Eurasia Press & News
Key Takeaways
Iran is using force, combined with the threat to suspend US-Iran negotiations, to try to deter the United States from conducting further attacks on Iran that would likely make it more difficult for Iran to achieve its strategic objectives, which include solidifying control over the Strait of Hormuz and preserving the Axis of Resistance. US forces struck around 20 targets in southern Iran, including air defenses, ground control stations, and surveillance radar sites, on June 9 in response to Iran’s drone attack that downed a US Apache helicopter off the coast of Oman on June 8.
Iran has repeatedly used calibrated force as part of a series of campaigns to try to achieve its strategic objectives. Iran launched missiles at Israel on June 7 to pressure US President Donald Trump to convince Israel to halt its operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon. These attacks were part of a broader Iranian effort to preserve Hezbollah, which it views as a key pillar of its deterrence strategy vis-a-vis Israel and the United States.
ISW-CTP is monitoring reports of additional US strikes in Iran as of 5:36 PM ET on June 10. ISW-CTP will provide more details on the US strikes in its June 11 morning thread and evening update.Toplines
Iran is using force, combined with the threat to suspend US-Iran negotiations, to try to deter the United States from conducting further attacks on Iran that would likely make it more difficult for Iran to achieve its strategic objectives, which include solidifying control over the Strait of Hormuz and preserving the Axis of Resistance. US forces struck around 20 targets in southern Iran, including air defenses, ground control stations, and surveillance radar sites, on June 9 in response to Iran’s drone attack that downed a US Apache helicopter off the coast of Oman on June 8.[1] Iranian forces responded by conducting several drone and missile attacks targeting US bases in Jordan, Kuwait, and Bahrain.[2] US forces intercepted all of the projectiles except for one that landed in the vicinity of the US Navy 5th Fleet Headquarters in Manama, Bahrain, with no reported casualties at the time of this writing.[3] The Iranian regime likely intended for these strikes to have an informational effect by signaling to the United States that Iranian forces would be prepared to resume the war with the United States if necessary. The Iranian regime likely calculated that the United States would not resume the war in response to these strikes given recent reports that US President Donald Trump would prefer a negotiated settlement over a resumption of conflict. Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei separately stated on June 10 that Iran will “review” negotiations with the United States in light of the US self-defense strikes on Iran on June 9.[4] This comment is also part of the Iranian informational campaign aimed at deterring further US military action against Iran because Baghaei is implicitly threatening to suspend negotiations if the United States takes military action against Iran.[5] Iran is exploiting the current situation in which it has neither made concessions in negotiations nor faces continuous large-scale strikes from the United States and Israel to advance its objectives, such as normalizing Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz. ISW-CTP previously assessed that the Iranian regime likely calculates that the status quo is favorable to achieving its objectives.
Iran has repeatedly used calibrated force in recent weeks as part of a series of campaigns to try to achieve its strategic objectives. Iran launched missiles at Israel on June 7 to pressure US President Donald Trump to convince Israel to halt its operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon.[6] These attacks were part of a broader Iranian effort to preserve Hezbollah, which it views as a key pillar of its deterrence strategy vis-a-vis Israel and the United States.[7] Iran has also used force, including attacks on US forces in the Gulf and the drone attack on the Apache helicopter, to try to deter the United States from enforcing its naval blockade and interfering with Iranian efforts to control the strait.[8] Iranian officials and media have repeatedly emphasized that Iran will not concede on control of the strait, its proxy and partner network, and its nuclear program because it views these things as central pillars to its national security strategy to deter future attacks by the United States and Israel.[9]
ISW-CTP is monitoring reports of additional US strikes in Iran as of 5:36 PM ET on June 10. CTP-ISW will provide more details on the US strikes in its June 11 morning thread and evening update. President Trump threatened earlier on June 10 to strike Iranian power plants and bridges if Iran did not make progress in negotiations.[10]
US-Iran Negotiations
See topline section.
Maritime Activity in the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf
See topline section.
US and Israeli Air Campaign
See topline section.
Iranian Domestic Affairs
Nothing significant to report.
Iran’s Axis of Resistance
Lebanese Hezbollah and the Israeli Campaign in Lebanon
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is continuing to strike Hezbollah targets and conduct ground operations in southern Lebanon, despite Hezbollah and Iranian efforts to deter Israel from continuing its campaign in Lebanon. ISW-CTP assessed on June 8 that Hezbollah likely seeks to benefit from Iran’s threat to respond to any Israeli attack against Hezbollah because such threats seek to inject uncertainty into Israel’s decision-making process for military operations against Hezbollah.[11] Senior Israeli officials stated on June 8 and 9 that Israel will not allow Hezbollah and Iran to deter Israel from striking Hezbollah targets in Lebanon and will respond to any Hezbollah or Iranian attacks on Israeli territory.[12] The IDF continued to strike Hezbollah targets, including rocket and drone launch sites, in southern Lebanon on June 9 and 10.[13] IDF units, including the 869th Brigade Reconnaissance Unit (91st Division) and the 84th (Givati) Infantry Brigade (91st Division), have continued to seize and destroy Hezbollah weapons caches and infrastructure and kill the group’s fighters in southern Lebanon in recent days.[14] Lebanese security sources told Saudi media on June 10 that the IDF is attempting to advance along the Beaufort Castle axis toward Kfar Tebnit and Ali Taher Hill in southeastern Lebanon and along the Biyyadah axis toward Majdal Zoun and Mazraat Buyut al Sayad in southwestern Lebanon.[15] Kfar Tebnit and Ali al Taher are both located on high ground, which is favorable for observing Hezbollah ground force movements.[16] The IDF and Hezbollah launched strikes against each other along both axes on June 10.[17]
Other Axis of Resistance Activity
Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib al Imam Ali submitted files and data related to its members, weapons, and vehicles to the Iraqi federal government’s disarmament committee.[18] The Iraqi federal government began trying to restrict arms to the state on June 4 through the disarmament and integration of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia fighters into the Iraqi security establishment, including the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[19] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes many Iraqi militias, such as Kataib al Imam Ali, that answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[20] Kataib al Imam Ali controls the 40th PMF Brigade.[21] Kataib al Imam Ali announced on June 2 that it would begin to “disengage” from the PMF and restrict weapons to the Iraqi state, possibly to overcome US opposition to the group’s involvement in the next Iraqi government.[22] Kataib al Imam Ali could also seek to fill a portion of the 35,000 jobs in Iraqi security institutions that Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi has reportedly proposed to be allocated to militia members who disarm.[23]
It will be difficult for the Iraqi federal government to confirm the degree of Kataib al Imam Ali’s transparency and honesty given the extent to which Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have routinely obscured their operations from the Iraqi state. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias operate covertly due to their very nature as “resistance” organizations.[24] The PMF, which the militias are supposed to integrate into, also operates with limited Iraqi government oversight.[25] The Iraqi federal government, under former Prime Minister Haider al Abadi, tried and failed multiple times to audit the PMF.[26] PMF officials have deliberately hidden information such as the size of the PMF from the Iraqi federal government, for example.[27] Militias that control PMF brigades also manage illicit financial networks that Iran uses to evade US sanctions.[28] ISW-CTP continues to assess that any Iraqi federal government attempt to disarm the militias and integrate them into the Iraqi security establishment that does not address the militias’ networks and allegiance to Iran will likely further embed Iranian influence within the Iraqi state.
