Eurasia Press & News
Criminal networks in the South Caucasus are expanding their reach across borders, exploiting both the region’s geographic position as a trade hub and its complex political environments. While in Azerbaijan, organized crime has largely been absorbed by the state apparatus, in Georgia and Armenia, criminal groups have been allowed to operate within limits set by political authorities. In all three countries, these networks thrive on blurred lines between licit and illicit economies, creating transnational challenges for security and governance.
Thieves-in-law, a powerful criminal subculture rooted in Soviet times, remain influential in the region. While many have moved operations abroad —notably to Europe, Russia, and the US— they maintain ties at home through proxies and political alliances. These figures are involved in extortion, illicit trade, and money laundering, often filling voids left by weak or compromised institutions. Transnational criminal activities now span trafficking in drugs and humans, cyber scams, and financial crime.
Armenia, following its Velvet Revolution, enacted reforms aimed at severing links between the state and criminal elites. Despite progress, organized crime persists in the form of monopolies, illicit trade, and a growing role in drug trafficking. Armenia has also become a re-export hub for Russian gold and jewellery, contributing tosanctions evasion activities that have emerged since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 . Concerns remain over capital flight and weak judicial oversight, while Armenian networks continue to operate internationally, supported by diaspora connections.
In Georgia, the Rose Revolution initially curbed organized crime, but recent years have seen the resurgence of thieves-in-law, especially in prisons. Call centre scams have proliferated, allegedly protected by political or security actors. Georgia has also become a key route for drug trafficking and sanctions evasion in the region. While criminal networks are increasingly based abroad, they continue to influence domestic affairs, including elections.
Azerbaijan presents a more centralized model. Underworld figures have been either eliminated or co-opted into state structures since the 1990s. Criminality is closely linked to powerful family networks, and grand corruption appears to be the main source of illicit financial flows. Despite official anti-crime efforts, the state’s control over resources and public tenders has allowed corruption to thrive, often hidden behind monopolistic economic practices.
The war in Ukraine has amplified these dynamics. As traditional smuggling routes through the Black Sea have closed, the South Caucasus has emerged as a key corridor for trafficking and sanctions evasion. Armenia and Georgia have become parallel trade hubs for Russian goods, while Azerbaijan facilitates Russo-Iranian commerce via its Caspian port.
Organized crime in the South Caucasus is increasingly shaped by geopolitical realignments, regional trade corridors, and digital technologies. While each country presents distinct challenges, the region as a whole is becoming a node in global illicit networks. Effective responses will require strengthening oversight of trade infrastructure, confronting state-crime collusion, and supporting independent journalism and civil society to expose and counter these evolving threats.
This is the first report in a two-part series by the GI-TOC looking at organized crime and illicit economies in the South Caucasus. The second report – due out shortly – investigates issues of state capture and grand corruption, which provide the overall enabling environment for organized crime and criminal actors to operate in the South Caucasus and across the neighbouring regions.
