Eurasia Press & News
In the wake of setbacks over Iran, stalled Middle East diplomacy, and hollow peacemaking claims, Donald Trump is scrambling for any foreign policy win he can claim—real or manufactured.
His latest gambit?
A disastrous last-ditch push to drag Russia into U.S.-led sanctions against Tehran.
Trump holds no winning cards. Any attempt to force or coerce Moscow into enforcing American trade restrictions would demand massive concessions elsewhere—major shifts on European security or relief from existing U.S. sanctions on Russia itself. Moscow has little incentive to compromise over Iran, a key strategic partner.
Yet more may be in play. The Trump administration’s so-called unwavering support for Ukraine looms large. Ukraine is the issue where Moscow wants something from Washington; Iran is the issue where Washington wants something even more urgently from Moscow. That makes CIA Director John Ratcliffe a particularly logical emissary.
Last Ditch Diplomacy
That is not quite a foreign-policy breakthrough. But in the current Washington climate, it may qualify as one
After all, the administration’s better-known diplomatic operators—Steve Witkoff, Trump’s special envoy, and Secretary of State Marco Rubio—have had decidedly mixed results, while Trump’s inner circle has hardly demonstrated a unified or coherent approach to negotiations with either Moscow or Tehran.
If the objective was to explore an arrangement too sensitive, too deniable, or simply too politically awkward for conventional diplomacy, the CIA’s back channel offers obvious advantages.
Ratcliffe, unlike the administration’s more conspicuous envoys, can talk to Russian intelligence without pretending that every conversation constitutes a formal diplomatic initiative. His established relationship with Sergey Naryshkin, head of Russia’s SVR, makes the choice even less mysterious.
And that may be the point. If Washington wants Moscow to do something about Iran, Moscow presumably wants Washington to do something about Ukraine. The question is whether there is a bargain hiding somewhere between the two—or merely another diplomatic dead end being dressed up as progress.
And the fact that the CIA director was in and out of Moscow in only a few hours makes his journey look even more like a carrier pigeon, i.e., a message-delivery/negotiation mission rather than any semblance of a conventional diplomatic visit.
Timing is Everything!
Washington wants Russia to put pressure on Iran. Moscow wants Washington to address Russian interests over Ukraine.
The CIA director wasn’t merely delivering an ultimatum. He was carrying a wish list. The timing is critical—and leaves lots of room for speculation. Russia has already pressed Washington over its provision of intelligence and direct help to Ukraine. No one expected a serious response.
Russia does not yield to pressure, blackmail, bullying, or mafia-style leg-breaking.
Meanwhile, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent is pushing hard to cut off trade with Iran. Ratcliffe might have been tasked with cutting some kind of deal on that front. Yet there is little reason to believe anything will come of it. We cannot claim with authority that the CIA director was sent specifically to demand Russian compliance with Bessent’s Iran sanctions.
What we do know is this: Bessent launched his campaign on August 24. Ratcliffe made his highly unusual visit to Moscow on August 25. The timing itself is an interesting coincidence—or a possible bargain.
Washington wants Russia to pressure Iran. Moscow wants Washington to address Russian interests on Ukraine. If that was the conversation Ratcliffe carried to Moscow, the CIA director was not merely delivering an ultimatum. He was carrying a shopping list.
Touch-and-Go Landing
The visit was brief—a classic touch-and-go. Flight-tracking data showed a U.S. Air Force C-17A Globemaster III departing the United States, stopping in Latvia, then landing at Moscow’s Vnukovo airport around 10 a.m. local time. The aircraft left again only a few hours later.
Who Ratcliffe met has not been officially disclosed. The obvious candidate is Sergey Naryshkin, director of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). The two men established a direct channel in March 2025, speaking by telephone and agreeing to keep regular contact.
This was no ordinary diplomatic call. A CIA director flying straight into Moscow points to an intelligence and security channel, not conventional negotiation.
The Kremlin has now confirmed that Ratcliffe met Russian intelligence officials, describing the contacts as a “positive development.” Putin was briefed but did not meet him.
CIA Remains Tight Lip
Moscow has little reason to surrender its relationship with Tehran simply to hand President Trump another photograph labelled “Mission Accomplished”
The great irony may be that Ratcliffe’s Moscow mission has already produced the one thing Washington desperately needs: a success story. The CIA will say nothing. The White House will say nothing.
Moscow, after initially appearing to know nothing about the American aircraft, now concedes that Ratcliffe did indeed meet Russian intelligence officials.
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov describes the encounter simply as “contacts between security services” and says that such contacts are a “positive development.” Putin did not meet Ratcliffe, but, according to Peskov, he was briefed on the results.
That is not quite a foreign-policy breakthrough. But in the current Washington climate, it may qualify as one.
Economic Outcasts or Castaways
The timing makes the visit far more interesting than any public explanation. Ratcliffe landed in Moscow one day after Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent unveiled “Operation Economic Outcast”—Washington’s latest campaign to isolate Iran—while Russia remains one of Tehran’s most important strategic partners. At the same moment, the Russia-Ukraine diplomatic track sits stalled, and Washington has been pressing Kyiv to restrain long-range strikes against Russia.
So the real question is not whether Ratcliffe went to tell Moscow to stop trading with Iran. That would be a thin hand indeed. The sharper question is what Washington might be prepared to put on the table in return.
If Iran is the American problem and Ukraine is the Russian problem, Ratcliffe was an unusually logical messenger. The CIA director can carry conversations that are not quite diplomacy, not quite negotiation, and certainly not material either side wants on the front page the next morning.
Moscow has little reason to surrender its relationship with Tehran simply to hand President Trump another photograph labeled “Mission Accomplished.” Russia has its own interests in Iran, its own calculations on Ukraine, and—most importantly—its own price for anything Washington wants.
That leaves the possibility of a much larger bargain beneath the remarkably small footprint of Ratcliffe’s visit.
Iran for Ukraine? Intelligence for restraint? Sanctions for concessions?
We do not know yet.
And that is precisely what makes the eight-hour Moscow excursion so fascinating. The C-17 arrived, Ratcliffe delivered whatever message he carried, Russian intelligence listened, Putin was briefed, and the aircraft departed.
No flags. No summit. No handshake. No triumphant press conference. Just the intelligence services talking while the politicians insist nothing much happened.
Perhaps nothing did.
But if Washington is truly trying to manufacture a foreign-policy win out of Iran, Ukraine, Russia, and sanctions all at once, Ratcliffe may not have been sent because Trump still held plenty of cards.
He may have been sent because the deck is getting rather thin. And sometimes, when the diplomatic cards run out, the last card left is the one you send by C-17.
