership welcomed his victory, interpreting it as a legitimizing factor for its anti-Western rhetoric. Irakli Kobakhidze, chairman of Georgian Dream, openly celebrated Trump’s win, calling it “the end of liberal hegemony in the world.” Tbilisi expects that under the new Trump administration, the U.S. will not punish Georgia for democracy or human rights violations, but rather support the Georgian government if it adopts a tough stance toward Russia. If the Trump administration emphasizes “deals” over “values,” the Georgian government may feel freer to take hardline domestic actions without fear of U.S. criticism. Nonetheless, recent developments suggest that the Trump administration may continue some of its predecessor’s policies toward Georgia. This includes the U.S. House of Representatives’ adoption of the “MEGOBARI Act,” which imposes sanctions on Georgian officials.
Regarding NATO, Trump’s skepticism toward the alliance further clouds Georgia’s long-standing aspiration for membership. Although Georgia was promised NATO membership at the 2008 Bucharest Summit, that promise has yet to materialize. Even under the Biden administration, despite an official “open door” policy, problems in Georgia-NATO relations had stalled the process. Trump, known for questioning the value of NATO allies and even discussing U.S. withdrawal from the alliance, is unlikely to strongly support NATO expansion during 2025-2029. As such, Georgia may refrain from emphasizing NATO membership and instead focus on strengthening bilateral security cooperation with Washington. Ultimately, Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration could slow down or stall during Trump’s presidency – though much will also depend on domestic political dynamics in Tbilisi.
Conclusion
Trump’s return to the presidency in 2024 could significantly reshape the tone and priorities of U.S. policy in the South Caucasus. Value-based themes emphasized by the Biden administration may fade into the background, while pragmatic interests take center stage. Trump’s policy based on the principle of “practical benefit for America” is likely to favor continued cooperation in energy and security – areas in which the South Caucasus provides concrete value to the U.S. (e.g., reducing Russian influence, isolating Iran, securing Europe’s energy supply). However, Trump’s unpredictable nature could lead to abrupt decisions – such as cutting off foreign aid or alienating allies – potentially causing “earthquake effects” for smaller states.
In this complex landscape, the leaderships of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia are each trying to formulate strategies suited to the Trump administration. Azerbaijan aims to attract Trump’s attention to its economic and geopolitical projects and thereby secure both political and non-political support from the U.S. Armenia seeks to ensure that the Trump administration, supported by Congress, adopts a position in the peace process that aligns with Yerevan’s interests and does not over-penalize it due to Iran-related concerns. Georgia, meanwhile, is attempting to portray Trump’s return as legitimizing its government and plans to continue its risky rapprochement with Russia – while still trying not to alienate Washington, instead presenting itself as Trump’s “loyal ally.”
The Trump administration’s concrete policy toward the South Caucasus will take shape over time. However, some contours are already visible: the U.S. is likely to pursue a balancing act in the region to prevent any one power (e.g., Russia or China) from gaining overwhelming dominance. In this pursuit, the U.S. may support energy, transport, and peace initiatives as a mediator and moderator. On the contrary, if the Trump administration disregards the region as unimportant and leaves a vacuum, major powers like Russia, Iran, China, and Turkey will compete to fill that gap – potentially destabilizing the region further.
Therefore, Washington’s South Caucasus policy will largely reflect Trump’s global strategic choices – choices that will be shaped by U.S. moves toward Russia, China, and Iran. In the end, while there may be tactical shifts during Trump’s second presidency, the fundamental U.S. interests in the region – stability, energy security, and great power balance – are likely to remain intact. Even if the style changes (including unpredictable statements and a preference for practical “deals”), U.S. presence in the region will not disappear completely.
