Eurasia Press & News
Key Takeaways
The Houthis likely decided to impose their blockade on Saudi Arabia to advance their own interests, though Iran probably encouraged them to impose the blockade for Tehran’s own purposes. The Houthis have repeatedly warned Saudi-owned ships against transiting the Red Sea via radio on July 20 and July 21.
The Houthis only threatened shipping in the Red Sea once it benefited Houthi objectives. The Houthis did not adhere to earlier Iranian calls in July to close the Bab al Mandeb Strait during the recent conflict and only decided to impose a blockade on Saudi Arabia on July 20 following Saudi strikes on Sanaa International Airport on July 13.
Iran continues to use force to impose its control over the Strait of Hormuz and compel vessels to follow Iranian transit restrictions. Iran rejects any alternative to its designated traffic separation scheme, particularly the southern Omani route, because it allows vessels to bypass Iranian authorization and directly undermines Iran’s claim to control maritime traffic through the strait.
Iran is repeatedly attacking US bases and personnel across the region in order to erode US willingness to challenge Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz. Iran likely calculates that sustained attacks and rising US casualties will generate domestic pressure on the United States to end the conflict, force the United States to surrender, and accept Iranian control over the strait.
Iran is attacking critical infrastructure in Kuwait to impose direct civilian and economic costs on states that host US forces and pressure them to curtail US military operations. Iran likely calculates that sustained disruptions to electricity and water supplies will increase domestic pressure on Kuwait to restrict US operations from Kuwaiti territory.Toplines
The Houthis likely decided to impose their blockade on Saudi Arabia to advance their own interests, though Iran probably encouraged them to impose the blockade for Tehran’s own purposes. The Houthis have repeatedly warned Saudi-owned ships against transiting the Red Sea via radio on July 20 and July 21.[1] The Houthis also emailed shipping companies on July 20 and warned them against loading or discharging cargo in Saudi ports on the Red Sea.[2] These threats and warnings have resulted in at least two vessels turning around in the Red Sea to avoid crossing the Bab al Mandeb and a third turning around rather than continuing its transit to a Saudi port.[3] The Houthis have not yet attacked shipping, however. These efforts will almost certainly increase the cost of shipping goods through the Red Sea while also imposing high economic costs on Saudi Arabia specifically. The increase in costs globally and the economic impact on Saudi Arabia specifically supports both Iranian and Houthi objectives. The Houthis seek to discourage Saudi action against them, while the Iranians seek to extend the maritime shipping crisis and increase oil prices caused by Tehran’s efforts to close the Strait of Hormuz.
The Houthis only threatened shipping in the Red Sea once it benefited Houthi objectives. The Houthis did not adhere to earlier Iranian calls in July to close the Bab al Mandeb Strait during the recent conflict and only decided to impose a blockade on Saudi Arabia on July 20 following Saudi strikes on Sanaa International Airport on July 13.[4] This suggests the Houthis expanded the shipping crisis only when doing so served their interests, such as deterring future Saudi strikes on Houthi targets in Yemen.[5] Iranian and Houthi interests align in this case, but the Houthis are not enforcing the blockade for Iran. Their actions benefit Iran while directly serving Houthi objectives against Saudi Arabia. The Houthis’ enforcement of the blockade, regardless of how it affects Houthi objectives in Yemen, supports Iranian efforts to degrade US willingness to continue the war and force the United States to accept Iran’s demand to retain control over the Strait of Hormuz.[6] Disruption in both the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al Mandeb increases pressure on the United States and global markets more than disruption in either waterway alone.[7] This pressure could help Iran force the United States to accept Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz, assuming Iran is able to secure Saudi assurances that Riyadh will not strike Houthi assets and end the Houthi blockade on Saudi Arabia.
