Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 22, 2026

Toplines

A senior Ukrainian military official forecasted that Russia will begin using mobilized personnel on the battlefield in Ukraine on April 1. Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn told Ukrainian outlet Interfax Ukraine on March 21 that Russia will begin involving all mobilized personnel currently in Crimea in combat operations in Ukraine starting April 1.[1] Voloshyn stated that mobilized personnel will replace wounded personnel and replenish the Russian 810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet), elements of which are currently operating in the Kursk direction and in the “Crimea” operational-tactical group. Russia may be resorting to deploying mobilized personnel as Russian forces continue to incur heavy losses on the battlefield while struggling to recruit enough new volunteers to replace its losses.[2] Voloshyn added that the Russian military command plans to reorganize its 810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade into a naval infantry division, which would be the tenth new maneuver division that Russia has formed since 2022.[3] The Russian military command most recently reorganized its 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) into the 55th Naval Infantry Division and its 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet) into the 120th Naval Infantry Division as of December 2025.[4]

Ukrainian counterattacks in southern Ukraine continue to create operational and strategic effects against Russian forces going into the Spring-Summer 2026 offensive. Voloshyn stated that the Russian military command is transferring elements of the Russian 55th and 120th naval infantry divisions to the 29th Combined Arms Army’s (CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) area of responsibility (AoR) in the Oleksandrivka and northern Hulyaipole directions.[5] Voloshyn noted that these forces could then participate in combat operations starting in April 2026. ISW recently observed reports that elements of the 55th Naval Infantry Division (Pacific Fleet) and 120th Naval Infantry Division redeployed from the Dobropillya tactical area to the Hulyaipole and Oleksandrivka directions as of late February 2026 and mid-March 2026 respectively, likely in response to the successful Ukrainian counterattacks in the area.[6] Voloshyn stated that the Russian 58th CAA (Southern Military District [SMD]), reportedly operating in western Zaporizhia Oblast and the Kherson direction, will have to replenish elements of its 19th and 42nd motorized rifle divisions with reserve elements of the Moscow Military District (MMD).[7] Russian forces have reportedly already been deploying forces from their operational reserve simply to support ongoing combat operations and likely laterally redeployed elite VDV and naval infantry units from Donetsk Oblast to the southern frontline in early March 2026.[8] Ukrainian forces’ dual tactical efforts to halt and push back Russian gains in southern Ukraine are having cascading effects on other sectors of the front, forcing Russian forces to choose between defending against the Ukrainian counterattacks and allocating manpower and materiel for offensive operations elsewhere on the frontline.[9] Russia’s redeployments to southern Ukraine in response to Ukrainian counterattacks are likely disrupting the Russian military command’s plans for the Spring-Summer 2026 offensive against the Fortress Belt. Russian forces have previously failed to conduct simultaneous offensives in different sectors of the front, and it is unlikely that they will be able to make significant efforts to advance in the Fortress Belt area while contending with Ukraine’s recent successes in the Hulyaipole and Oleksandrivka directions.[10]

Likely Belarusian balloons recently landed in Poland, possibly as part of Russia’s ongoing use of Belarus in its “Phase Zero” effort, setting conditions for a potential future war with NATO. Polish authorities reported on March 21 that they found five balloons and 10 foil-wrapped packages in fields across Podlaskie Voivodeship along Poland’s eastern border with Belarus.[11] The officials did not state where the balloons originated, but Belarusian balloons have frequently violated Polish airspace since October 2025, including five times since January 27.[12] ISW continues to assess that Russia has de facto annexed Belarus and that Russia is likely using airspace incursions into NATO states like Lithuania and Poland from Belarus as part of its “Phase Zero” effort — the informational and psychological condition-setting phase — to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[13]
Key Takeaways

A senior Ukrainian military official forecasted that Russia will begin using mobilized personnel on the battlefield in Ukraine on April 1.
Ukrainian counterattacks in southern Ukraine continue to create operational and strategic effects against Russian forces going into the Spring-Summer 2026 offensive.
Likely Belarusian balloons recently landed in Poland, possibly as part of Russia’s ongoing use of Belarus in its “Phase Zero” effort, setting conditions for a potential future war with NATO.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
Ukrainian forces struck military assets and oil infrastructure in Russia. Russian forces launched 139 drones against Ukraine.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued to strike military assets in Russia on the night of March 21 to 22. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian command and observation post near Smorodino, Belgorod Oblast (roughly five kilometers from the international border) and a Buk-M1 anti-aircraft missile system near Pervoye Maya, Bryansk Oblast (roughly 30 kilometers from the international border).[14] Geolocated footage published on March 22 confirms the Ukrainian strike against Pervoye Maya.[15]

