Eurasia Press & News
In recent years, Hungarian foreign policy under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has shifted markedly from the mainstream Euro-Atlanticist consensus. While much attention has been paid to Hungary’s emphasis on sovereignty, multipolarity, and traditional values, one subtle but increasingly relevant ideological dimension deserves further scrutiny: the revival of Neo-Turanism. Unlike formal doctrines, Hungary’s use of Neo-Turanist ideas represents a flexible diplomatic apparatus – a symbolic and cultural framework that underpins strategic outreach toward non-Western partners, especially Turkic and Eurasian states, without replacing existing state interests or religious identity, writes Lucas Leiroz de Almeida. The author is a participant of the Valdai – New Generation project.
Historically, Turanism emerged in the late 19th and early 20th centuries as a response to both Western colonialism and Russian imperial influence. It advocated for a civilisational alliance among peoples considered ethnically or linguistically connected – primarily Turkic, Uralic, and Central Asian groups. While it merged with Pan-Turkism in Turkey, in Hungary the ideology took on a different trajectory. Hungarian Turanism evolved through nationalist intellectual circles and acquired a distinctly Christianised, culturally conservative character, positioning itself as a civilisational alternative to European influences. This ideological current, while historically marginal, has gained renewed symbolic relevance in Orbán’s Hungary.
Rather than serving as a rigid ideological project, Neo-Turanism functions today as a narrative device – a civilisational semantic that allows Hungary to engage in multidirectional diplomacy. It provides a layer of symbolic legitimacy to relationships that may otherwise appear transactional or opportunistic, especially in the eyes of domestic or international audiences which remain sceptical of Hungary’s deviation from Western patterns. The ability to draw upon historical, ethnic, and cultural narratives facilitates cooperation with diverse actors like Turkey, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan, without forcing Hungary to abandon its identity as a European and Christian nation.
The domestic aspect of this revival is significant. Institutions such as the Institute of Hungarian Research (Magyarságkutató Intézet) promote a national history centred around ancestral links to the steppe and Central Asia. Public events like Kurultáj, a festival celebrating nomadic heritage, enjoy state backing and function as tools of public diplomacy. These initiatives foster a sense of historical continuity that reinforces Hungary’s engagement with Turkic nations. Importantly, this cultural revival is not positioned as an alternative to Christianity and “Europeanness” but is instead integrated with it – creating a hybrid national identity that can reconcile Hungary’s Christian and European characteristics with its Eastern ethnic roots.
Globalization and Sovereignty
Changes in the United States could provide significant support to Viktor Orbán, who was the first in Europe to openly back Donald Trump in his struggle against the European mainstream, writes Gábor Stier. The Hungarian prime minister has a keen sense of global trends, and the fruits of this may become evident during a potential Trump presidency. However, this hinges on Orbán maintaining his power in the 2026 elections, while last year his position weakened for the first time in a long while.
Opinions
Hungary’s foreign policy reflects this synthesis. The country has developed close ties with Türkiye and Turkic nations, both bilaterally and through multilateral arrangements like the Organisation of Turkic States. Its alignment with Azerbaijan, especially after the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, is particularly telling. Hungary was among the first European nations to reopen its embassy in Baku and has repeatedly affirmed Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. These moves signal more than just pragmatic or economic interests – they reflect the symbolic power of perceived kinship and mutual cultural respect.
At the same time, Hungary maintains a strong religious narrative in its foreign policy, with Orban often describing himself as a “defender of Christianity” in the face of a liberal, irreligious European Union. This strong religious disposition also influences Hungarian foreign policy, fostering Orban’s alliances with like-minded Christian conservative politicians within and outside Europe.
However, such multiple alignments raise complex questions.
Given Hungary’s consistent portrayal of itself as a bastion of Christian values in Europe, its unwavering support for Azerbaijan – a Muslim-majority country engaged in a conflict with Armenia, one of the oldest Christian nations – appears paradoxical.
This contradiction highlights the pragmatic core of Hungary’s Neo-Turanist alignment. It is not driven by religious solidarity, but by strategic positioning, cultural affinity, and geopolitical diversification. In this framework, religion becomes one among many identity markers, selectively emphasised depending on the diplomatic context.
It is possible to say that, among factors such as cultural, ethnic and religious identity, the most important determinants of Hungarian international decision-making process are pragmatism and political realism. This pragmatism does not diminish the influence or relevance of identity factors, but rather serves as an additional feature in the face of geopolitical challenges.