Iran continues to use force to impose its control over the Strait of Hormuz and compel vessels to follow Iranian transit restrictions. Iran rejects any alternative to its designated traffic separation scheme, particularly the southern Omani route, because it allows vessels to bypass Iranian authorization and directly undermines Iran’s claim to control maritime traffic through the strait.[8] Iran sees this control as its primary means of imposing costs on the United States and compelling Washington to accept Iranian demands. Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Deputy Secretary for International Affairs Ali Bagheri Kani described the strait on July 21 as Iran’s “decisive leverage,” and argued that Iran must translate its military strength into political gains.[9] Iran has repeatedly threatened and attacked vessels using the southern route to enforce this objective.[10] The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Organization (UKMTO) reported on July 20 that unknown projectiles struck two vessels near Oman and the United Arab Emirates, which damaged one vessel’s steering gear and forced the crew of the second vessel to abandon ship.[11] Kuwait identified the second vessel as the Kuwaiti tanker Kaifan and reported that the likely Iranian attack injured several crew members.[12] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) separately claimed on July 20 that it attacked two tankers on July 20 because they attempted to use the southern Omani route.[13]
Iran is repeatedly attacking US bases and personnel across the region in order to erode US willingness to challenge Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz. Iran likely calculates that sustained attacks and rising US casualties will generate domestic pressure on the United States to end the conflict, force the United States to surrender, and accept Iranian control over the strait. The Wall Street Journal reported on July 20 that Iran conducted three ballistic missile strikes against Muwaffaq al Salti Air Base in Jordan on July 17 and 18.[14] The first two Iranian missiles reportedly struck a gym and an empty aircraft hangar, while the third struck housing units and killed two US service members.[15] These strikes demonstrate that Iran can still penetrate US air defenses and inflict casualties despite repeated US strikes on Iranian drone and missile launch sites, storage facilities, and command and control centers. Satellite imagery also shows that Iran attacked King Faisal Air Base and another Jordanian airfield, where Iranian strikes reportedly damaged several US Army UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters.[16] Iran continued to claim attacks on US bases and military assets in Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, and Qatar on July 20 and 21.[17]
Iran is attacking critical infrastructure in Kuwait to impose direct civilian and economic costs on states that host US forces and pressure them to curtail US military operations. Iran is broadening the costs of the war beyond military facilities by targeting infrastructure that supports essential civilian services. Iran likely calculates that sustained disruptions to electricity and water supplies will increase domestic pressure on Kuwait to restrict US operations from Kuwaiti territory. The Kuwaiti government stated on July 21 that Iran attacked several power-generation and water-desalination facilities for the fourth consecutive day on July 20, which disabled several generators.[18] Islamic Development Organization-affiliated Mehr News Agency separately reported on July 21 that an Iranian drone strike targeted the al Zour power plant in southeastern Kuwait.[19] Iran is likely trying to demonstrate to Kuwait and other Gulf states that they will bear direct civilian and economic costs for hosting US forces and supporting US operations against Iran. Iran likely also conducted these attacks to portray the United States as an unreliable security guarantor and drive a wedge between the United States and its Gulf partners. Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei stated on March 12 that Iran would strike bases used to attack Iran but avoid attacking host countries and urged neighboring states to close US bases.[20] Iran’s attacks on Kuwaiti civilian infrastructure expand beyond this distinction, however.
US-Iran Negotiations
Nothing significant to report.
Maritime Activity in the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf
See topline section.