Ukrainian forces likely struck oil infrastructure in the Republic of Bashkortostan on March 22. Russian opposition media Astra reported that geolocated photographs from local eyewitnesses indicate that Ukrainian drones struck the northern industrial zone in Ufa on the morning of March 22.[16] Astra noted that Rosneft’s Bashneft operates three oil refineries in the industrial zone. Geolocated footage published on March 22 shows smoke in Ufa.[17]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on March 22 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Potapivka (northwest of Sumy City).[18] Russian milbloggers credited elements of the Russian 80th Separate Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) with seizing Potapivka.[19] Russian sources first claimed that Russian forces seized Potapivka on March 19.[20]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Sumy City near Sopych and Potapivka and north of Sumy City near Novomykolaivka, Kostyantynivka, and Kindrativka and toward Nova Sich on March 21 and 22.[21]

Order of Battle: Elements of the 3rd Battalion of the Russian 119th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[22] Elements of the 1st Battalion of the 217th VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Tetkino, Kursk Oblast (southwest of Glushkovo).[23]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on March 22 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Vovchanski Khutory (northeast of Kharkiv City).[24]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Prylipka, Synelnykove, Starytsya, and Vovchanski Khutory and toward Okhrimivka and Zybyne on March 21 and 22.[25]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported fighting in the Velykyi Burluk direction on March 22.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian forces continue offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on March 22, but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and toward Kurylivka and Hlushkivka on March 21 and 22.[26]

Russian milbloggers continue to deny the Russian military command’s claim that Russian forces seized Kupyansk. A Russian milblogger criticized on March 22 how unspecified actors, likely referring to pro-Kremlin milbloggers, are smearing independent Russian milbloggers who are trying to report on the “difficult” situation in Kupyansk, which the milblogger characterized as a contested “gray zone.”[27] Another Russian milblogger claimed on March 21 that bots are commenting lies on their posts to try to control the ongoing crisis in Kupyansk.[28]

Russian forces are intensifying assault operations towards Kupyansk. A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction stated that the Russian military command is using barrier troops to force Russian infantry to advance.[29] The spokesperson reported that Russian forces are struggling to survive due to insufficient food and ammunition supplies. The spokesperson forecasted that Russian forces will likely increase their number of assaults in the area soon.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 122nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are operating in southwestern Kupyansk.[30] Elements of the 1431st Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], LMD) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[31]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on March 22 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Novoplatonivka; northeast of Borova near Borivska Andriivka; east of Borova toward Shyikivka; and southeast of Borova near Serednie on March 21 and 22.[32]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 237th Tank Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are striking Ukrainian unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) in Novomykhailivka (southeast of Borova).[33] Signalmen of the 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA, MMD) are reportedly operating near Bohuslavka (north of Borova).[34]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian forces conducted another mechanized assault of an unspecified echelon in the Slovyansk direction on March 22 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Riznykivka (east of Slovyansk).[35]

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; north of Lyman near Stavky; east of Lyman near Dibrova; south of Lyman toward Staryi Karavan and Brusivka; east of Slovyansk near Kalenyky, Zakitne, Riznykivka, Pazeno, and Platonivka and toward Rai-Oleksandrivka; and southeast of Slovyansk near Fedorivka Druha and Lypivka on March 21 and 22.[36] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kryva Luka (east of Slovyansk), Kalenyky, Nykyforivka (southeast of Slovyansk), and Fedorivka Druha.[37]

Ukraine’s Joint Forces Task Force stated that Russian forces unsuccessfully conducted a mechanized assault in the Lyman direction on the morning of March 22.[38] The Joint Forces Task Force reported that Russian forces attacked with an unspecified number of heavy armored vehicles, military vehicles, and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs). Russian forces conducted a roughly battalion-sized mechanized and motorized assault in the Lyman direction on March 19, indicating that Russian forces began their Spring-Summer 2026 offensive against the northern flank of the Fortress Belt.[39]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian sources are prematurely reporting Russian sabotage and reconnaissance activity within Rai-Oleksandrivka as Russian advances.[40]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Riznykivka.[41] Reconnaissance elements of the 85th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are reportedly operating near Riznykivka and Nykyforivka.[42] Drone operators of the Smuglyanka Detachment and Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Slovyansk.[43] Elements of the 31st Motorized Rifle Regiment (67th Motorized Rifle Division, 25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[44]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 22 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced along the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway in eastern Kostyantynivka.[45]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Orikhovo-Vasylivka, Chasiv Yar, and Minkivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka, Ivanopillya, and Kleban-Byk; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Stepanivka, Illinivka, and Yablunivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and Novopavlivka on March 21 and 22.[46]

