Iran Update Special Report, May 14, 2026

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance’s response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.

Key Takeaways

Iran may be prioritizing upholding the “legitimacy” of its claims to the Strait of Hormuz over toll collection at this time. This prioritization helps Iran encourage states to implicitly recognize its control over the strait while avoiding international concerns over paying the Iranians and incurring sanctions risk. Legitimizing any aspect of Iranian control over the strait, with or without tolls, is unacceptable due to the precedent it sets.
Iran is likely prioritizing the implementation of the protocol over the tolls at this time in order to present itself as a reasonable actor that is willing to “open” the strait to “free” travel without tolls. Recognizing Iran’s protocol — which bars certain countries from accessing the strait and not others based on their behavior — is unacceptable because it implies that the Strait of Hormuz is sovereign Iranian territory. The PRC only explicitly opposes the toll system and the Iranian “blockade,” but has not explicitly opposed Iranian claims to sovereignty, for example.
PRC companies have been reportedly discussing arms sales routed via third-party countries with Iranian officials, but currently it is unclear to what extent PRC officials have decided to approve these sales and subsequent weapons shipments, according to New York Times reporting on May 13 that cited US officials.

Toplines

Iran may be prioritizing upholding the “legitimacy” of its claims to the Strait of Hormuz over toll collection at this time. This prioritization helps Iran encourage states to implicitly recognize its control over the strait while avoiding international concerns over paying the Iranians and incurring sanctions risk. Legitimizing any aspect of Iranian control over the strait, with or without tolls, is unacceptable due to the precedent it sets. Iran has touted its ability to charge tolls on ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz, but it remains unclear how many vessels have paid the tolls. Lloyd’s List reported in late March 2026 that “at least” two vessels paid the toll in Yuan, but Iranian officials on April 16 noted that no tolls had been collected.[1] Iran only announced it received its first toll payment on April 23.[2] Iran also appears to be providing toll exemptions for so-called “friendly” countries, which implies that a set of state behaviors approved by Iran is sufficient to avoid tolls on vessels bound for a state’s ports. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said on March 26 that the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Russia, India, Iraq, and Pakistan were “friendly” states, and their vessels could pass through the strait.[3] Others, like Malaysia and Thailand, have separate deals that permit them to travel through the strait. Most of these states, including India, Russia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand, are not subject to fees.[4] Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi announced on May 14 that she also negotiated with Iran the safe passage of a Japanese-managed oil tanker through the strait without paying a toll.[5] Iranian regime-affiliated media reported on May 14 that at least six Chinese vessels also safely passed through the strait, although it is unclear whether they had to pay a toll.[6] All of these countries notably have relatively friendly relationships with Iran, including Japan, which has long acted as a mediator between Iran and the United States.[7] The decision by Tehran to exempt so-called ”friendly” countries suggests that Iranian officials decided to prioritize encouraging states to follow its transit protocols by lifting fees, which, by implication, confers legitimacy and recognition upon Iran’s claims of sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran is likely prioritizing the implementation of the protocol over the tolls at this time in order to present itself as a reasonable actor that is willing to “open” the strait to “free” travel without tolls.[8] Recognizing Iran’s protocol—which bars certain countries from accessing the strait and not others based on their behavior—is unacceptable because it implies that the Strait of Hormuz is sovereign Iranian territory. The PRC only explicitly opposes the toll system and Iranian “blockade,” but has not explicitly opposed Iranian claims to sovereignty, for example.[9] The Strait of Hormuz is an international waterway. Recognizing Iran’s claims to the strait now will enable it to change which countries it deems as “hostile” and bar access selectively and for any reason.[10] It is not a given, for example, that Iran would recognize the United Kingdom or France as “friendly” countries, for example, given their participation in sanctions against Iran.

Iran has continued to enforce its protocols in the Strait of Hormuz by attacking ships. United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported on May 14 that likely Iranian forces seized the Honduras-flagged Hui Chuan 38 nautical miles northeast of Fujairah, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and moved it towards Iranian territorial waters.[11] Reuters reported on May 14 that Iran likely sank an Indian cargo vessel off the coast of Oman in the Strait of Hormuz region that was traveling from Somalia to the UAE.[12] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi stated on May 14 that Iran considers the strait open for all commercial vessels but that they must “cooperate” with Iranian naval forces.[13] Allowing Iran to continue enforcing these protocols would be detrimental to US and international commercial interests, as it would mean Iran could prevent ships from traversing the strait anytime it wants.

PRC companies have been reportedly discussing arms sales routed via third-party countries with Iranian officials, but currently it is unclear to what extent PRC officials have decided to approve these sales and subsequent weapons shipments, according to New York Times reporting on May 13 that cited US officials.[14] The US officials did not specify what military equipment PRC companies were discussing with Iranian officials, but earlier reports prior to the current war suggested that Iran sought PRC shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles and anti-ship missiles.[15] The US officials noted that at least one of the proposed transit countries was in Africa.[16] The PRC has provided assets to support Iranian military capabilities in this war and in the past. The PRC sent missile fuel precursors to support Iranian missile reconstitution efforts following the June 2025 Israel-Iran War and also provided satellite imagery of US facilities in the Middle East during the current war.[17]The PRC government closely controls and approves the export of military and dual-use goods, so it is unlikely that companies in the PRC would export military equipment without clear approval from the PRC.[18] US officials have reached “different conclusions” about whether the arms have already been sent to the transit countries, though the New York Times noted that none of the PRC weapons have been used against US forces in the current war.[19]
Maritime Development

US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced on May 14 that US naval forces have redirected 70 vessels and disabled four since the US blockade began on April 13.[20]
US and Israeli Air Campaign

Nothing significant to report.
Iranian Internal Dynamics

Nothing significant to report.
Israeli Campaign Against Hezbollah and Hezbollah Response

Nothing significant to report.
Other Axis of Resistance Response

Nothing significant to report.