US-Israeli Air Campaign and Iranian Response
Iran has reportedly temporarily restored communications between the mainland and Kharg and Qeshm islands after US strikes disrupted key communications and supply networks along the southern coast of Iran. Iranian Communications and Information Technology Minister Sattar Hashemi told Iranian media on July 21 that US strikes have repeatedly disrupted communications between mainland Iran and the islands, including Kharg and Qeshm.[21] Iran has reportedly replaced damaged fiber-optic links with radio and satellite communications, but Hashemi emphasized that these measures are only temporary and that Iran must restore fiber-optic networks to reestablish reliable communications.[22] The reported repairs follow recent US strikes along Iran’s southern coast that sought to disrupt communications and sever supply networks linking key locations in southern Iran to the mainland to degrade Iran’s ability to coordinate operations to threaten international shipping.[23] Iran’s illegal traffic separation scheme runs along Qeshm Island.[24]
Iranian Domestic Affairs
Iran reportedly moved critical nuclear infrastructure and material to the Mount Kolang Gaz site in Esfahan Province after the June 2025 Israel-Iran War. Unspecified US and Israeli officials, citing Israeli intelligence, told the Wall Street Journal July 21 that Iran moved “thousands” of uranium-enrichment centrifuges to Mount Kolang after the war.[25] An Israeli source told CNN on July 21 that Iran also moved part of its highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile to the site.[26] US and Israeli strikes during the June 2025 war damaged or destroyed thousands of centrifuges at Iran’s principal underground enrichment facilities, including Fordow, Natanz, and the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center.[27] The Institute for Science and International Security assessed following the June 2025 war that the Israeli campaign rendered most, if not all, of Iran’s operational centrifuges inoperable and effectively destroyed Iran’s enrichment capacity.[28] The strikes also buried at least a majority of Iran’s HEU stockpile, according to International Atomic Energy Agency Director Rafael Grossi.[29] Commercially available satellite imagery suggests that Iran has not accessed the damaged underground facilities since the June 2025 war to recover buried centrifuges or HEU.[30] Iran may nevertheless retain additional centrifuges or portions of its HEU stockpile at undisclosed facilities that the US-Israeli strikes did not target. Commercially available satellite imagery indicates that Iran has conducted activity at the Mount Kolang site since the war, including efforts to harden the facility against future strikes.[31]
Iran’s Axis of Resistance
Lebanese Hezbollah and the Israeli Campaign in Lebanon
The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) deployed to Zawtar el Gharbiyeh in Nabatieh District on July 21 after the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) withdrew from the town.[32] This marks the first Israeli withdrawal in southern Lebanon in accordance with the June 26 Trilateral Framework Agreement.[33] The IDF reported on July 21 that its forces fired into the air to repel Lebanese forces who “breached” the IDF’s security zone in Zawtar el Charqiyeh, a town immediately east of Zawtar el Gharbiyeh.[34] The IDF added that Zawtar el Charqiyeh is not part of the “pilot zones” plan and that the IDF did not permit Lebanese forces to enter the town.[35] The LAF told Lebanese media on July 21 that its forces did not enter Zawtar el Charqiyeh and stated that this engagement “will hinder the implementation” of the “pilot zones.”[36] Lebanese media also reported on July 21 that vehicles in a Red Cross convoy struck an Israeli mine in Zawtar el Charqiyeh, which injured two paramedics.[37] The IDF established operational control over Zawtar el Charqiyeh in May 2026 to use the village as a bridgehead for ground operations north of the Litani River.[38]
Israeli and Lebanese efforts to implement the “pilot zones” coincided with US President Donald Trump’s meeting with Lebanese President Joseph Aoun in Washington, DC, on July 21.[39] Trump pledged political and military support to help the Lebanese government disarm Hezbollah.[40] An unspecified US official told Axios on July 21 that the LAF will be responsible for disarming Hezbollah in the first “pilot zones.”[41] The official’s statement is consistent with the June 26 Trilateral Framework Agreement, which stipulates that the LAF will be responsible for disarming Hezbollah in the “pilot zones.”[42] Aoun and other LAF officials recently said that the Lebanese government is reluctant to use force to disarm Hezbollah due to the risk of civil war and fractures within the LAF, however.[43]