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that the northwestern outskirts of Minkivka are contested “gray zones.”[47]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian ammunition depots and positions near Raiske and Torske (both southwest of Druzhkivka).[48] Lancet loitering munitions operators of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian radar stations near Kamyshevakha (west of Druzhkivka).[49] FPV drone operators of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) are reportedly intercepting Ukrainian drones near Rusyn Yar.[50] Elements of the 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka direction.[51]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Dobropillya toward Kucheriv Yar and east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and Nove Shakhove on March 21 and 22 but did not advance.[52]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on March 22 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; west of Pokrovsk toward Serhiivka; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and toward Shevchenko; north of Pokrovsk near Bilytske and Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Chervonyi Lyman; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Novopidhorodne, and Molodetske on March 21 and 22.[53]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Novopavlivka itself and northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka on March 21 and 22 but did not advance.[54]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on March 22 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Oleksandrivka near Ternove and Novohryhorivka and south of Oleksandrivka near Yehorivka, Zlahoda, and Krasnohirske on March 21 and 22.[55] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a motorized assault with motorcycles and ATVs toward Herasymivka and Zarichne (both southwest of Oleksandrivka).[56]

The Russian military command has reportedly deployed unspecified Spetsnaz forces to the Oleksandrivka direction. The chief of staff of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported that intelligence indicates that the Russian military command is planning to transfer unspecified brigades to the area and that an unspecified Russian Spetsnaz unit has arrived.[57] The chief of staff reported that Russian forces are struggling to establish high-quality aerial reconnaissance but are heavily using Molniya fixed-wing drones. The chief of staff stated that Russian forces continue infiltration missions between Ukrainian positions.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are intercepting Ukrainian drones northeast of Krasnohirske.[58] Drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) reportedly continue to operate in the Oleksandrivka direction, striking Ukrainian armored vehicles near Barvinivka (southwest of Oleksandrivka).[59]

Ukrainian forces continued their frontline and mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast and reportedly destroyed 26 Russian air defense systems between March 1 and 22. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 22 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian personnel concentration and logistics hub near Velyka Novosilka (roughly 22 kilometers from the frontline) and a drone control point near Rivnopil (roughly 15 kilometers from the frontline) in the past day.[60] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on March 22 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian S-400 air defense system radar in an unspecified area of occupied Donetsk Oblast.[61] Brovdi reported that the Ukrainian USF destroyed 26 unspecified pieces of air defense equipment at operational depths in unspecified areas between March 1 and 22.
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on March 22 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; north of Hulyaipole near Solodke and Varvarivka; northwest of Hulyaipole near Staroukrainka, Olenokostyantynivka, and Zelene; west of Hulyaipole near Zaliznychne; and southwest of Hulyaipole near Myrne and Charivne on March 21 and 22.[62]

Ukrainian force continued their frontline strike campaign against Russian military assets in the Hulyaipole direction. The Ukrainian General Staff stated on March 22 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian manpower concentration near Hulyaipole in the past day.[63] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Hulyaipole direction reported on March 21 that one of the brigade’s battalions struck over 130 Russian vehicles and almost 40 motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) near Hulyaipole in January and February 2026.[64]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 22 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske and toward Novoboikivske and Novoyakovlivka and west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk and Pavlivka on March 21 and 22.[65] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are operating east of Orikhiv.[66]

Order of Battle: Drone operators and artillery elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces and equipment near Orikhiv.[67] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Nemets group of the 3rd Assault Company of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[68]

Ukrainian forces continued their frontline and mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 22 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Buk-M2 air defense system concentration near Staropetrivka (roughly 97 kilometers from the frontline), a manpower concentration near Berdyansk (roughly 97 kilometers from the frontline), and a command and observation point near Uspenivka (roughly 2.5 kilometers from the frontline) in the past day.[69]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on March 22 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in the Kherson direction, including southwest of Kherson City near Bilohrudskyi Island, on March 21 and 22.[70]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 4th Military Base (58th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian drone positions in the Kherson direction.[71]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 21 to 22. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 139 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other drones — of which about 80 were Shaheds — from the directions of Oryol, Kursk, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[72] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 127 drones, that eight drones struck seven locations, and that drone debris fell at seven locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck industrial and civilian infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk and Kyiv oblasts.[73] Ukrainian railroad operator Ukrzaliznytsya reported that Russian forces struck a locomotive of a suburban commuter train at an unspecified location on the Prydniprovska Railway.[74] Sumy Oblast State Emergency Service reported that Russian forces conducted a “double tap” strike against rescue workers responding to a Russian strike against Sumy City on the night of March 21 to 22.[75] Odesa Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Kiper stated that Russian drones struck agricultural infrastructure in Odesa Oblast during the day on March 22.[76]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian forces launched almost 1,550 drones; over 1,260 guided glide bombs; and two missiles against Ukraine in the past week (March 15 to 21).[77]

Russian forces are significantly increasing their strikes against Ukraine’s Black Sea ports. Ukrainian Minister of Community and Territorial Development Oleksiy Kuleba reported on March 22 that Russian forces struck port infrastructure in Odesa City and Chornomorsk about 150 times in all of 2025 but have already conducted over 180 such strikes since the start of 2026.[78] Kuleba stated that Ukrainian forces have improved their shoot down rate in the area by 25 to 35 percent compared to an unspecified time period.
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks

Nothing Significant To Report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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