Eurasia Press & News
Unifying and deradicalizing Syria’s armed forces will be the regime’s most formidable challenge.
The United States has now lifted all sanctions on Syria, except on some individuals and entities associated with the former Assad regime. Additionally, the United States has revoked the foreign terrorist organization designation for Syria’s Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). This comes after Washington approved the Syrian leadership’s plan to incorporate thousands of foreign jihadists into the new Syrian army, dropping its longstanding demand that the new leadership deport or detain foreign fighters.
Yet, the issue of foreign fighters—excluding the thousands of ISIS affiliates currently detained in Syria—has since stirred significant debate both domestically and internationally, with speculations over many prospects from the potential resurging global jihadism to weakening Syria’s national unity with limited representation of its diverse communities to undermining Syria’s fragile process of rebuilding government institutions.
What explains this marked shift in US policy? When asked about the decision, US Envoy to Syria, Tom Barrack, cited “transparency” in the integration process as a key condition for the decision, referencing Washington’s understanding of Syria’s new dynamics. On June 26, Barrack said that US policy in Syria is focused on fighting ISIS and countering Iran-backed militias.
Under the Syrian plan, some 3,500 foreign fighters, mainly Muslim Uyghurs from China and neighboring countries, would be integrated into a newly formed unit, the 84th Syrian Army Division. Syria is currently undergoing a five-year transitional period, led by the HTS-interim government, following the collapse of Bashar Assad’s regime in late 2024.
Notably, in December 2024, an official decree by the HTS-led government announced the promotion of 49 officers, six of whom were foreign fighters, to high-ranking military positions. Syria’s Interim President, Ahmed al-Shara (formerly known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al-Jolani based on his former membership in Al Qaeda), justified these promotions as a recognition of their battlefield sacrifices.
Roughly two months later, the issue of foreign fighters resurfaced when brutal violence erupted in several Syrian coastal governorates, resulting in over a thousand civilian deaths, including many Alawites. Multiple reports indicated that foreign fighters were involved in the massacres. A June investigation by Reuters concluded that government forces, along with foreign fighters, had participated in the killings.
Some estimates suggest that foreign fighters make up about 30 percent of HTS’s ranks. There are claims that Uyghur fighters alone number as many as 7,000—well beyond official Syrian estimates. HTS has historically relied on these fighters for key military operations.
Supporting this, a report by The Soufan Center (TSC) stresses the combined expertise of these foreign militant groups as highly instrumental to HTS’ and its allies’ expanding battlefield capacity. The report asserts that this has played a definite role in the expeditious overthrow of the Assad regime.
According to TSC, these fighters are integrated into HTS through various brigades and coordinate via the al-Fateh al-Mubeen Operations Room—a joint command structure used to conduct operations against regime forces. TSC highlights several groups, including Malhama Tactical, Yurtugh Tactical, Muhojir Tactical, and Albanian Tactical. These organizations demonstrate significant capabilities in logistics, battlefield coordination, propaganda, and ideological outreach. Their stated objective is to disseminate military knowledge from a jihadist perspective.
More recent research shows that Malhama Tactical and Albanian Tactical are currently training Syria’s new army, underscoring their persistent autonomy and influence over the army. Several foreign jihadist groups have even established their own private military companies (PMCs) to train fighters as well as participate in combat. Wassam Nasr has indicated that HTS has long deployed foreign fighters in critical operations and strategic areas for decisive outcomes.
Before the Trump administration approved their integration, various scenarios were debated for addressing the foreign fighter file in Syria: integration into Syrian society while fully abiding by Syrian laws, repatriation and rehabilitation, an offer of asylum provided that they abstain from political or military activities, or relocation to other battlefields.
Internationally, the recognition of the foreign fighter threat led to the adoption of several international and regional policy instruments. The United States and the broader international community have largely addressed the foreign fighter issue through a counterterrorism lens. The US counterterrorism approach has primarily focused on monitoring and prosecution.
However, in comparative perspective, particularly with a focus on challenges posed by foreign fighter returnees, major policy responses have variously been developed, including the following: allowing return, blocking return, repatriation, repatriation of children only, surveillance, criminalization, prosecution, revoking citizenship, prosecution and rehabilitation, and allowing return but no repatriation.
At a more fundamental level, integrating foreign fighters into a unified Syrian army is part of the broader challenge of building a unified Syrian army amid a fragmented military landscape dominated by armed factions. Following the regime’s fall and the Syrian army’s collapse, military unity is central to the political transition.
This task involves integrating ideologically, ethnically, and sectarian-diverse groups such as: the Islamist HTS (including its foreign factions); the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA); the US-aligned Syrian Free Army (SFA); the Kurdish-majority Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF); the Russia-backed 8th Brigade in Daraa; Druze factions in Suwayda; and thousands of Alawite officers from the former military. This is further complicated by the autonomy of a sizeable SDF and control over most of Syria’s oil and gas, Suwayda’s secular Druze resistance, and Alawite marginalization in coastal Syria.