Hezbollah Political Council Deputy Chairman Mahmoud Qamati threatened on July 21 that Hezbollah may shut down Rafic Hariri International Airport in Beirut in response to Lebanese government restrictions on Iranian influence in Lebanon.[44] Qamati warned during an interview with Hezbollah media that “no more planes will land in Beirut” and demanded that the government repeal its February 2025 ban on Iranian aircraft in Lebanese airspace and its visa requirements for visiting Iranian civilians, which it instituted in March 2026.[45] Qamati said that Hezbollah will employ strictly “peaceful means” to compel the government to reverse its restrictions on Iranian travel to Lebanon.[46] It is unclear how Hezbollah would shut down Hariri International Airport or what Qamati meant by “peaceful” means, however. Unspecified Lebanese Foreign Ministry officials told Saudi media on July 21 that Hezbollah’s threats will not compel the government to reverse its decisions regarding Iran.[47] The Lebanese Foreign Ministry expelled the newly appointed Iranian Ambassador to Lebanon on March 24 because of Iran’s support for Hezbollah.[48]
Other Axis of Resistance Activity
The Iraqi National Intelligence Service arrested three unidentified individuals who operated a first-person view (FPV) drone factory in Baghdad on July 21.[49] Iraqi authorities seized 25 drone frames, carbon fiber panels, and assembly and production equipment.[50] The factory is likely located in an area of eastern Baghdad in which Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah maintains a presence, according to footage from July 21 that ISW-CTP geolocated.[51] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, likely including Kataib Hezbollah, conducted multiple FPV drone attacks on US targets in Iraq during the war, as well as targets in the Gulf, in March and April.[52] The drones the Iraqi authorities seized, according to Iraqi media, appear to be made locally and differ from the types of drones that the IRGC has attempted to transfer to Lebanese Hezbollah. Syrian Interior Ministry forces thwarted an IRGC attempt to smuggle advanced weapons, including FPV and fiber-optic drones, from Iraq through Syria to Hezbollah on July 7.[53]
Multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi militias within the Islamic Resistance of Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, reiterated their refusal to disarm until after a complete US withdrawal from Iraq.[54] Unidentified sources told Iraqi media on July 21 that 10 militias within the Islamic Resistance of Iraq informally told the Iraqi federal government that they would retain their weapons until this withdrawal occurs.[55] The sources said that the militias do not believe the United States will withdraw from Iraq by the end of September, as planned by the Iraqi government.[56] Kataib Hezbollah, Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, and Harakat Allah al Awfiya are known to comprise the militia coalition, but the identity of the other six militias the sources are referring to is unknown.[57] The six other militias could include smaller Iraqi militias, front groups affiliated with the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, or members of the Islamic Resistance Coordination Committee.
Multiple Iraqi militias have repeatedly rejected disarmament in recent months and will likely continue to use the US presence in Iraq to justify their existence amid the Iraqi federal government’s disarmament initiative.[58] The United States has increasingly pressured the Iraqi federal government to disarm the militias due to militia activity in March and April.[59] The militias’ opposition to US presence in Iraq is integral to their identity as “resistance” organizations, hence their recent efforts to cast doubt on US plans to leave Iraq in September. The militias have also used a variety of justifications for their existence, such as sectarian violence in coastal Syria in 2025, and thus they are likely to use new justifications once the United States withdraws. [60] Iraqi media reported on July 20 that Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi will ask the Iranian government to pressure the militias to surrender Iranian-provided missiles to the Iraqi federal government during his upcoming visit to Tehran on July 23.[61]
The Iraqi Security Forces reported on July 21 that an explosive-laden drone crashed near the US al Harir Air Base in Iraqi Kurdistan.[62] It is not clear at the time of this writing which actor conducted the attack or if the base was the intended target. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducted numerous attacks targeting US positions in Iraqi Kurdistan, such as al Harir Air Base, in March and April.[63] US air defenses at the US Consulate in Erbil also reportedly intercepted at least three drones on March 21.[64] The consulate’s air defenses have intercepted multiple drone swarms in recent days.[65] No actor has yet claimed these attacks.
Gulf Activity
See topline section.