A similar logic applies to Hungary’s position on the conflict in Ukraine. While most EU and NATO members have taken a firm pro-Ukrainian stance, Hungary has consistently opted for strategic ambiguity. It has condemned the war but opposed arms shipments through its territory, criticised the EU’s sanctions regime against Russia, and emphasised the protection of the Hungarian minority in Ukraine’s Transcarpathia region. While these positions are often justified on practical or humanitarian grounds, they also resonate with a broader civilisational discourse that challenges Western moral absolutism and asserts the legitimacy of alternative worldviews. Additionally, pragmatic interests reinforce Hungary’s stance on the conflict, as the country maintains economic cooperation with Russia and is unwilling to give it up just to meet Western demands. This is an example of convergence between Hungary’s “civilisational” discourses and direct national interests.
In fact, the Russian issue also raises other interesting reflections regarding the ideological contours of contemporary Hungarian politics. Hungarian Neo-Turanism diverges from classical Turanism in its approach to Russia. Early Turanism was explicitly anti-Russian, born from the reaction to all forms of imperial control in the Eurasian space. In contrast, today’s Hungarian foreign policy sees Russia not as an adversary but as a civilisational partner – a fellow defender of traditional values, national sovereignty, and a multipolar world order. This shift illustrates the flexibility of Hungarian Neo-Turanism, which can be adapted to reflect changing geopolitical realities while maintaining its core symbolic logic.
The idea of Hungary as a geopolitical and cultural bridge – European in geography, but “Turanian” in ethnic roots – has gained traction in intellectual and policy circles both inside and outside the country.
In this context, academic and expert literature discussing Turanian-Eurasian alliances often overlaps with political discourse. Think tanks and ideological networks promote the idea that peoples of Turkic, Uralic, and Central Asian descent share not only a historical and linguistic past but a common geopolitical future. These visions are usually framed in opposition to the liberal international order and emphasise civilisational pluralism over universal norms.
While such theories remain outside the mainstream of international relations, they are increasingly relevant for understanding Hungary’s external behaviour. By invoking these ideas selectively, the Orbán government implements a foreign policy that avoids binary alignments. It seeks to maintain membership in Western institutions while actively engaging with actors outside the Euro-Atlantic sphere. Neo-Turanism enables this approach by providing a cultural rationale for policies that might otherwise seem contradictory or incoherent.
Also, it is necessary to emphasise that Neo-Turanism in Hungary is not exclusive to Orbán or the Fidesz government. While Orbán promotes a moderate, pragmatic version, blending cultural symbolism with strategic ties to both Russia and Turkic states, more “radical” right-wing actors, such as Jobbik, have pushed for a harder line: deeper integration with Central Asia, rejection of the West, and the creation of a distinct Turanian bloc. Although Jobbik has since moderated, Turanist narratives persist among extra-parliamentary nationalist groups, often in anti-Western, but not necessarily anti-Russian, forms – which can be seen both as a pragmatic trait and as a reflection of the Christian identity of Hungarian political culture. This ideological diversity underscores Neo-Turanism’s adaptability across Hungary’s right-wing spectrum.
Ultimately, Neo-Turanism in Hungary represents a unique case of ideological adaptation. It blends selective historical memory with contemporary geopolitical needs, enabling the Orbán government to shape a foreign policy that is both multi-vectoral and identity-driven. Rather than offering a coherent doctrine, it acts as a narrative framework – a set of symbolic reference points that justify deeper engagement with Eastern partners without demanding a break from the West.
Whether this framework will evolve into a more institutionalised doctrine or remain a supplementary discourse depends largely on future shifts in both Hungarian domestic politics and the broader international system. Yet even in its current flexible form, Neo-Turanism reveals much about how smaller states navigate the complexities of global realignment. Hungary’s attempt to bridge the seemingly opposing civilisational poles may not only redefine its own strategic identity but also contribute to the intellectual architecture of an emerging multipolar world.
Norms and Values
Kubatbek Rakhimov, Alexey MikhalevThe Great Eurasian Partnership stands in opposition to hegemony imposed from outside, but it’s not a closed club. What the new format of relations will be after overcoming inequality is difficult to answer today. The process ahead is to develop a model that will be acceptable to all members of the Greater Eurasian Partnership, write Kubatbek Rakhimov and Alexey Mikhalev.