More broadly, rebuilding Syria’s military holds substantial geopolitical significance. Turkey, for instance, sees military support as a key step in solidifying its influence in the neighboring country as well as checking the SDF. Saudi Arabia’s financial assistance aligns with its strategy to counter Iranian power in Syria. Israel has justified its targeting of military infrastructure in Syria as neutralizing Hezbollah’s threats. However, it views Turkey’s plan to establish military bases in Syria as a potential threat. The collapse of the Syrian army and, concurrently, the state would have far-reaching consequences across the region, while creating fertile ground for transnational jihadism.
China is especially alarmed by the Uyghur fighters gaining legitimacy and training under a formal military structure, and Israel remains wary of jihadist factions on its border, particularly after the October 7 attack. Some analysts argue the United States sees the Uyghur presence as a strategic lever in its rivalry with China.
The reorganization of the Syrian armed forces was formally launched in January 2025 with an HTS-led national dialogue, known as the “Victory Conference.” Since then, beyond the various announcements of disbanding Assad regime institutions and former opposition parties, structural arrangements had taken place including restructuring Syria’s ministry of defense and ministry of interior that are tasked with managing security operations involving merging armed factions, the formation of army factions across various governorates, and the military appointments and promotions, according to various statements.
Most recently, the Ministry of Defense has announced several key details of its strategic plan, which includes the abolition of mandatory conscription, the recruitment of young people with technological skills, and increased international military cooperation.
However, these efforts have fallen short of elaborating a military doctrine. The army building approach appears rather mechanistic, lacking the ideological and national foundation necessary to consolidate diverse factions into a cohesive national force.
Programs like Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR) are critical for restructuring Syrian military and security institutions A recent policy paper published by the Harmoon Center for Contemporary Studies argues for DDR and SSR in Syria, pointing to the challenge posed by the multitude of armed groups, ideological, sectarian, and ethnic divides, and the foreign fighter issue. In discussing DDR and SSR implementation, the paper outlines all armed factions and power structures in Syria, but emphasizes that foreign factions are ineligible to participate in such processes.
The paper emphasizes the importance of establishing clear legal frameworks for addressing foreign fighters, which will guide the vetting and regularization of their status. It also critiques the policy of granting sensitive posts to foreign fighters in response to international pressure, warning that this undermines both domestic trust and external support.
DDR and SSR appear to be currently part of the media debate on Syrian army rebuilding, and some reports indicate that DDR and SSR have been proposed to the Syrian government. Yet, their success in the Syrian case is contingent on developing a military doctrine grounded in a nationally unified defense strategy. US defense studies aver that in the absence of a military doctrine that defines DDR, all DDR-related planning becomes essentially ad hoc.
While HTS as an organization has been disbanded, its cadres remain central to military restructuring. However, HTS was at its core a coalition of Islamist (jihadist) militias. While in several interviews and a documentary about al-Shara, al-Shara denounced Al Qaeda’s and ISIS’ jihadist approach, concerns persist over HTS’s ideological roots, amplified by the increasing influence of the foreign militant groups.
Formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra, an Al Qaeda affiliate, HTS initially formed in 2017 out of a merger of several Islamist militias after al-Shara broke ties with Al Qaeda in 2016. While HTS has since undergone several changes in terms of its organization and ideology, making compromises to incorporate religious and political groups but publicly distancing itself from Al Qaeda’s global jihadist ideology, its early composition and operations reflect persistent jihadist undercurrents, particularly those composed of foreign fighters.
Some observers point to internecine conflict and a history of battles between HTS and Al Qaeda or ISIS affiliates as an affirmation that HTS has broken with Salafi jihadism. In fact, HTS proceeded, as part of its power consolidation around Idlib, to defeat or dispel various militant groups such as Ahrar al-Sham and Hurras al-Din affiliated with global jihadist organizations. Besides, HTS, since it broke ties with Al Qaeda and ISIS, has continued its targeting campaign against their members. For instance, most recently in 2023, HTS fighters killed ISIS leader Abu Hussein Al-Husseini al-Qurashi. In addition, HTS’s prisons are still filled with ISIS or Al Qaeda prisoners.
Amid these shifts, analysts are attempting to taxonomize various factions within HTS, particularly the foreign militant groups, according to two versions of jihad in Islamic thought on war: defensive jihad, which refers to war in response to unjust aggression against muslims, and offensive jihad, which advocates for expansionist conquests to spread the Islamic faith. However, it remains to be seen how the new Syrian government will proceed with what it claims to be a national restructuring of the army and whether transparency about the integration of foreign fighters (and of potentially future ones) will prove to be a viable policy option.
Overall, the risk of foreign fighters’ integration into the new Syrian army remains multifaceted. Key factors—including the scale of foreign militant participation, their training role, their high command positions, HTS’s Islamist legacy, the absence of a unifying doctrine, and regional geopolitical stakes—raise legitimate concerns. These factors threaten not only Syria’s stability but also decades of US-led counterterrorism efforts and national security planning.
For now, incorporating Uyghur fighters into a separate faction, the 84th Syrian army division, seems to serve the purpose of monitoring them. Perhaps a different policy approach may be necessary to address foreign militant groups that are extremist and fundamentally unsuitable for Syria’s state institutions.
