Loyalty vs combat readiness. How Hegseth’s policy became a major issue for the U.S. Army

The Pentagon’s purges have not waned over the past months, despite the “strange war” that Donald Trump is waging with Iran. Military Minister Pete Hegseth dismissed some generals without warning, others blocked promotion. In parallel, he used the Pentagon’s civil leadership institute to impose Donald Trump’s political and cultural agenda on the military. Meanwhile, the strongest army of the world lacks ammunition, the personnel are tired, and the headquarters are deserted. Experts believe that Hegseth himself created or at least exacerbated a significant part of these problems: he paid more attention to the political issues and loyalty of his generals than to supplying the army and the competence of his subordinates.
The lightning war has been prolonged

The claims against Pete Hegseth, which have been accumulated for many months, have overwhelmed the cup of patience of some Republicans in Congress, who have tried not to cross the Trump administration’s agenda in the last year and a half.

It was the Republican, Thomas Massey, who, on 15 September submitted to the House of Representatives a proposal to impeach the Minister of War in eight articles. Three of them point to the outbreak of war with Iran without congressional authorization. The rest relate to alleged abuses against civilians, military action against drug traffickers and Yemeni Houthis, and the prosecution of Senator Mark Kelly for calling for the military not to comply with illegal orders.

The rest of the Republicans, however, won enough votes to postpone consideration of Massi’s demands for November after the midterm elections. However, Congress is likely to give them a move in the future if the control of the chamber, as the polls are now prophesied, will receive the Democrats.

The claims to the way Hegseth leads the Pentagon during the war are not groundless. The war, launched by the United States and Israel in February, initially assumed to be lightning to behead the Iranian leadership. This was to lead to a pro-Western turn in Tehran’s politics. The first allies succeeded, the second one did not. After the elimination of the old rulers, power in Iran consolidated in the hands of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and they are not afraid of escalating hostilities.

In September, the war focused on oil exports and maritime communications. The US began attacking Iranian oil tankers, and Tehran responded with attacks on commercial vessels. Iranian missiles began to hit closer to American ships. Saudi Arabia asked the United States for military assistance, and immediately after that, Iranian attacks damaged a critical land pipeline, which became an alternative to the Straits. In addition, the Iranian-backed Houthis recently seized strongholds in another part of the Middle East Maritime Corridor, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.

Now the US administration is forced to plan a long war. Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio allegedly even warned President Trump that Iran was capable of resisting until the end of his presidential term — that is, before the beginning of 2029. It coincides with what Hegseth hears from his own generals.

According to the Washington Post, in August, the high command reported to the Pentagon that the war could not continue indefinitely. The Central Command of the U.S. Armed Forces, responsible for the Middle East region, keeps more than 50 thousand military personnel in a state of high alert for many months.

Back in August, the high command reported to Hegseth that the war in Iran could not continue indefinitely in the previous regime

The generals are worried that the combat load is increasing, the soldiers are tired without a change (rotation may not be until the beginning of 2027 and even longer), and the stock of high-precision weapons is not replenished.

When the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln recently entered the port of Thailand after a 286-day hike — one of the longest in modern history of the U.S. Navy — the sailors complained about problems in everyday life, a lack of varied food and a difficult psychological state. Trump responded, however, that the aircraft carrier was at sea “not long enough.”

The Navy’s Chief of Staff, Daryl Kodl, expressly stated that the fleet would not be able to support the current volume of operations against Iran, as the date of the end of operations was unknown, and the sailors were already at their limits.

Even American convoys, which help tankers pass through the Strait of Hormuz, have now begun to work on a limited schedule and do not provide 24-hour air defense protection. The US, of course, is still in a position to wage war with Iran, but there are problems. And not just in the Middle East. Since forces from other regions had to be pulled out here, the containment of other potential opponents of America, primarily China and Russia, has weakened, the generals warn.
Generals vs. Minister

The problem of lack of resources is exacerbated by the difficult relationship between the Minister and the General. Hegseth has been consistently cleaning the headquarters for a year and a half. He gets rid of officers he considers disloyal to his political course.

The US military, while subject to civilian political leadership, has traditionally enjoyed professional autonomy. The estimates of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) are not always the same as those of the politicians. The planning and conduct of operations, the assessment of military risk, the development of doctrine and standards, recommendations for promotion were administered by the military.

Trump and Hegseth almost immediately after coming to power took up “purges” among the military leadership. The president fired Charles Brown’s head of the OCNS, and Hegseth got rid of the then Navy’s then chief of staff, Lisa Franchetti, and a number of other top commanders, without any charge of wrongdoing. Brown subsequently indirectly criticized the administration for politicizing military appointments.

Recently, Hegseth has moved from layoffs to controlling those receiving promotions. He personally interferes with the already drawn up military lists for promotion, excluding many undesirable officers from there.

Among the reasons for the opal, according to the media, was participation in inclusivity programs. In one case, Hegseth struck out of the list of candidates for Rear Admiral of all three women and two African-Americans.

For the remaining officers, this inevitably raises the question of where the boundary between the professional assessment of their service and political loyalty is now. Already in the course of the Iranian war, Hegseth resigned the Chief of Staff of the Land Forces, Randy George.

The perturbations of the largest kind of troops continued when Army Secretary Dan Driscoll, the civilian leader of the ground force and one of the main supporters of their accelerated modernization, as well as Hegseth’s largest competitor in the struggle for influence and his potential successor, left his post in late August.

However, the personnel reshuffle did not eliminate professional disagreement within the command. According писалиto the American media, in August the commanders of the European, Indo-Pacific and Southern commands, as well as the head of the Navy formally expressed disagreement with the extension of the period of stay of part of the deployed forces there.

This did not mean refusing to comply with the order: the generals and admirals had to execute it. But they recorded that they considered the decision to be risky. Hegseth’s reaction has still not followed: dissenting generals are still in their posts. But the question of how safe it is for a military career to tell Hegseth regularly what he doesn’t want to hear remains open.
Where are the shells, Hegseth?

Personnel conflicts are only part of the problem. Even if you take Hegseth’s relationship with the generals and their impact on the combat capability of the army behind the brackets, the armed forces are banally short of ammunition and equipment. The US is spending its expensive weapons much faster than the American military industry is now able to replenish it.

Meanwhile, cheap Iranian drones create a deep imbalance in the cost of attack and defense: Tehran can force the US and its allies to spend on intercepting a device that is many times more expensive than the means of attack.

The US has already spent a huge amount of high-precision weapons. In the first month of the war alone, The Washington Post estimates that 850 Tomahawk cruise missiles used to strike fortified targets, and more than 1,000 missiles to Patriot anti-aircraft missile systems and THAAD’s atmospheric interceptor missile systems were spent.

CNN estimates that the U.S. by August spent about half of the pre-war arsenal of Patriot missiles and roughly 80 percent of THAAD interceptors. In addition, the United States lost at least 45 heavy drones MQ-9 Reaper – about a quarter of the pre-war fleet. Slow and expensive drones proved to be relatively easy targets for Iran and its allies.

The US not only reduced its ability to strike, but also left without the proper cover of the allies in the region. They were willing to pay the petrodollars for American air defences, but now they are not in sufficient quantity. Not surprisingly, the Gulf monarchies turn to Ukraine for technology and specialists in the fight against cheap drones — the experience that Kiev has gained during the war with Russia.

The US, in reality, too. The global drone market was already estimated at $20 billion in 2025, and by 2034 should exceed $50 billion. The United States intends to take the leading place, albeit late. The Pentagon is not standing still: it has invested about $1 billion in the Drone Dominance initiative to produce up to 200,000 attack drones by 2027.

Young people who have recently engaged in sports drone races win half-billion contracts of the military department for the production of drones-killers worth $5000 per piece. A whole galaxy of new companies claims billions of dollars distributed by the Pentagon.

By 2034, the global drone market should exceed $50 billion, and the US would like to take the lead

But here the key again becomes the question of voluntaristic personnel reshuffles, potentially reducing combat readiness. After the dismissal of Randy George, the new leadership of the ground forces dissolved the experimental battalion for 600 people, which specialized in unmanned warfare for almost a year and had to adopt the experience of Ukraine.

The Pentagon argues that a separate unit is no longer needed: drone skills should be shared across the army. But lawmakers from both parties demand to explain why the experiment is stopped right now, during a war in which cheap Iranian drones became one of the main threats to American troops.

Hegseth didn’t create that deficit. But he came to the Pentagon promising the opposite: to revive the defense industry, reform the procurement system and establish the rapid introduction of new technologies.

As a result, innovation is slow, almost contrary to the efforts of the leadership, which disbands the relevant units. Therefore, the failure of the military department to make up for the losses is now becoming a claim in person to Hegseth.
Prepared for the last war

It is too early to say that the personnel policy of Hegseth and Trump has significantly weakened the American armed forces. But the alarm calls sound from everywhere. Missile shortages, their slow production and fleet congestion did not arise under Hegseth—these are old problems. According to the winged phrase, US generals were preparing for the past war, relying on lightning strikes and technological superiority.

They were not ready for war of attrition with such a major enemy as Iran. However, Hegseth, who came to the Pentagon with the promise to “restore the fighting capacity” of the army, does not cope with the current problems and aggravates them with a personnel chehard and ideology, which is more important to it than efficiency.

The U.S. military, for which Trump has requested a colossal $1.5 trillion military budget for 2027, is seeking to correct shortcomings. The Pentagon is building emergency plans to replenish the arsenal.

However, the political agenda promoted by Hegseth has already cost the military a lot of money and effort, and possibly lives. And, apparently, it will continue to be the main brake for any modernization programs and solutions. That is, the main problem will be the head of the Pentagon.